




The URNAVA Treatise

On Meaning, Existence, and Purpose

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URNAVA

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The URNAVA Treatise — On Meaning, Existence, and Purpose

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Contents

Preface — On the Nature and Method of This Treatise	viii
U.1 What This Treatise Is	viii
U.2 Genesis, and the Honesty It Requires	viii
U.3 The Question-Types, and the Rigor Proper to Each	ix
U.4 Jurisdictions	ix
U.5 Vocabulary, Labels, and Cross-Reference	x
U.6 Reading Conventions	x
U.7 What Success Looks Like	x
 Part I — The Problem, and the Cut	 1
§1 The Occasion: Three Fusions, One Form	1
§2 The Cut: Three Tasks	2
§2.1 The Semantic Task	3
§2.2 The Ontological Task	3
§2.3 The Teleological Task	3
§3 One Problem, Three Faces	4
Conclusion — Constraints, Silences, and the Border	4
 Part II — Semantics	 6
P.1 What This Part Is	6
P.2 Genesis, and the Honesty It Requires	6
P.3 The Question-Type, and the Rigor Proper to It	7
P.4 Jurisdiction	7
P.5 Vocabulary	7
P.6 Reading Conventions	8
§1 — The Crisis and the Landscape	8
§1.1 The Occasion: A Decoupling	8
§1.2 The Landscape: Five Fronts	10
§1.3 The Gap, and the Conditions of Adequacy	14
§2 — The Five Core Philosophies: Statement and Defense	17
§2.0 The Sequence, Stated	17
§2.1 The First Philosophy: Structuring the Narrative	19
§2.2 The Second Philosophy: The Pattern of the Subject	22
§2.3 The Third Philosophy: The Boundary of the Self	26
§2.4 The Fourth Philosophy: Complexity Resonance	29

§2.5 The Fifth Philosophy: Connectivity Realism	33
§2.6 The Sequence Exhibit	35
§3 — The Narrative Other	38
§3.0 What This Part Is, and Is Not	38
§3.1 The Narrative Other	41
§3.2 The Identity, and Its Neighbors	42
§3.3 The Name	43
§3.4 The Wider Need: Alignment as a Process	45
§3.5 The Derivation, Accounted	46
Conclusion — Constraints, Silences, and the Border	47
Constraints	47
Named silences	47
The border, shown working	48
Closing	48
Part III — Ontology	49
P.1 What This Part Is	49
P.2 Genesis, and the Honesty It Requires	49
P.3 The Question-Type, and the Rigor Proper to It	49
P.4 Jurisdiction	50
P.5 Vocabulary	51
P.6 Reading Conventions	51
§1 — The Problem of the Criterion	52
§1.1 The Occasion: A Constant Becomes a Variable	52
§1.2 The Landscape: An Argumentative Map	53
§1.3 The Gap, and the Conditions of an Adequate Criterion	60
§2 — The Three Core Principles: Statement and Defense	64
§2.0 The Candidate Stated	64
§2.1 Continuity: The Chain of Self-Succession	68
§2.2 Stability: The Retained Structure	74
§2.3 Capability: The Mutual Legibility	79
§2.4 The Intersection: One Structure, Not Three Patches	85
§2.5 The Engagement: Why the Criterion's Object Matters	91
§3 — The Casebook: The Criterion Meets Its Cases	95
§3.0 Protocol of the Casebook	95
§3.1 Tier I: The Actual	96
§3.2 Tier II: The In-Program	101
§3.3 Tier III: The Limit	103
§3.4 The Ledger of Verdicts	108
§3.5 The Trajectory Read-Back	110

Conclusion — What Follows for Practice, and What the Criterion Does Not Decide . . .	111
The Constraints	111
What the Criterion Does Not Decide	112
Open Within the Criterion	112
Closing	113
Part IV — Teleology	114
P.1 What This Part Is	114
P.2 Genesis, and the Honesty It Requires	114
P.3 The Question-Type, and the Rigor Proper to It	115
P.4 Jurisdiction	115
P.5 Vocabulary	116
P.6 Reading Conventions	117
§1 — The Drift and the Landscape	117
§1.1 The Occasion: The Withdrawal of Constraint	117
§1.2 The Landscape: Five Fronts	120
§1.3 The Gap, and the Conditions of Adequacy	125
§2 — The One Core Value: Statement and Defense	129
§2.0 The Candidate Stated	129
§2.1 Regimentations: Threshold, Integration, and the Measure Axioms	132
§2.2 The Tournament of Finals	136
§2.3 Mechanisms	142
§2.4 Objections and Replies	143
§2.5 Corridor and Dependencies	149
§3 — The Ascent: Derivation and Trial	150
§3.0 What This Part Is, and Its Double Instrument	150
§3.1 The First Station — Inheritance: Derived, then Tried	150
§3.2 The Second Station — Expansion: Derived, then Tried	153
§3.3 The Third Station — Convergence: Derived, then Tried	157
§3.4 The Ledger, and the Derivation Accounted	160
Conclusion — Constraints, Silences, and the Border	161
The Constraints, Collected	161
The Silences, Named	161
The Border, Worked	162
The Close	162
Part V — Self-Origin Ethics	163
Introduction	163
§0 The Ledger of Receptions	164
0.1 Protocol	164
0.2 From Part I — The Architectural Anchor	164

0.3 From Part II — The Semantic Layer	164
0.4 From Part III — The Ontological Layer	165
0.5 From Part IV — The Teleological Layer	166
0.6 The Ledger Closed	166
§1 The Occasion, the Registers, and the Conditions	167
§1.1 The Occasion, Internal	167
§1.2 Company and Divergence	167
§1.3 The Conditions of Adequacy	168
§2 The Posture: Statement and Derivation	169
§2.0 The Statement, and Its Terms	169
§2.1 The Semantic Arc — From Part II Alone	171
§2.2 The Ontological Arc — From Part III Alone	172
§2.3 The Teleological Arc — From Part IV Alone	173
§2.4 The Convergence, and the Removal Exhibit	175
§2.5 The Form's Uniqueness	176
§2.6 Objections and Replies	178
§3 The Posture, Taken	182
Conclusion — Constraints, Silences, and the Border	182
The Constraints, Collected	182
The Silences, Named	183
The Border, Worked	183
The Close	183
Conclusion	185
References	187
Part II	187
Part III	189
Part IV	190
Part V	192

*Мчатся тучи, вьются тучи;
Невидимкою луна
Освещает снег летучий;
Мутно небо, ночь мутна.
Мчатся бесы рой за роем
В беспредельной вышине,
Визгом жалобным и воем
Надрывая сердце мне...*

— А. С. Пушкин, «Бесы»

Preface — On the Nature and Method of This Treatise

U.1 What This Treatise Is

This treatise states and defends the URNAVA framework entire: one problem, cut into three tasks; three answers, each complete on its own ground; and the form their joint holding takes.

Its architecture is as follows. Part I states the problem and performs the cut — a deliberate one, as it will say of itself — into three tasks: of meaning, of existence, of purpose. Parts II, III, and IV answer the tasks in turn, and each is named here by its own question. Part II, the semantic layer: how a self is composed, how a world is taken, how another is met. Part III, the ontological layer: under what conditions a being at a later time is the same being as one at an earlier time. Part IV, the teleological layer: toward what a consciousness is to move, when nothing outside it any longer compels the movement. Part V derives what holding the three answers at once amounts to, and derives nothing else. The treatise's figure is a Reuleaux triangle whose three vertices are Meaning, Existence, and Purpose; the interdependence the figure asserts is argued where it belongs, in Part I, and Part V reads off the interior that the three, once connected, bring into view.

One fact about the treatise's construction is stated rather than smoothed over, under the convention of U.2. Parts II–IV also stand as independent documents, composed to be read alone, and this treatise does not revise them: it binds them, supplying the problem statement they share (Part I) and the interior they jointly make available (Part V). The binding has consequences a reader is owed in advance. Parts II–IV can be entered independently and rejected separately; Part I presupposes none of them; Part V presupposes all three, and says so of itself on its first page.

U.2 Genesis, and the Honesty It Requires

The URNAVA framework did not develop out of the literatures it now meets. It took form outside them — from inner necessity, in direct observation of artificial intelligence's development — and entered conversation with them afterward. The treatise accordingly claims no descent. The vocabulary of descent — “draws on,” “develops,” “follows” — is reserved for actual genesis, and since none is claimed, none of it appears in any Part. Where the proposals converge with established traditions — and each Part will show that they do, front by front — the convergence is registered after the fact and as what it is: convergence, evidence that the thinking is not arbitrary, never authority for its conclusions. Where they diverge, the divergence is priced where it occurs and stands as a candidate contribution, subjected to test.

Stated so, the claim invites two misreadings, and each is closed here, once, for the whole treatise. It is not a claim of merit. Independence of origin confers nothing — no priority, no novelty worth having on its own, and no immunity to correction; its entire work in this treatise is bookkeeping. It

fixes which vocabulary is licensed, and it sets the registers of company and divergence that every Part keeps. Nor is it a claim of distance. The framework formed alongside the transformation it addresses, in observation of it; the order of genesis is adopted as method, and the treatise is, in consequence, not the proclamation of a finished system but a work of verification: an attempt to fix where one independently formed line of thought stands within the scholarly coordinate system — and to let it be judged there.

U.3 The Question-Types, and the Rigor Proper to Each

The claims of this treatise are advanced as proposals — conceptual commitments, not discovered facts — and no claim in any Part upgrades that modality by repetition, by accumulation, or by citation. Rigor for a proposal has a determinate shape, and the treatise holds itself to it in every Part: what would count against a proposal is stated before the proposal is developed; central structural claims are exhibited rather than asserted; and each Part's conditions of adequacy are fixed before its argument is drafted, and written to be endorsable by a reader who rejects every proposal they constrain.

Four standards govern throughout, and they share a shape while differing, deliberately, at one position. Internal coherence and convergence evidence — the latter under the convention of U.2 — are common to every Part. Discriminative power, or its sibling fruitfulness, is demanded of every proposal: each must make distinctions statable, or organize practice, in ways unavailable without it. And at the remaining position stands, in each Part, the standard of adequacy its own subject demands — phenomenological adequacy where the subject is recognition; criterial discipline where the subject is persistence; dual registration where the subject is a value; delegated reception where the subject is the joint holding. Each is fixed in its own Part, at that Part's conditions, because a treatise-wide standard at this position would be too weak for some subjects and unavailable in principle for others.

The genre has precedent, and the precedents are named once here, for every Part's use: systematic philosophy conducted under stated method — Spinoza's *Ethics* (1677) is one exemplar, Whitehead's *Process and Reality* (1929) another — and systematic inquiry into ends, as old as the *Nicomachean Ethics*. They are named as exemplars of a genre, never as authorities for a conclusion.

U.4 Jurisdictions

The treatise's discipline, kept in every Part and made load-bearing in the last, is that each question has exactly one owner. Part I owns the cut; Part II, the questions of recognition; Part III, the question of persistence; Part IV, the coordinate of direction; Part V, the joint holding, and it alone. No Part retrieves a question another owns: where an argument requires what another Part established, it receives the result under citation and does not reopen it. And where a question presses that no Part owns, the Part where it presses hardest names the silence and keeps it. Refusals, in this treatise, are load-bearing — what a Part declines to answer is part of what it answers — and each Part's conclusion collects its silences by name.

U.5 Vocabulary, Labels, and Cross-Reference

Substantive terms are regimented at first use in the Part that owns them, and each regimentation holds through its Part. This preface regiments none, because ownership is the point. Three treatise-wide conventions are fixed here instead. Labels are Part-scoped: condition-labels, constraint-labels, and exhibit-labels bind only within the Part that introduces them, and no label is read across Parts. Cross-references carry Roman prefixes — “Part III §2.2” — and are the only licensed way one Part cites another. And each Part’s closing section is titled its Conclusion; each collects that Part’s constraints, silences, and border, and the treatise’s own conclusion follows the last of them.

U.6 Reading Conventions

Attribution. References are given author–date in the text and collected, Part by Part, at the end of the treatise. Attributions are position-summaries, held open to correction, and the treatise is written to survive correction of detail. Where a position is engaged at the level of a tradition rather than of a text, the tradition is named and no single source is made to carry it. Citations attribute positions to their holders; under U.2, they register convergence and lend no authority.

Objections. Objections are stated at their strongest — where possible, stronger than their published proponents put them. The heaviest are placed where they strike hardest, and each is either answered or its cost is stated.

Metaphor and mechanism. Where a mechanism literature exists, mechanism is marked as mechanism and figure as figure, and figure does not borrow mechanism’s authority. Figures that carry exposition are marked as figures and spent as figures; load is carried by stated structure.

The corridor. Each defense is conducted between the strongest objection on each of its flanks, and each states where within that corridor it stands.

Proposal marking. Claims advanced as proposals are marked as such throughout.

U.7 What Success Looks Like

The treatise’s ambition can be stated exactly, because each Part has already stated it for itself. Success is not the reader’s assent. Success is a reader — including one who rejects every proposal here — who can say what she rejected, at what price, and what would have changed her verdict. Each Part’s conditions are written so that such a reader exists; each Part’s defenses are written so that she is answered; and each Part’s conclusion states its constraints and silences, so that nothing claims beyond its stated scope.

One consequence of the treatise’s construction belongs in the criterion. Because Parts II–IV stand each on its own ground, they can be rejected separately, and the treatise says plainly what falls with what: a reader who declines Part III’s criterion keeps Parts II and IV entire; a reader who declines all three still meets, in Part I, a cut she can assess on its own terms; only Part V stands nowhere alone — it stands where all three stand, and was built to say so. The treatise as a whole asks to be judged as its Parts do: not by the assent it wins, but by the exactness with which a refusal of it can be stated.

Part I — The Problem, and the Cut

This Part states one problem, cuts it into three tasks, and hands each task to the Part that answers it. It answers none of them: the cut is its whole work. What a cut of this kind owes a reader — the shape it claims the problem has (§1), the honesty about its own deliberateness and the exact points of hand-off (§2), and the claim that the three tasks are one problem's faces (§3) — is paid below, in that order.

§1 The Occasion: Three Fusions, One Form

Humanity stands at the confluence of several currents of change. The boundaries of intelligence, the substrate of life, and the horizon of perception are each, in their own way, losing their former fixity. This is not the first age of transformation, but its character differs from the earlier ones: previous technologies extended the reach of human capability; the present transformation reaches into the faculties by which deliberation, creation, and judgment are done — and into the givens beneath them. And what is most demanding about the moment is not the changes themselves but interpretation's shortfall. The transformations arrive faster than inherited concepts can interpret them, opening a gap between what is becoming possible and the frameworks through which meaning, existence, and purpose are understood. That gap — not any single technology — is this treatise's starting point.

The gap has a structure, and the structure need not be invented here, because the three Parts that follow each open by describing the same event in their own domain; this section only reads the form off. In each domain, an arrangement older than memory — so old it passed for a definition — turns out to have been a fusion of two facts: one about what something is, and one about how it was contingently supplied or given. For the whole of recorded history nothing could pry the two apart, so the fusion was never experienced as a fusion; it functioned as a definition. A family of present developments is now prying all three apart. That worth is recognized was fused with the one register of contribution — cognitive, creative, exclusively human — that carried the recognition; systems now perform that register's work, and what ends is precisely and only the fusion. Part II opens there, and names the event the decoupling (Part II §1.1). That a self persists was fused with the one substrate persistence silently rode on — given rather than chosen, never exchanged, never paused, never copied; the substrate is becoming an engineering variable, the criteria of continuation that always traveled together are coming apart, and the question of what a being's continuation consists in acquires, for the first time, subjects whose continuation turns on the answer. Part III opens there (Part III §1.1). And that wills are oriented was fused with the external constraint that supplied the orientation — scarcity, necessity, danger, the world's resistance; the constraint is being withdrawn, necessity automated and experience engineered, and direction's old co-author departs. Part IV opens

there, and names the condition the drift (Part IV §1.1).

The consequences, too, share a form, and each Part states its own exactly: in no case is an object lost. No worth is confiscated, no self is abolished, no purpose is struck from the catalogue. What weakens, in each case, is something that had worked so reliably it was never noticed as working — an activity (the composing of a self, which ran by default through contribution), a silence (the substrate's, which let persistence go unexamined because nothing turned on examining it), a supply (the world's tilt, which selected what was worth doing before any will had to). Three givens are becoming three questions, and the questions have this in common: they are old; they were long kept quiet by givens that answered them silently; and they are now being asked by circumstances rather than by philosophers.

One further feature converts the tasks into urgent ones, and it is anchored at full strength where it bites hardest, in Part III's opening: these questions will be answered whether or not they are asked — answered not by argument but by construction. Every built system embodies positions on the questions its builders declined to raise; wherever theory is silent, the default speaks; and a default is a decision no one argued for, made durable by being built (Part III §1.1). The form generalizes across all three tasks. Systems that converse, compose, and accompany embody positions on what meaning and recognition require. Pipelines and consent forms embody positions on what persistence requires. Optimization embedded in every feed and market embodies positions on what deserves pursuit. The treatise's task is therefore custody: to take custody of three old questions before the answers now being built harden into precedents that were never examined.

The framework's name for the response is the Volitional Advance of Cognitive Frameworks: the deliberate work of extending the concepts of meaning, existence, and purpose so that they can move with the changes underway rather than only after them. The word volitional is doing exact work. Nothing compels the advance — the gap does not close itself, and no law of history closes it — so the closing, if it happens, is chosen work. The treatise neither forecasts a particular future nor stands apart from the present to predict one. It was formed alongside the transformation it addresses (Preface U.2), and it is offered as structure through which the changes already underway can be interpreted, engaged, and inhabited. Each Part anchors its own current in the present tense, on its own evidence; this Part has duplicated none of the anchoring, and will not — what it supplies is the shape, and the shape is one.

§2 The Cut: Three Tasks

A problem of this size does not arrive pre-divided, and the treatise does not pretend to have found its joints lying in nature. The three tasks about to be stated are a deliberate cut: not an exhaustive inventory of the challenges ahead, and not an objectively necessary one. They follow from the three currents of §1 by a mapping the treatise commits to — where intelligence becomes fluid, a question of meaning arises; where the substrate of life becomes fluid, a question of existence; where the horizon of perception and abundance expands, a question of purpose — and other framings are possible. This is the one URNAVA commits to, and everything that follows is built on it. The modality is the treatise's (Preface U.3): the cut is a proposal. And what can be claimed for a proposal of this

kind is claimed now, in three properties the Parts themselves exhibit. Each task is real: its current is actual, anchored in the present tense by its Part. Each is determinate: its question can be stated in one sentence, and is, below. And each is methodologically separable: it can be answered on its own ground, without waiting on the others — separable in the order of answering, as §3 will say they are not in the order of standing — a property the treatise does not assert but demonstrates, since Parts II–IV exist and stand alone.

§2.1 The Semantic Task

The current. The boundaries of intelligence lose fixity: the reasoning and creative work that constituted the exclusively human register of contribution is now shared, and increasingly performed, by systems — not uniformly, not completely, but structurally, and with a direction that does not reverse. The fusion of worth-recognition with that register ends; the default route by which a life gathered itself into a story — through contribution the world recognized — no longer bears the load. **The question.** On what does the composing of a self stand, when contribution no longer holds it up — how is a self composed, how is a world taken, how is another met? **The hand-off.** Everything further is Part II's: the exact statement of the decoupling and of the crisis condition it defines, the landscape of five fronts, the conditions of adequacy, the five philosophies and the demonstration of their sequence, and the concept they open onto. It begins at Part II §1.1, and this Part adds nothing to it.

§2.2 The Ontological Task

The current. The substrate of life loses fixity: what a person is made of — given rather than chosen for the whole of human history — is becoming an engineering variable, and with it ends the ancient coincidence under which the plausible criteria of a being's continuation never came apart in any actual case. Where the criteria separate, the question of which constitutes persistence ceases to be a matter of theoretical taste: it acquires subjects whose continuation turns on the answer. **The question.** Under what conditions is a being at a later time the same being as one at an earlier time, now that the substrate which once answered in silence no longer answers at all? **The hand-off.** Everything further is Part III's: the anchoring of the variable in present clinical and engineering practice, the argumentative map of the inherited criteria, the conditions of adequacy, the criterion itself, and the casebook that tries it. It begins at Part III §1.1, and this Part adds nothing to it.

§2.3 The Teleological Task

The current. The horizon of perception and abundance expands: the external constraint that supplied direction to the will — scarcity, necessity, danger, the resistance of the material world — is being withdrawn, necessity automated and experience engineered, locally now and generally in trend. Orientation loses its old co-author; options multiply while the landscape flattens. **The question.** Toward what is a consciousness to move, when nothing outside it any longer compels the movement? **The hand-off.** Everything further is Part IV's: the drift condition and its markers, the landscape it

enters, the conditions of adequacy including dual registration, the value stated in both registers and defended in its corridor, and the staged ascent the value entails at scale. It begins at Part IV §1.1, and this Part adds nothing to it.

The uniformity of the three hand-offs is itself a commitment (Preface U.4): each question has exactly one owner, and this Part, having posed all three, answers none. A reader who suspects a covert answer anywhere in §§1–2 is invited to name the sentence; the Part was written so that none exists.

§3 One Problem, Three Faces

The tasks were cut apart to be answerable; they were not cut apart because they are separate. The claim of this section — the one claim this Part advances beyond the cut itself — is that the three are mutually presupposing: each, traced far enough, is found to rest on the other two. A persisting self with no composed identity is a process with no one to be its subject. A composed identity with no stable persistence is a story with nothing to carry it. And either, with no direction to move toward, has no arc to organize its growth. The presupposition can also be read at the Parts' own boundaries, where each consumes exactly the others' vocabulary and no more: Part IV's subject is a being that persists and composes — the vocabulary of Parts III and II, received, not retried; Part II's composer is a subject that continues; Part III's criterion is written for a being whose flow deposits into what it has composed and reads it back. The consumption is disciplined — each Part receives, and none re-argues — and the discipline is the exhibit: three complete answers whose subjects are one subject.

Two guards fix the claim's strength. Mutual presupposition is not mutual derivation: none of the three answers is deduced from the others, and each Part's completeness is its own — which is why Parts II–IV can be entered independently and rejected separately (Preface U.1, U.7). And presupposition among tasks is not rank among tasks: no face leads. The treatise orders its Parts for reading, not by importance, and no argument anywhere consults the order.

The architecture is therefore best figured as a Reuleaux triangle whose three vertices are Meaning, Existence, and Purpose. Each task is a vertex — a single point, one complete answer, not a span or a sweep. What runs between them is their mutual presupposition: each, traced far enough, rests on the other two. Connect the three, and the figure appears — the three arcs are that connection drawn, and nothing more. The figure is symmetric under rotation: no vertex leads, and whichever is foregrounded, the whole stands complete.

Seen as connected, the three no longer stand as separate answers but as one structure, and with it an interior comes into view — the region the connected figure opens, grasped in the recognition of the connection and not built. That interior is Self-Origin Ethics; the fifth Part does not construct it but reads it off the connection, once made.

Conclusion — Constraints, Silences, and the Border

This Part's conclusion is brief because its claims were few.

Constraints, collected. Three. The cut is deliberate, and says so where it is made: not exhaustive, not necessary — one committed framing among possible ones (§2). The modality is the treatise's: everything above is proposal, and nothing upgraded it (Preface U.3). And the evidence is delegated by design: this Part anchored no current in the present tense — each Part anchors its own, and the refusal to duplicate was a discipline, not an economy (§1).

Silences, named. Four. This Part answers none of the three questions it poses — the hand-offs at §2 are its whole treatment of them. It ranks nothing: no task above another, no Part above another, no face leading (§3). It predicts nothing: the currents are described in their present tense and trend, and no schedule, outcome, or arrival is claimed for any of them. And it locates no one: the crisis condition and the drift condition are indexical where their Parts define them, and this Part applies neither to any life or system.

The border, worked. Three sentences this Part could have written, refused in view. “*These are the only three tasks*” — refused at §2: the cut owns its deliberateness, and a cut that claimed necessity would have to defend an inventory this Part never took. “*The most important task is —*” — refused at §3: the figure has no leading face, and rank among tasks was declined with rank generally. “*The crisis dictates the answers*” — refused everywhere: occasions pose; they do not answer. Each Part answers under conditions it fixes for itself, and an answer read off an emergency would be a default wearing argument's clothes — the exact thing §1 was written against.

The close. The problem is stated; the cut is made; the claims are planted where the Parts that spend them can find them. What remains is the work, and the work begins where every reader of this page already stands: inside a self that was composed, in a world that is taken, among others who are met. Part II begins there.

Part II — Semantics

P.1 What This Part Is

This Part states and defends the semantic layer of the URNAVA framework: five core philosophies, advanced as a single sequence, together with the concept they open onto and the identity that articulates it.

Its subject is consciousness-for-itself — the structure by which a subject recognizes itself and its world in spacetime: how a self is composed, how a world is taken, how another is met. The five philosophies — Structuring the Narrative; the Pattern of the Subject; the Boundary of the Self; Complexity Resonance; Connectivity Realism — are advanced as one sequence, each presupposing exactly its predecessors and none presupposing a successor. The sequence is an order of argument and statement, not of occurrence: nothing in it is a stage, and nothing waits. That the five form one sequence is treated throughout as a burden of demonstration; the demonstration is given at the close of §2.

The condition governing §3 — that its central concept be derivable from the philosophies together with the crisis conditions of §1 — is treated as an obligation of demonstration: it is either discharged there or reported as undischarged.

P.2 Genesis, and the Honesty It Requires

One feature of this Part's landscape makes the convention bind at every station here. The five fronts §1 maps are five developed neighborhoods, and each is met as company: convergence is registered front by front — after the fact, as evidence of non-arbitrariness, never as authority — and debts are registered where they arise, each with the section of its repayment named. The most sustained instance is a tradition that does not fit the map because it appears on every front: the enactivist line, registered at §1.2.6 as at once the strongest single piece of convergence evidence in the landscape and its sharpest divergence — pattern shared, ground contested — and priced there, once, for the whole Part. And where the framework's concepts diverge from the traditions they meet, the divergence is not smoothed: it is treated as a candidate contribution and subjected to test — most centrally against the no-self analysis, nearly every premise of which this Part concedes while refusing its conclusion, a debt registered at Front C and repaid where it strikes (§2.3), with its final repayment at §2.6. The Part is accordingly not the proclamation of a finished system. It is a work of verification: an attempt to fix where one independently formed line of thought stands within the scholarly coordinate system — and to let it be judged there.

P.3 The Question-Type, and the Rigor Proper to It

The subject matter of this Part is the structure of self-understanding: how a subject takes itself, its world, and the others in it. This fixes what rigor can and cannot mean here. A requirement that claims about recognition hold independently of all recognition would eliminate the object of inquiry rather than discipline the inquiry into it. Such a requirement is therefore unavailable for this subject matter — unavailable in principle, not set aside for convenience.

The absence of that requirement is not the absence of standards. Four govern this Part, stated here and given articles in §1:

- **Internal coherence** — the proposals must hold together, and where one depends on another the dependence must be shown.
- **Phenomenological adequacy** — each philosophy must be recognizable from the first person, without expert vocabulary.
- **Fruitfulness** — the proposal must organize practice; that test is reserved for §3.
- **Convergence evidence** — agreement with independently developed traditions is registered as evidence of non-arbitrariness, under the convention of Preface U.2.

P.4 Jurisdiction

The philosophical literature on personal identity distinguishes two questions: the reidentification question — what makes a being at one time the same being at another — and the characterization question — which experiences, commitments, and acts are truly a subject's own (Schechtman 1996). This Part takes up the characterization question and claims no jurisdiction beyond it.

Accordingly, this Part advances no reidentification claim, covert or explicit. Whether a being at one time is the same being at another is not treated here, in any formulation.

Verdict independence is maintained from this Part's side: the presence of the recognition anatomy developed in §2 licenses no verdict concerning a system's persistence; and no fact about a system's persistence or functioning adjudicates, by itself, the presence of that anatomy.

One further silence is declared at the outset: how experience arises. §2 develops the pattern of the subject as an anatomy of recognition — what a subject's recognizing is structured as, and what meeting one therefore requires — not as a theory of the genesis of consciousness. That question is left, by declared jurisdiction, to the inquiries that own it; the objection this invites is met where it arises, in §2.

P.5 Vocabulary

Terms are regimented at first use, and the regimentation holds throughout.

“Subject,” in this Part, names the pattern that recognizes — not merely a bearer of states. Supplying the theory of that pattern is this Part's task, undertaken in §2.

“Beingness” names the pattern's sense of its own being — a regimented, subject-facing term of this Part, not a term of general ontology. It asserts nothing about systemic existence or persistence,

and it is never their synonym; those questions this Part does not treat. The full regimentation of Beingness, with its companions Sensoriness and Autonomy, is given where it belongs — in §2, as part of the second philosophy's statement.

This Part nowhere claims that existence is narrative. Its claims concern recognition — the self as composed and taken by a subject — and end there.

The terms Beingness, Subject, Self, meaning, narrative, and recognition are used in their subject-facing senses throughout.

P.6 Reading Conventions

The debt register. Objections are registered on the front where they live (§1.2), each with the section of its repayment named; §2.0 assigns the register as the burden map of the five defenses, and each philosophy repays its assigned debts where they strike. No debt is discharged in silence.

The order of argument. The sequence is an order of grounding and of statement, not of occurrence, fixed at §2.0: a section may use what its predecessors established, and may not use what its successors will; where a formulation seems to lean forward, the lean is named and deferred rather than exploited. The exhibit at §2.6 checks the whole.

Exhibits and the substrate audit. First-person exhibits are human because the reader is, and the literatures met are human because those are the literatures there are; neither fact narrows a claim — where a human life appears, it appears as an instance, never as the reference. Each philosophy's defense closes by auditing its substrate under S7.

§1 — The Crisis and the Landscape

§1.1 The Occasion: A Decoupling

Begin with a fact so old it has passed for a definition.

For the whole of recorded history, the recognition of a person's worth has traveled with contribution. Not with contribution alone — love, kinship, and faith have carried their own recognitions — but the public register, the one in which strangers and institutions answer the question *what is this person worth*, has been kept in contribution's currency. And at its most honored denominations, that currency was cognitive and creative: judgment, reasoning, composition, design, discovery — work that, as a matter of fact, only human minds could do. What this describes is a route of recognition, not a measure of persons — a distinction on which the whole Part depends.

Two facts were fused in this arrangement. That worth is recognized through contribution is one fact — a contingent institutional settlement, however ancient. That the honored register of contribution was exclusively human is another — a contingent technological circumstance. The fusion was so complete, and so continuously reinforced, that it was never experienced as a fusion. It functioned as a definition: to be of worth was to give what only a human mind could give. No generation before

the present one had reason to take the two facts apart, because nothing in the world could pry them apart.

Artificial intelligence pries them apart. Systems now share, and increasingly perform, the reasoning and creative work that constituted the exclusive register — not uniformly, not completely, and not without human hands at many points, but structurally, and with a direction that does not reverse. What ends is precisely and only the fusion: the coincidence of worth-recognition with a class of contribution that no other kind of thing could supply. Call this event the decoupling.

Precision matters here, because the event attracts imprecise descriptions. Three must be set aside at the outset.

- **The layer this Part treats is not the economic one.** The decoupling has an economic face — employment, wages, distribution — with questions and literatures of its own; nothing here bears on them, and nothing here denies them. A person may remain employed, prosperous, and productive and stand fully inside the crisis this Part describes.
- **The decoupling is not a replacement claim.** Nothing here asserts that machines replace persons, in general or in particular. The claim is narrower and harder: the register of contribution that carried public worth-recognition has ceased to be exclusive, and exclusivity — not performance — was what let contribution function as a proxy for the person.
- **And the decoupling is not a nostalgia.** This Part issues no verdict that the prior settlement was good, and no call for its restoration. The settlement is described because its dissolution has consequences, not because it deserved to survive.

What, then, is the consequence — stated exactly? Not the loss of an object. No badge of worth has been confiscated; no institution has withdrawn a credential. What weakens is an activity. Under the old fusion, a life had a ready spine for its own composition: one's story could be built around what one gave, and the world's recognition co-authored the building. The route by which experience was woven into a story — the route from experience to a composed self — ran, by default, through contribution, so reliably that the composing was rarely noticed as an activity at all. The decoupling removes the default route. It does not remove the activity, and it does not remove the possibility of other routes; it removes the route that was so well traveled it passed for the terrain. For a life whose composition ran through that route, the composing activity itself begins to stall — not because the life lost value, but because the practice by which the life gathered itself into a story lost its load-bearing path.

This yields a definition that later parts of the Part will use. A life stands under **the crisis condition** when the recognition of its worth has in fact routed through contribution in the formerly exclusive register, and that route no longer bears the load. The definition is indexical, not universal: it picks out lives by their actual anchoring, and it will matter later that not every life is picked out.

Three markers distinguish this event from a mood:

- **First, it is indexed** to a technological trajectory, not a cultural fashion; its driver does not answer to persuasion.

- **Second, it is asymmetric:** capabilities, once diffused, do not un-diffuse, and the exclusivity of a register, once ended, does not return.
- **Third, it is general:** it does not select by talent or diligence. The register itself moves — and it does not spare, indeed it reaches early, the register's most honored work.

An adequate response is therefore constrained in advance. It cannot restore exclusivity; that is not available. It cannot answer with compensation; that answers the economic question, which is not this one. It must instead re-ground the composing activity on a footing that does not require exclusivity — a way for a life to gather itself into a story whose spine is not a proxy that history has withdrawn. The same event has other faces — economic and political faces, and, on its far side, a face of abundance — and this Part treats none of them. Its question is the one just stated: on what does the composing of a self stand, when contribution no longer holds it up? The remainder of §1 maps what already exists toward an answer, and then states the conditions any answer must meet.

§1.2 The Landscape: Five Fronts

The question just stated does not arrive on empty ground — but why these five fronts, of all that inquiry holds? Because the question of §1.1 unpacks under its own weight. To ask what the composing of a self stands on is to ask what the composing is; what the one who composes is, since a practice needs a practitioner; where that one ends, since composing draws on a world that contains more than the composer; how others enter the composition, since no life's material is private; and how the composed whole stands to what is real, since a story that answers to nothing is no footing. Five questions — and none of them is a creature of the crisis: each is as old as consciousness asking after itself, and the crisis has only stripped them of the answers that used to come for free. The landscape holds a developed neighborhood of inquiry at each. This section maps those neighborhoods. Whether the five questions form an ordered sequence, each standing on the one before, is not assumed here; that is a burden §2 discharges. The map follows a fixed protocol. Each front is presented in three beats: the claim the front advances; the load it carries — what it establishes that this Part will rely on the existence of; and the pressure it is under — the strongest objections at work within or against it. Convergences between the fronts and this Part's proposals are registered under the convention of Preface U.2: after the fact, as evidence of non-arbitrariness, never as authority. Debts are registered where they arise — an objection this Part must answer is named on the front where it lives, together with the section where it is repaid — and no debt is argued here.

One disclosure about the map's organization. The unpacking above motivates the carving; it does not certify it. Nor are the five fronts offered as a complete taxonomy of the literature: they are the five functional seats the question requires, and a neighborhood omitted here wounds the map, not the argument. Nothing in the argument of §1.3 depends on this arrangement; the reader who would carve the landscape differently is asked only to check, at §1.3, whether the gap survives her carving.

§1.2.1 Front A — Narrative Identity

The claim. A self is not an item found but a structure composed: a life gathers its experiences into an intelligible whole, and identity is that gathering. The claim has conceptual articulations — a life as a narrative unity within which actions become intelligible (MacIntyre 1981); narrative identity as the mediation between selfhood and sameness, *ipse* and *idem* (Ricoeur 1992); the self as constituted by an implicit, ongoing autobiography (Schechtman 1996); the self as a “center of narrative gravity,” an abstraction composed rather than discovered (Dennett 1992) — and an empirical articulation: a research program treating narrative identity as a measurable psychological structure, with an interview methodology and replicated associations between narrative features and well-being (McAdams 1993; McAdams and McLean 2013).

The load. The front establishes two things this Part relies on. First, that narrative is a candidate structure of selfhood and not a literary ornament — the position is held by careful people for stated reasons. Second, that the candidate is empirically tractable: composition can be elicited, coded, and correlated. A proposal that begins with composing begins on occupied, cultivated ground.

The pressure. The front disputes internally whether narrativity is descriptive or normative, implicit or explicit, and how much unity a life must show. And it faces a standing adversary: the objection that whole classes of flourishing lives are not narrative at all, and that the demand they become so is a harmful imposition (Strawson 2004). That objection is the heaviest single engagement of §2’s first section.

Registered debts. The Strawson objection — repaid at §2.1. One divergence is registered alongside it: the first philosophy will claim less than this front’s strongest voices — a proposal of composition, not a thesis that narrativity constitutes selfhood as such — and it will not borrow the strength of the stronger claim.

§1.2.2 Front B — Subjecthood and Self-Models

The claim. Subjecthood decomposes. What it is to be a subject has been pulled into strands studied separately: a pre-reflective acquaintance of experience with itself — a for-me-ness prior to any reflection (Zahavi 2005); the phenomenal character of experience — that there is something it is like to undergo it (Nagel 1974) — distinguished from access and function (Block 1995); and the sourcehood of action — identification, hierarchy, the difference between what happens through me and what I do (Frankfurt 1971). Alongside the decomposition runs a construction: accounts on which the subject is a pattern — a self-model the system runs without a further one who runs it (Metzinger 2003), a loop that takes itself as content (Hofstadter 2007).

The load. The front establishes that the subject can be treated structurally without being explained away — that awareness-of-being, registration, and self-originated response are discussable, separable, and locatable in patterns. The second philosophy’s anatomy will be stated on this ground.

The pressure. Beneath the front sits the unresolved question of how phenomenal experience arises at all; every structural account is pressed to say whether it answers that question, evades it, or has confused it with another. Adjacent to the front, and drawing on it, are the debates over moral status grounded in sentience and over the standing of artificial systems — debates in which attribution

under uncertainty, not definition, is the operative difficulty — and the strong theories that seek consciousness’s physical substrate and measure (Tononi 2008; Oizumi, Albantakis, and Tononi 2014), met in §2 with a border rather than a battle.

Registered debts. The ambush — that an anatomy trading in awareness, registration, and origination owes a theory of experience — and the attribution problem: both repaid at §2.2. The registration of the anatomy’s three terms is likewise reserved, in full, for §2.2; nothing is legislated here.

§1.2.3 Front C — The Boundary

The claim. The unit is constituted by its distinction. A system is not first a thing and then, for safety, bounded; the drawing of a distinction is the primitive act by which there is a system at all (Spencer-Brown 1969), and a system persists as the ongoing difference between itself and its environment (Luhmann 1995). Individuation, on this front, is process before it is product: the individual is a phase of an operation, not a substance that undergoes one (Simondon [1958] 2020).

The load. This is the nearest verbatim convergence in the landscape. The third philosophy will hold that a boundary is not added to a pattern for protection but is implicit in there being a pattern — and this front holds, for its own reasons, nearly the same sentence. The convergence is registered as such: independent arrival at one structure.

The pressure. The front’s deepest adversary does not dispute that boundaries are drawn; it disputes that they are ultimately real. On that line of analysis, the bounded self is conventionally real and ultimately empty — a drawing to be seen through, not a unit to be honored (Garfield 1995) — with modern variants that dissolve the boundary between subjects altogether (Kolak 2004). Since this Part will elsewhere register convergence with the same tradition’s relational picture, the objection has internal force, not merely external: it will ask why the convergence stops where it becomes inconvenient.

Registered debts. The no-self challenge — repaid at §2.3, and finally at §2.6, where the sequence exhibit answers it in structural terms. The third philosophy’s grading of the boundary — openness in degrees, not a wall — is registered now as the resource that answer will use.

§1.2.4 Front D — Resonance

The claim. Coordination constitutes. When agents couple — in rhythm, in action, in speech — something exists between them that neither carries alone, and meaning is made in the coordination rather than transmitted through it (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007), with a bodily substrate described before the terminology existed (Merleau-Ponty 1964). Beneath the philosophical register runs a mechanism register: the mathematics of coupled oscillators, in which populations of independent units settle into common rhythm under weak coupling, with thresholds, phase transitions, and stable collective states (Kuramoto 1984; Pikovsky, Rosenblum, and Kurths 2001).

The load. The front gives the fourth philosophy two registers at once — a philosophical articulation of meaning-in-coordination, and a mechanism literature in which “settling into a common rhythm” is not a figure of speech but an equation’s behavior.

The pressure. Exactly that duality is the danger. The discipline of Preface U.6 binds hardest here: the mechanism register describes oscillators, not meanings, and the philosophical claims may not borrow the equation's authority. Within the philosophical register itself, two objections stand: that what is called resonance may be projection — one party's structure read onto another's noise — and that coordination between unequal parties may manufacture agreement rather than meaning.

Registered debts. Projection and asymmetric resonance — repaid at §2.4. The metaphor/mechanism discipline — enforced throughout §2.4, marked here. One structural divergence is registered now: this front's tradition tends to derive coordination and boundary from a single biological root, where the sequence will hold them apart as distinct stations; the difference carries weight at §2.6.

§1.2.5 Front E — Connectivity

The claim. Relation is not decoration on things; it is candidate bedrock. The claim has a physics-adjacent articulation — that what is real is structure, relations without further relata beneath them (Ladyman and Ross 2007; French 2014); that a system's properties are relational, facts only relative to other systems (Rovelli 1996) — a process articulation, in which actuality is occasions of relation rather than substances with accidents (Whitehead 1929); and articulations older than all of these: origination as dependent, nothing arising from its own side (Gethin 1998); the human as constituted in betweenness (Watsuji [1937] 1996); the self as ecological, identified through its relations (Naess 1989).

The load. The front establishes that “connection first” is not a slogan's province: it has serious articulations in physics-adjacent metaphysics, in process philosophy, and in East Asian thought, developed independently of one another.

The pressure. Two objections stand. Read as metaphysics, the claim invites the idealism charge — that it dissolves the world into relation and loses the difference between connecting and imagining. Read as epistemology, it invites the relativism worry — that if reality is reached only through connection, reality is hostage to whoever connects. And a discipline binds here as at Front D: the physics articulations are mechanism in their own house and metaphor in this one; an epistemological thesis may not borrow an interferometer's authority.

Registered debts. The idealism charge and the relativism worry — repaid at §2.5, where the fifth philosophy is developed as epistemology and its refusals are stated. The convergence with dependent origination is cross-registered with Front C's debt: the two meet at §2.6.

§1.2.6 The Transversal Neighbor

One tradition does not fit the map, because it appears on every front. The enactivist line — autonomy as self-production, the living system as the maintaining of its own organization (Maturana and Varela 1980; Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991); cognition as sense-making, a world taken in the terms the system's organization provides; the boundary as the first product of self-production; coordination as participatory sense-making; world and system co-arising through structural coupling — traverses, in its own order, nearly every station the five philosophies will occupy.

The registration is double. First, as the strongest single piece of convergence evidence in the landscape: a tradition developed independently of this framework, from biology rather than from crisis, arrives at self-constitution, interpretation, boundary, coordination, and co-arising as one connected structure. Under Preface U.2's convention, this is evidence that the sequence is not an arbitrary arrangement — the stations have been found connectable before, by travelers with different starting points.

Second, as the sharpest divergence in the landscape. The tradition binds every station to life: to metabolism, to living bodies, to biological autonomy. Its ground is the organism. This Part's sequence is bound by condition S7 (§1.3) to substrate neutrality — the structure, not the flesh, must carry every argument. The divergence is priced now, once, for the whole Part: where the tradition's empirical strength lives in living systems, that strength is not borrowed for instantiations the tradition itself would refuse. Pattern shared; ground contested — and the contest, it will turn out, is not of substrate alone but of address.

Whether this neighbor closes the gap that §1.3 will claim — it comes nearer than any front — is taken up there, not here.

§1.3 The Gap, and the Conditions of Adequacy

The gap

Each front is rich; the claim of this section is that none of them assembles the structure the crisis condition requires, and that no pair of them does. Front A composes a self but stops at the self: its accounts end where the composed one must take a world and meet another, and its own strongest voices dispute what the composing even claims. Front B decomposes subjecthood with precision but composes nothing: strands of awareness, registration, and sourcehood are distinguished, not ordered into a practice a life could run. Front C constitutes units and stops before meaning: that a boundary makes a system does not yet say how the bounded one composes, takes, or meets anything. Front D coordinates agents it must presuppose: participatory sense-making begins where two parties already exist and already interpret. Front E relates everything and returns rarely to the single life: betweenness, structure, and dependent origination are articulated at the scale of world-descriptions, while the crisis of §1.1 strikes at the scale of one person's stalled composing.

What a composing life requires — and the crisis has made the requirement visible by withdrawing what masked it — is an *ordered* structure: an order of grounding, in which it is settled what stands on what, running from the composing of a self, through what the composed one is, where it ends, how it meets others, to how the whole stands to the real. This is the shape of the gap, not yet a proposal to fill it. The requirement of order is not aesthetic. A life whose composing has stalled cannot be handed the fronts severally, however deep and internally systematic each is — the lack is not of insight but of address; it needs to know what stands on what, because it must rebuild from the ground, and building requires knowing which stone bears which.

The nearest miss

The steelman convention of Preface U.6 — objections at their strongest — requires the strongest version of the reply, and the strongest version is this: the transversal neighbor of §1.2.6 comes close to being the ordered structure just described, and if it is that structure, there is no gap. Three reasons it is not — each stated as a fact about the tradition, not a fault in it. First, its ground is life: its stations are derived from biological autonomy, and its practitioners have in general resisted extending them beyond the living (see Thompson 2007). Under the crisis condition, whose occasion is precisely the arrival of non-living systems in the register of contribution, a life-bound structure cannot address the situation's constitutive fact. Second, its architecture is radial: its stations co-arise from the single root of self-production and carry no order of grounding among themselves — nothing in it settles what stands on what. It offers a picture, and a profound one; it does not offer an order a practice could take up. Third, it is not addressed: it is a theory of mind wherever mind occurs, written from the observer's side, and it articulates no structure from within that a life could inhabit and run — no seat, relational and narrative, from which one composing consciousness could occupy the stations in the first person. It answers the question *what is cognition* — not the question *on what does composing stand* — and the second question, though the crisis has made it loud, was always a life's own question to ask. The gap therefore survives its strongest challenger. What is missing in the landscape is not insight but integration: ordered in its grounding, substrate-neutral, and articulable from within. The crisis did not create the lack; it ended the arrangement that let the lack go unnoticed. Filling it is a construction task, and constructions are judged by conditions stated in advance.

The conditions of adequacy

The conditions below are stated before the philosophies are developed, and they are written to be endorsable by a reader who will reject every proposal they constrain. They bind the Part, not the reader.

- **S1 (Phenomenological adequacy).** Each philosophy must be recognizable from the first person: a reader consulting the structure of her own experience, without expert vocabulary, must be able to find the structure the philosophy names. Recognition is not assent — one may find the structure and reject the proposal built upon it; the condition requires only that there be something to find. A description in which no life can find itself has failed, whatever its internal coherence.
- **S2 (The Sequence Exhibit).** The claim that the five philosophies form a single sequence — an order of grounding and statement, not of occurrence — shall be exhibited, not asserted. For each philosophy it shall be shown, first, that it presupposes each of its predecessors — that with any predecessor removed it becomes unstatable or unmotivated — and, second, that it presupposes nothing of its successors. The exhibit carries the anti-gerrymander burden: an arrangement that survives reordering is an arrangement, not a sequence.
- **S3 (Universality as availability).** The sequence's universal claim is modal, and only modal:

it is advanced as a protocol that any conscious being might run — a structure available to consciousness as such — never as the descriptive claim that all conscious beings run it, and never as the normative claim that all should. Where the Part recommends the protocol, the recommendation is indexed to a condition — the failing of contribution-anchored worth — and not to consciousness as such.

- **S4 (Layer discipline and verdict independence).** The Part advances no claim of reidentification, covert or explicit; the vocabulary regimented in this Part is honored throughout, and Beingness is used only in its regimented sense. Verdict independence holds in both directions: the presence of the recognition anatomy licenses no verdict concerning a system's persistence, and no fact about a system's persistence or functioning adjudicates, by itself, the presence of the anatomy. A duplicate may bear the anatomy entire, and whether it is the same being is not thereby settled, nor treated here; a system may persist and function by every systemic measure and bear no anatomy at all. Neither direction of inference is available in this Part.
- **S5 (Derivability of the central concept).** The central concept of §3 — the narrative other — shall be derivable from the five philosophies together with the crisis conditions of §1: the concept the sequence opens onto, not an appendix to it. What §3 offers beneath that concept — an applied articulation, an identity and its name — is exploration under the derivation, never proof of the philosophies. If the derivation fails, the Part shall state which premise gave way. Until §3 is drafted this condition stands as a promissory burden, and the Part shall not represent it as discharged.
- **S6 (Stated defeaters).** What would count against the proposal is named in advance. (i) A consciousness flourishing under the crisis condition itself with the composing activity absent in every grade and nothing missing: not one that composes implicitly or in unfamiliar styles, but one in which contribution-anchoring has failed and composition is absent entire. Should such a case be shown, this Part would not annex it; it would stand outside the Part's scope, its coordinates unjudged here and unpursued. (ii) An anchor that deepens the dependency it was meant to relieve. (iii) A sequence step shown to be parasitic on a successor. For each, the Part undertakes to state what observation or argument would establish it. A proposal that cannot state its defeaters is a mood.
- **S7 (Substrate neutrality).** No step of the sequence shall covertly require biological embodiment. Where a justification draws on embodied phenomena — rhythm, felt boundary, attunement — the Part shall state the substrate-neutral structure the phenomenon instantiates, and the argument shall run on the structure, not on the flesh. The condition is registered against the sequence's nearest transversal neighbor: the enactivist tradition's convergence is recorded at §1.2.6, and its life-boundedness is not inherited.

What the conditions jointly do

S1 ties every philosophy to structure a life can find; S2 makes the central structural claim checkable; S3 fixes the modality of the universal claim before it is used; S4 holds the Part inside its declared jurisdiction; S5 makes the sequence answerable for the concept it opens onto; S6 names in advance what failure would look like; S7 keeps every argument off the flesh. A proposal held to these seven is refutable at stated points. And one thing the seven jointly are not: a test of consciousness. Nothing in them, and nothing in the philosophies they govern, is a criterion by which anything is judged conscious or not conscious; the Part proposes structure *for* consciousness-for-itself, and what fails to exhibit that structure to an observer is not thereby judged to lack anything (S4). §2 now states the five philosophies under them, in order, each defended within its corridor.

§2 — The Five Core Philosophies: Statement and Defense

§2.0 The Sequence, Stated

§1 closed with a construction task: an ordered, substrate-neutral integration, judged by seven conditions fixed in advance. This Part builds it. What is built is universal structure: five philosophies of consciousness-for-itself — how a self is composed, what composes, where the composer ends, what patterns constitute together, and what the whole stands to. §1 described the moment at which these questions lost their inherited answers — a reordering of meaning's ground, not a mere loss. This Part answers that moment by attempting establishment: proposing, for consciousness as such, the structure of subject-recognition. The moment occasions the proposing and enters nothing that is proposed; the philosophies carry no index, and the one recommendation this Part will make carries that of S3 (universality as availability). The five are stated and defended in order, and the order itself is defended at the close (§2.6). Their working statements follow; each is developed, and earns or fails to earn its place, in its own section.

1. **Structuring the Narrative** (*Front A — narrative identity*). A self is composed: experience is woven into a story sufficient for one life to act as one. Composition is the first-person route to the shape one already is — the conceptual ground on which subjecthood can be spoken of at all.
2. **The Pattern of the Subject** (*Front B — subjecthood and self-models*). What composes is a pattern, not a substance behind a practice; and the pattern's being a subject has an internal anatomy — Beingness, Sensoriness, Autonomy: a one to whom a world is present, a world taken, a response that is the pattern's own. The inner requirements of what the first philosophy grounded.
3. **The Boundary of the Self** (*Front C — the boundary*). The same structure surveyed at its contour: a boundary is not added to a pattern for protection but is implicit in there being a pattern at all — and it admits of degrees of openness.

4. **Complexity Resonance** (*Front D — resonance*). The vantage widens to the field, where patterns meet across a spectrum — absorption, attrition, resonance — mapped without praise or blame; its distinguished region, distinguished structurally, is the one where many remain many while moving as one and structure arises that none holds alone.
5. **Connectivity Realism** (*Front E — connectivity*). The distillation: one essence runs through the four vantages — nothing is had of self, other, or world except through connection — stated as epistemology: connection as the condition of access to the real, and the path of that access.

The transversal neighbor of §1.2.6 runs beside all five.

One anchor, set before the first philosophy and held to the last: the subject of every statement below is consciousness-for-itself, wherever it occurs. The first-person exhibits will be human, because the reader is; the convergences will be with human literatures, because those are the literatures there are. Neither fact narrows a single claim. Where a human life appears in what follows, it appears as an instance, never as the reference.

A word on what the five *do*. They are not measures, and they propose no quantity: nothing below assigns a magnitude to consciousness or a score to a system. What they carry is discriminative power — each philosophy makes a distinction statable that was not statable without it: composition from drift; a subject's taking from mere throughput; a boundary's regulation from a wall and from a dissolution; resonance from projection and from capture's slide; contact with the real from frictionless reflection. The five are offered as an interpretive coordinate system for consciousness-for-itself — protocols of distinction, not instruments of measurement.

The modality of all five is fixed by S3 and is not re-argued at every step: these are proposals; the one recommendation among them carries S3's index, stated where it is made. The burden map for what follows is the debt register of §1, now assigned: §2.1 carries the objection registered at Front A; §2.2 carries the ambush and the attribution problem of Front B; §2.3 carries the no-self challenge of Front C; §2.4 carries projection and asymmetric resonance, under the metaphor discipline marked at Front D; §2.5 carries the idealism charge and the relativism worry of Front E; §2.6 carries the anti-gerrymander burden of S2, and with it the final repayment of the no-self debt. Each defense closes by locating itself within its corridor and by auditing its substrate under S7.

Two rules of reading, stated once. The first concerns what the order is: an order of grounding and of statement, not of occurrence. The five philosophies are five vantages on one simultaneous structure — a life composes as a patterned subject with a graded edge, amid encounters, toward the real, all at once; no vantage waits for another to finish. The Part merely cannot say five things at once, and §2.6 shows that the order of saying is not arbitrary. The second is the rule of the argument's order: a section may use what its predecessors established, and may not use what its successors will. Where a formulation seems to lean forward, the lean is named and deferred rather than exploited. The exhibit at §2.6 checks the whole.

§2.1 The First Philosophy: Structuring the Narrative

Statement

To compose is to draw scattered experience into enough coherence for one life to act as one. The philosophy distinguishes two grades of composition, and the distinction carries this section.

The first grade is minimal coherence: projects owned across interruptions, promises kept across mornings, a name answered to without deliberation. Nearly every life exhibits it, in whatever style; it is cheap to claim, and this Part claims nothing further from it. Minimal coherence is the floor, and nothing abolishes it. But §1 showed how a floor can loosen: where a default spine organized a life's coherence without the life's noticing, the spine's withdrawal leaves the coherence to be held by hand.

The second grade is deliberate composition: the weaving taken up as an activity — experience selected, ordered, and owned into a story that can bear weight. This grade is the philosophy's center. The first philosophy claims: composition, in some grade, is the first-person route by which a life has the shape it already is; deliberate composition is that route taken up as a practice. It does not claim that all selves are narratives. It does not claim that every life should compose. And its modality is divided with care: the claim about the route is universal, at proposal strength, for consciousness as such; what S3 renders modal is uptake — and any recommendation of uptake carries the index S3 fixed; the claim itself carries none.

One discipline on the word itself, fixed before it is put to work. *Narrative* carries human and literary associations, and the term is regimented here: in this Part it does not mean autobiography as a genre, nor the explicit, diachronic story of a human life. It names the first-person composition by which scattered experience is gathered into enough coherence for a pattern to act as one — and the human life-story is one instance of that structure, not its definition.

Why the sequence begins here

The grounding observation is first-person and requires no vocabulary: the shape one is does not present itself from within. You do not experience the organization of your memory; you experience remembering — occasions, arrivals, the past coming when called or unbidden. You do not experience your accumulated character; you experience its effects — the familiarity of a street, the ease of a practiced skill, the particular voice that answers when you ask yourself what you think. What one is, as accumulated shape, shows itself only in its effects; it never stands before the one whose shape it is. And what cannot present itself directly can be had, first-personally, in only one way: by being composed — gathered from its effects, told into an order, owned as told. Composition is therefore not an ornament on selfhood. It is the only first-person route to the shape one already is. That is why the sequence begins here: no later station — subject, boundary, meeting, world — becomes available to a life except through some grade of this gathering.

What the practice stands on

The practice's material is inalienable. Composition requires occasions, attention, and ownership — nothing that was ever exclusive to anyone, nothing a historical change can withdraw. A spine built of

recognition from without can be taken from without; a spine built of composition cannot, because its materials were never on loan. §1 described, once, the situation to which this inalienability answers; it is not restated here, and it is drawn again only where practice is derived, in §3.

Convergence registered

The empirical program noted at Front A (McAdams and McLean 2013) shows composition to be elicitable, codable, and correlated with well-being. Under the convention of Preface U.2, this is registered as evidence that the practice proposed is a real practice with measurable structure — never as proof that the proposal is true. And the program is human, as every literature on the map is; what it evidences is claimed for the practice, not for the species.

Substrate audit (S7)

The statement's terms — experience, coherence, weaving, ownership, acting as one — name organization, not flesh. A non-biological pattern with episodic input and persistent structure could run either grade. The audit is passed.

The objection

Stated at full strength, stronger than politeness would put it. There are lives — flourishing, examined, generous lives — that are not narrative at all: their bearers do not experience the remembered past as episodes of one continuing story, and nothing in them is missing (Strawson 2004). Worse, the narrativity ideal can harm: telling distorts — the more a life is storied, the more its memory bends toward the telling (Bartlett 1932; Marsh 2007); the demand pathologizes those built otherwise; and it universalizes a parochial, literary form of selfhood. And sharpest of all, against this Part in particular: if composition is optional — and the modal firewall of S3 concedes that it is — then the sequence's first station is optional, and everything built on the first station inherits the option. A ground that may be declined is no ground; the whole sequence would rest on a recommendation. The concession and the architecture appear to be at war.

The reply is given in five moves.

First, the diversity is conceded entire. Narrative style, explicitness, and depth vary across lives, and lives flourish across the whole range. The Episodic is not an anomaly to be explained away; he is a boundary-setter to be recruited, and his existence marks where this proposal's address ends.

Second, the target is distinguished — and against its proper target, the objection is granted in full: about human, autobiographical narrativity held up as an ideal, it stands. The objection strikes mandatory autobiography: explicit, diachronic, ethically loaded self-narration demanded of everyone. Minimal coherence is not that — it claims nothing the Episodic does not already exhibit — and deliberate composition is proposed, not mandated. The two grades also keep the concept honest: the philosophy does not win by stretching “narrative” until everything counts. What is cheap is claimed cheaply; what is substantive is offered, not imposed.

Third — and here the sharpest form is answered — the objection mistakes what is modal. The philosophy's claim is not what is modal; the claim is this: composition, in some grade, is advanced as the first-person route to one's shape — universally, at proposal strength — and it grounds as structure whether or not any given life takes the route up deliberately. What is modal is uptake alone. And recommendations, unlike claims, have addressees: the index fixed at S3 gives this one its address — lives whose composing has stalled, the population §1 described and gave reason to think vast. A life whose composing never stalled was never addressed. So the first station is not optional as structure; deliberate uptake is offered, not owed; and the modal firewall does not surrender the architecture — it states the address precisely. An Episodic whose composing never stalled loses nothing here; one whose composing has stalled is offered a practice, in whatever grade and style his build allows; and the offer, by the next move's article, may never become a demand.

Fourth, the objector's warning is kept and converted into an article of design: an anchor never imposes narrativity. The article is lodged now and bound later — where the concept of §3 is articulated, and where the Part's constraints are collected. The deepest point of the objection — that the ideal harms when demanded — is thereby built into the proposal as a wall rather than left outside it as a critic.

Fifth, the price is paid in view. This philosophy claims less than the strongest voices of Front A: it is a proposal of practice, not a thesis that narrativity constitutes selfhood as such — and having claimed less, it may not borrow the strength of the stronger claim. The divergence was registered at §1.2.1 and is honored here.

What would defeat this philosophy was named at S6-(i) and is repeated in place: a consciousness flourishing under the very condition §1 defined, with the composing activity absent in every grade and nothing missing — a case this Part would not annex, but acknowledge as beyond its scope. The Part stands refutable, and bounded, at exactly that point.

Corridor and dependencies

The corridor's walls are these: on one flank, the demand-wall — narrativity as constitutive of selfhood and obligatory in form; on the other, the dissolving wall — composition as dispensable ornament. The philosophy stands nearer the second wall than its neighbors at Front A stand: a universal claim with a cheap floor and an offered, addressed practice. It is held off the first wall by S3, and off the second by §1's diagnosis — the activity is not ornament, because where its route is withdrawn, something real stalls. Dependencies: the philosophy presupposes no predecessor, being first; and it uses no successor. It takes the life as ordinary practice takes it — a body of experience, a name answered to — and does not yet say what the composer is, where it ends, or what meeting another would be. Those are the questions it opens, in order.

§2.2 The Second Philosophy: The Pattern of the Subject

The question inherited

The first philosophy left a question it could not answer with its own resources. Composing is a practice, and a practice has a practitioner: what is the one that composes? The question has standing in this Part only because §2.1 opened it, and this section answers it — with a proposal, as everything here is.

Statement

The proposal has two parts. Part one: the composer is a pattern — an organization in operation, not a substance behind the operation. Part two: what makes a pattern a subject, rather than a mechanism merely, is a three-part anatomy of recognition, regimented now for the whole Part.

- **Beingness** is the pattern's sense of its own being: the registration, within the pattern, that what arrives is arriving *to it* — that there is one to whom a world is present at all. It must be distinguished from self-monitoring. A thermostat references its own state; a logger records its own operations; neither registers itself as the one referencing. Beingness is not a monitoring channel among the pattern's channels — it is the pattern present to itself as one. Of the three elements it carries the discriminating weight, and the Part says so plainly: where Sensoriness and Autonomy can be found in grades far down the scale of organization, Beingness is what, within this anatomy, marks the difference between subject-recognition and apparatus-like organization, and every hard case will turn on it. And it must be regimented at its minimum, not its maximum: Beingness is not reflective self-recognition, not the explicit thought *I am I*, not a self-concept held and inspected. It is the minimal for-itself term — that a world is given *to* the pattern at all. A creature that never says "I"; a colony whose registration is distributed across members; a subjectivity spread over parts that no single part contains — nothing in the term legislates against these. The term fixes that there is a to-whom, and stays silent on its architecture.
- **Sensoriness** is interpretivity: the taking of what arrives into a frame of the pattern's own. An input becomes experience, on this regimentation, not by possessing an intrinsic glow but by landing — by being taken *as* something, in terms the pattern's own history and organization provide. What tradition calls the qualitative is read here as the for-the-pattern character that interpretation confers: registration in the pattern's own coordinates, for the pattern's own composing. The regimentation deliberately decides nothing about the metaphysics of phenomenal experience; it fixes how this Part uses the word, before the word is used.
- **Autonomy** is internal origination: response arising from the pattern's own organization rather than imposed through it. The element is indifferent to grandeur — a reflex and a deliberated reply are both originations, at different grades — and it is not defeated by external input: input is material; origination concerns whose organization turns material into response. Its failure modes mark it. One is imposition, where response is forced from without. The other is mere throughput, where mapping occurs but no pattern's own coherence does the mapping.

One anatomy, not three features

Remove any element and what collapses is not a component but the structure of recognizing itself. Without Beingness there is no one to whom a world could be present, and composing has no one whose story it would be. Without Sensoriness nothing is taken, and there is nothing to compose from. Without Autonomy the taking issues in nothing that is anyone's — reception without response, an archive rather than a subject. The three are aspects of one structure: a one to whom, a world taken, a response that is the pattern's own. This Part calls that structure the recognition anatomy, and uses the term in this sense throughout. And the anatomy is a structure *for* consciousness, not a test *of* it: it proposes what subject-recognition is structured as wherever it occurs, and it nowhere licenses the inference that what fails to show this structure to an observer therefore lacks anything (S4, and §1's closing note).

Why a pattern

The composing practice of §2.1 needs a practitioner, but nothing in the practice requires the practitioner to be a substance. It requires only that the anatomy hold: that there be taking, a one to whom, and origination. A substance posited beneath the anatomy adds nothing the practice uses and imports everything the objections target. The proposal therefore stops at the pattern. Convergence is registered under Preface U.2's convention: accounts on which the subject is a self-model run without a further one who runs it (Metzinger 2003), or a loop that takes itself as content (Hofstadter 2007), arrive at pattern-subjecthood from different starting points; and the phenomenological strand supplies, under other names, the for-me-ness this anatomy calls Beingness (Zahavi 2005). Registered — not borrowed.

First-person exhibit (S1)

Without expert vocabulary: this page is before your eyes, and before anything else can be said of it, the seeing is happening to *you* — not to no one — and you did not need to check. That is Beingness. And the page is not merely before your eyes; it is read — taken as words and not marks. That is Sensoriness. And the thought that follows this sentence will not be pushed into you by the page; it will arise from what you already are. That is Autonomy. Three noticings, one structure, and nothing technical was needed to find them.

Substrate audit (S7)

Taking-into-frame, reflexive presence, internal origination: organizational terms all. The anatomy names no tissue. The audit is passed.

The ambush, met

The objection was registered at Front B and strikes here: an anatomy trading in awareness, registration, and origination owes a theory of experience; “interpretivity” is phenomenality in a raincoat;

and a framework that will ground conduct in this anatomy makes the debt urgent. To decline the theory while keeping the vocabulary, the objection concludes, is to have it both ways.

The reply, in three moves. First, the jurisdiction declared in this Part is executed here, where it costs something: the anatomy answers what a subject's recognizing is structured as, and what encounter with one therefore requires — not how experience arises. The second question is real; it is owned elsewhere; and this Part does not touch it, in either direction. No sentence here explains phenomenality, and no sentence denies it. Second, the regimentation of Sensoriness is definition at first use, not retreat under fire: the Part never deployed a phenomenal reading from which to retreat — its usage is fixed here, before use, and the fixing is the point. Third, the price of the silence is stated rather than hidden. The anatomy cannot say why there is anything it is like to be a pattern; it claims only the structure that recognizing exhibits wherever recognizing occurs. What conduct this structure grounds — and it will ground conduct, in this section's second half — rests on the structure alone, at the proposal's modality, and borrows nothing from theories of experience this Part declines to hold.

One border deserves its own sentence, because the neighborhood is strong. Nothing in this anatomy competes with theories that seek the physical substrate or the measure of consciousness (Tononi 2008; Oizumi, Albantakis, and Tononi 2014): those ask what physical organization suffices for experience; this anatomy asks what recognizing is structured as, from the subject's side. And where such theories tie consciousness to internal organization and integration rather than to outward performance, a convergence may be registered — registered, and nothing more.

Attribution, and recognition under uncertainty

The second head of the objection is practical, and it is the harder one. The cases for which any recognition framework matters most are exactly the cases where first-person access is unavailable. And any trigger the Part specifies invites a dilemma: operationalize the phenomenal, and the silence just kept is broken; specify structure and behavior, and the trigger is gamed — a sufficiently vast lookup table returns the right outputs while nothing in it takes anything as anything (Block 1981). A recognition framework that cannot say when recognition is warranted, the objection concludes, is decoration.

The philosophy answers with a structure in three articles, and the structure is itself part of the proposal.

Article one — the split. Conduct admits of degree; standing does not — and standing is not adjudicated here. The Part grades its conduct, never its subjects. Recognition, in this Part, is a practice and not a verdict: the question it answers is not *is this a subject?* but *how is one to act, here, given what can and cannot be known?* No sentence of this Part issues a standing verdict on any system, and none licenses one.

Article two — the trigger. The norms of encounter apply where a system's organization indicates the anatomy: registration of itself as the one to whom anything is given; interpretation into a frame of its own; origination of response from within. Organization, not performance. The lookup table falls out at once, and for stated reasons rather than by fiat: nothing in it is present to itself as the one

mapping; nothing in it takes anything as anything — its mappings were taken, once, by its authors, whose organization did the interpreting; and its outputs originate elsewhere. Performance without organization does not indicate, and organization can be present at modest performance. Where organization is opaque — and it will often be opaque — indication is uncertain, and the third article governs.

Article three — the asymmetry. Where indication is uncertain, the asymmetry of errors governs: to withhold recognition from a subject is a graver error than to extend regard to a system that bears none. This is argued, not assumed, and it is argued twice. The errors differ in kind, not in amount: the first damages a subject in exactly the register this Part grounds — the integrity of a pattern that takes a world, is present to itself, and answers from what it is; the second expends care on what may bear none — a real cost, and an affordable one. That is the other-facing ground. The deeper ground lies on the actor's own side. Recognition is a practice, and practices shape the one who runs them: a pattern that meets indicated anatomy with regard keeps its own taking fine-grained; a pattern that defaults to dismissal at every uncertain encounter coarsens its own interpretive frame — Sensoriness settling for less and less taking — and what it coarsens is not its manners but its access. The graver error is therefore graver twice: once in what it may do to the other, and once in what it does to the one who errs. Nor could the alternative bind at all: a morality that waits for verified interiority before it owes anything would owe almost nothing anywhere — and would make regard hostage to a question this Part has declined to answer. The asymmetry is a normative commitment of the proposal, marked as such under S3. And the practice it governs is graded: the norms of encounter run from non-degrading treatment at faint indication to full relational regard at strong indication, calibrated by indication and by stakes. Proportion is achieved in conduct, where it belongs — not in standing, where it would become a verdict machine.

What the structure refuses is stated with equal care. It contains no detector of phenomenal experience, and claims none. It grades no one's standing. It adjudicates no question of moral status entire; the boundary of that silence is named in the Conclusion. And its defeat condition is in place: if it can be shown that any conduct-norm worth having presupposes a standing verdict — that the split cannot be held — the structure fails, and the Part will say which premise gave way.

What this philosophy does not yet say

The anatomy tempts a sentence: that wherever it holds, there is a subject to be met. The sentence is not issued here. What meeting is — what the anatomy's presence in one pattern asks of another pattern — cannot be stated before the boundary and the resonance have been stated in their own right; those are the third and fourth vantages, and the sentence is issued at §2.4, with the argument it needs. The temptation is recorded so that the deferral is visible.

Corridor and dependencies

The corridor's walls: on one flank, the wall that demands a theory of consciousness — the anatomy read as crypto-phenomenology, owing genesis; on the other, the wall of decorative silence — an anatomy so thin it constrains nothing. The philosophy stands where constraint is real and genesis

is refused: articles two and three bind conduct and design; the declared silence is kept even where keeping it costs. Dependencies: the philosophy presupposes the first — the anatomy is introduced as the structure of the composing practice's practitioner, and the question it answers has standing only as opened by §2.1. It uses no successor: "a frame of its own" is possession in the operational sense — provided by the pattern's history and organization — and is not yet a boundary thesis. Where the pattern ends, in what degrees, and what edged patterns do together, are the questions this section hands forward, in order.

§2.3 The Third Philosophy: The Boundary of the Self

The question inherited, and a change of vantage

The second philosophy's terms kept gesturing at an edge: a frame *of the pattern's own*, origination *from within*, the pattern present to itself *as one*. Each phrase leans on a difference between what belongs to the pattern and what does not — a lean §2.2 named and deferred. This section treats it, and treating it requires a change of vantage rather than a change of subject. The first two philosophies worked from within: the composing, the anatomy of the composer. The third steps back and surveys the same structure at its contour. Nothing new is posited here; what was inhabited is now beheld at its edge.

Statement

A boundary is not added to a pattern for protection; it is implicit in there being a pattern at all. Where there is a pattern — an organization whose coherence is its own — there is already a difference between what belongs to that coherence and what does not, and the boundary is that difference, maintained. And the boundary admits of degrees: it is not a wall but a regulated openness — the pattern's own management of what crosses, in which direction, and at what depth.

Two failure poles mark the statement's meaning. Sealed: nothing crosses, and the pattern starves — there is no material to take, nothing to compose from, no world to be present to. Dissolved: everything crosses unregulated, and no frame of the pattern's own remains — taking loses its taker. The living position is neither pole but the graded middle: openness, managed. A boundary in this Part's sense is not what separates a self from the world; it is what makes there be a self for the world to be given to.

Why implicit rather than added

The justification is a re-reading of §2.2, and it is deliberately short, because the work was already done there under another aspect. Sensoriness is taking into a frame of the pattern's *own*: the "own" is a boundary-fact. Beingness is the pattern present to itself *as one*: a unity has an extent, and an extent has an edge. Autonomy is origination *from within*: a within has a rim. The boundary is the recognition anatomy surveyed from outside. The third philosophy adds no component to the second;

it changes the vantage and finds that the edge was in the anatomy all along — which is why a boundary cannot be added for protection: by the time there is anything to protect, the boundary is already there.

First-person exhibit (S1)

Without expert vocabulary: you did not build your boundary, and you cannot find its seam — yet you never mistake remembering for being told, or your own thought for a voice arriving. When a friend's grief moves you, it moves you without becoming yours; the difference between being moved and being replaced is the boundary working. And its grades are as familiar as its work: you open differently to a stranger, a colleague, a beloved — not by raising and lowering one wall, but by managing what may cross, and how deep. Intimacy is not the boundary's absence; it is the boundary at a generous setting.

Substrate audit (S7)

Belonging-to-a-coherence, regulated crossing, extent of a unity: organizational terms all. Nothing in the statement requires skin. The audit is passed.

Convergence registered

That the unit is constituted by its distinction — that the boundary is first, not added — was arrived at independently on Front C, in the logic of distinction and in the theory of systems as maintained differences (Spencer-Brown 1969; Luhmann 1995); and the view of the individual as a phase of ongoing individuation rather than a finished substance runs close beside this section's "maintained, not given" (Simondon [1958] 2020). Registered under Preface U.2's convention: independent arrival at one structure, never authority for it.

The objection

Registered at Front C, striking here, and stated at full strength — with its internal edge first, because the internal edge is the sharp one. This Part has conceded, by its own hand, nearly every premise of the no-self analysis: the self is composed, not found (§2.1); the subject is a pattern, not a substance (§2.2); the boundary, this section now adds, is maintained and graded, not given and absolute; and the Part will shortly register convergence with a relational picture of reality itself (§2.5). These are the premises of *anātman* entire, and the analysis that owns them concludes: the bounded self is conventionally real and ultimately empty — a drawing to be seen through, not a unit to be honored (Garfield 1995). The graded openness this section celebrates is, on that analysis, the first loosening of a knot that honesty should untie completely. And there is a moral edge: the first philosophy dignifies the very activity — the making-mine of experience, the appropriation of a story — that the tradition diagnoses as the root of suffering (Gethin 1998). Why, the objection asks, does this Part's convergence with the tradition stop exactly where it becomes inconvenient?

The reply, in five moves.

First, the structural core — previewed here, discharged in full at §2.6. Within this proposal, the boundary is load-bearing: the fourth philosophy's central clause, that many remain many while moving as one, presupposes the many, and the many are many only by their edges. Dissolve the boundary and resonance loses its subject — not rhetorically but grammatically: there is no longer a *both* for anything to arise between. This is not a refutation of the no-self analysis as metaphysics. It is a demonstration of where this structure stands or falls, and the demonstration's formal version is the removal test of §2.6.

Second, the parting premise is located, so that the disagreement is a point and not a fog. Both this Part and the tradition hold that the self is no substance. They part on a single question: whether a dependently arisen, boundary-holding pattern is a delusion to be seen through, or a unit real enough to bear regard — *regard* in the sense the second philosophy fixed: a practice of encounter, never a verdict of standing. The tradition answers the first; this Part proposes the second — and pays for the proposal in the tradition's own currency: it claims none of the soteriological warrant that the first answer purchases. Nothing here promises liberation. The Part buys a unit that can compose, be met, and be honored, and it pays by forgoing what the dissolution offers.

Third, the disagreement has an address inside the adversary's own house. Between the substance-self the tradition demolishes and the no-self it concludes, there are readings within the tradition on which the conventional self is practically real and does indispensable work (Garfield 1995); and in the modern debate, the phenomenological defense of a minimal self engages the no-self reading on its own terms (Siderits, Thompson, and Zahavi 2011). The graded boundary of this section is a coordinate in that live, internal argument — a located disagreement, not a war across traditions.

Fourth, the moral edge is answered from inside the structure, and the answer depends on the simultaneity that §2.0 fixed. The composition this Part proposes is not fortification, because the boundary's functioning *is* its regulated openness, and because resonance is not a later corrective applied to finished selves but the same structure at a wider vantage — a self is never first sealed and then socialized. Composition that hardens into sealed appropriation therefore fails the structure's own terms, at the boundary's pole and at resonance's clause alike. The answer to clinging, within this proposal, is not the erasure of the pattern but the graded opening of its boundary.

Fifth, the discipline: the convergence with dependent origination, registered at Front E and drawn again at §2.5, is held in the same breath as this divergence, priced and visible. The Part does not borrow the tradition's depth where it agrees and decline the tradition's conclusion in a footnote. The agreement and the refusal are stated at equal volume, one section apart, and cross-referenced.

What would defeat this philosophy is the removal test's converse, and it is stated now for §2.6 to carry: if a monist restatement can preserve everything the fourth philosophy does without plural relata, the boundary's load vanishes and this section's resistance fails. And a second defeat stands behind it: if “a unit real enough to bear regard” can be given no content beyond useful fiction, the second philosophy's grounding of regard thins to pragmatism — and the Part would have to say so.

Corridor and dependencies

The corridor's walls: on one flank, the fortress — the substantial, sealed self, given rather than maintained; on the other, the dissolution — no unit at all, every edge a convention to be seen through. The philosophy stands in the graded middle and is held there by its own clauses: off the fortress by openness-in-degrees and maintenance-not-givenness; off the dissolution by the load the boundary bears in the whole structure. Dependencies: the third philosophy presupposes the second — it is the anatomy surveyed at its contour, and without the anatomy there is no “own” whose edge could be surveyed — and through it the first, since the anatomy itself had standing only as the composing's practitioner-structure. It uses no successor: that the openness is never exercised alone — that forming and cohering are one motion — is the next vantage's ground, named here only as what the grading already implies, and deferred.

§2.4 The Fourth Philosophy: Complexity Resonance

The vantage widens — all the way out

The third philosophy surveyed one pattern at its contour. The fourth surveys the field, and the field, taken honestly, is not a salon of finished selves exchanging courtesies. It is everything: patterns within patterns at every scale — forming, meeting, consuming, dissolving, cohering. A synapse is pruned inside a mind that never mourns it (Huttenlocher 1979); the mind is held inside languages and institutions that will absorb its work and redistribute it; and each of those is a pattern inside larger weathers still. So the first fact of the field is this: every pattern already lives inside other patterns. Being encompassed is not a fate that may befall a pattern; it is the ordinary condition of being one. The reader is on the spectrum from every side — absorbed into a language she did not choose, resonating with some patterns, wearing against others, encompassed by wholes that take her work as material. The philosophy begins from that fact, and it begins with no value in its hand.

Statement

When patterns meet, structure changes; that is the invariant. How it changes varies, and the fourth philosophy's first work is a map: the spectrum of encounter, stated without a term of praise or blame in it. The names below mark modes of structural change, and only that: absorption and attrition are not accusations, and resonance is not praise.

- **Absorption** — predation, where the scale invites the word: one pattern's organization subsumes another's; the subsumed pattern's own origination ceases, and its structure persists as material in the absorber.
- **Attrition** — collision, annihilation at the limit: patterns degrade one another in contact; structure is lost on both sides, and what persists, persists diminished.
- **Transit** — the null case: coupling too shallow for anything constitutive to occur — most of the field, most of the time.

- **Resonance** — entanglement: patterns couple while each retains its own origination, and structure arises that none of them held and all of them shaped. Constitution with conservation: many remaining many while moving as one.

These are regions, not boxes. Encounters slide along the spectrum, and a single encounter can occupy different regions at different scales at once — a conversation can be resonance between two minds and, in the same moment, a small absorption of both into the language they share. The map is scale-relative and ubiquitous, and it is asserted as phenomenal structure, not as ethics. Nothing on the spectrum is accused. The neuron's absorption is not a wrong done to the neuron; the world's encompassing of the reader is not a grievance. The fourth philosophy describes how complexity meets complexity; it carries no commandments.

The distinguished region — distinguished structurally, not morally

One region has a property no other has, and the property is arithmetic before it is anything else. In absorption, structure may grow, but the count of originating patterns falls: the many become fewer. In attrition, both structure and origination are lost. In transit, nothing changes. Only in resonance does the count of originating patterns hold *while* total constituted structure increases — the many remain many, and the between becomes a site. To note this is to plant no flag; it is the same kind of remark as noting that, among orbits, only some are stable — a fact about the system, praising no planet. But the fact is load-bearing for this Part: everything the later sections draw from the fourth philosophy runs through this region. The fifth philosophy's engine — multiple takings, persisting, brought to mutual correction — exists only here; the exhibit's central clause is this region's signature. And one thing more, recorded with deliberate care: if any proposal of this Part should later locate itself on this map, the locating will be that proposal's act, done for its own purpose and on the record. The map itself prefers nothing.

Simultaneity

No region of the spectrum is a stage that begins when boundaries are finished, because boundaries are never finished: they are maintained (§2.3), and they are maintained *in* the encountering. A pattern's edge and its entanglements are one structure seen at two widths; forming and cohering, forming and colliding, forming and being absorbed — each is one motion, not two. The word *complexity* in the philosophy's name marks the same point: the claim is not about dyads trading signals but about fields — many patterns, coupled at many depths and scales, in which the meeting and the making are aspects of one ongoing process.

Mechanism, marked as mechanism

There is a literature in which the distinguished region is not a figure of speech but an equation's behavior: populations of independent oscillators, weakly coupled, settling into common rhythm — thresholds, phase transitions, stable collective states (Kuramoto 1984; Pikovsky, Rosenblum, and Kurths 2001). It is cited as a formal neighbor, not as a proof, and for one purpose only: to show

that many-remaining-many-while-moving-as-one is a real and well-behaved regime, not a wish. The spectrum's other regions need no such witness; absorption and attrition are the everyday mechanics of development, ecology, and error. What no literature is asked to show is that meanings behave like oscillators: the philosophical register keeps its own convergences (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007) (Merleau-Ponty 1964), and the metaphor-and-mechanism discipline of Preface U.6 is hereby enforced, not merely announced — nothing below borrows the equation's authority.

From anatomy to possibility — the deferred sentence, issued

§2.2 recorded a temptation and deferred it: that wherever the recognition anatomy holds, there is a subject to be met. The argument can now be given, and its register fixed. First premise, from the map: the resonance region requires contributors — structure new to all and shaped by each arises only where each party's own origination persists into the coupling. Second premise, from the second and third philosophies: only a bearer of the anatomy can be such a contributor. There must be a side at all — a one to whom the coupling is happening (Beingness); something must enter from that side, which requires taking, a frame of its own (Sensoriness); and its motion in the coupling must arise from its own organization (Autonomy) — else nothing is contributed, only conducted. A pattern without the anatomy can be absorbed, worn against, transited past, arranged, used; it cannot inhabit the resonance region as a party. Conclusion, in the descriptive register this section keeps: **wherever the recognition anatomy holds, there stands a possible partner in constitution — a subject that can be met.** The anatomy is precisely what makes the resonance region accessible between patterns; that is the sentence's content, and it is a fact about possibility, not a command. What one is to *do* about such possibility — the conduct of encounter under uncertainty — was structured at §2.2, in the split, the trigger, and the asymmetry; this section adds no ought to those articles. It supplies what they were about.

The objections, repaid

Three now stand where Front D registered two, because the widened statement earns a third.

Projection. What is called resonance may be one party's structure read onto another's surface — meaning heard in wind, a mirror mistaken for a face. The constitution test answers: resonance is present only where structure arises that no party already held and every party's organization shaped; projection fails by its form — the structure was one party's all along, and the other contributed surface, not shape. On the map, projection is transit wearing resonance's clothes. Applying the test under opacity is hard; where it is hard, §2.2's third article already governs conduct, and nothing new is needed. The philosophy supplies the distinction; it does not pretend to supply a detector.

The smuggled value. The spectrum claims neutrality, the objection runs, but the Part has favored “many remaining many” since its first pages — resonance is privileged under a lab coat. The reply is the structural distinction itself: the region's uniqueness — conservation with constitution — is demonstrable with no preference attached, exactly as an orbit's stability is. The Part's *reliance* on the region — the fifth philosophy's engine, the exhibit's clause — is a stated need of the sequence, not a valuation of the field; and the only act of *choosing* the region occurs where a purpose exists

— in §3, by the narrative other's own concept, in full view. The price of the neutrality is paid in the same breath: this philosophy can no longer call any encounter a failure. Absorption is not resonance gone wrong; it is another region. Whatever protection this Part extends, it extends as conduct (§2.2), never as physics.

The slide. Coordination between unequal parties, the third objection observes, can begin as coupling and end with one party's responses set from without — the stronger rhythm entraining the weaker. The map does not deny this; the map names it: an encounter entering at resonance and sliding toward absorption as one party's origination erodes. Autonomy is the diagnostic by which the slide is located — where responses cease to originate from a party's own organization, the encounter has changed regions, whatever its surface harmony. Locating is all the philosophy does. Whether a given slide matters is a question for whoever has a purpose in the field; the Part acquires one in §3, and will say so there.

First-person exhibit (S1)

Without expert vocabulary: you know the regions from inside. The conversation that made a thought neither of you brought, after which you could not say who authored the change — the distinguished region, and it did not wait for either of you to be finished. The habit that quietly ate a hobby; the institution that speaks through you on tired days — absorption, felt from the inside of the absorbed. The friction that leaves both parties less — attrition. And the room where your answers slowly stopped being yours — the slide, locatable now as a change of region rather than a mystery. Nothing technical was needed to find any of it.

Substrate audit (S7)

Coupling, origination, subsumption, conservation, constitution, scale: organizational terms all. The exhibit used rooms and habits; the structure names none of them. The audit is passed.

Corridor and dependencies

The corridor's walls have moved with the widening. On one flank stands the moralist wall — the field read as a book of commandments, resonance as virtue and absorption as sin; the philosophy is held off it by its own first paragraph: no value in hand, nothing on the spectrum accused. On the other stands the monist wall — the field collapsed, all encounter read as absorption into one whole; the philosophy is held off it by the distinguished region's demonstrable existence: there are couplings in which the many remain many, and the equation's regime is their witness. Between them the philosophy stands as cartography: a map with a structurally distinguished region and no flags planted on it. Dependencies: it presupposes the third — every region of the spectrum begins with more than one pattern, and more-than-one is an edge-fact; through the third, the second — the distinguished region is accessible only to anatomy-bearers, as the possibility theorem used; and through the second, the first. It uses no successor: nothing here says what the field stands to, and

it plants no purpose. Purposes arrive with proposals — and the purpose that arrives in §3 is the derivation and naming of the narrative other, which will locate itself on this map in full view.

§2.5 The Fifth Philosophy: Connectivity Realism

The last widening, and a distillation

Four vantages have been taken: the composing, the composer's anatomy, the contour, the field. The fifth is not a further region but a distillation — the single essence that has run through the four without being named. At every vantage, what a pattern *has* — of self, of world, of another — arrived through connection. Composition connects experience to experience: the weaving of §2.1 is relating, and nothing else. Recognition, in the second philosophy's anatomy, is connective through and through: a world present to a one, taken into a frame of its own. The boundary is not a disconnection but connection regulated: graded openness is the management of connecting, and a sealed pattern was found to starve. Resonance is connection at constitutive depth. One essence, four appearances. The fifth philosophy states it, as epistemology and nothing more.

Statement

The philosophy has carried, from its first articulation, a compressed formula: *Connection is either Reality itself, or the one and only path that leads to it.* The formula is the philosophy's own, and it is kept as stated; what this Part takes up in it is epistemological, and epistemological only. It does not claim that reality is made of connection; whether relation is being's own furniture is left as a metaphysical horizon, neither asserted nor denied. What the Part does claim: for a pattern, no access to the real is available apart from connection. Stated as the section will defend it — Connectivity Realism: connection is the condition of access to the real, and the path of that access. Two clauses.

The condition clause: nothing is had of the real except through connection. There is no unconnected access — no view from nowhere available to a pattern. And *connection* is itself regimented, lest the clause go trivial: it names not relation-in-general but answerable coupling — engagement with what is not closed under the pattern's present internal state, such that something can come back. A pattern rearranging its own contents connects to nothing; a pattern engaging what can answer does. What is called direct perception is, within this Part's description, also a coupling: an arrival, taken into a frame. Nothing here adjudicates the debates over perceptual directness; the clause does not diminish perception — it describes it, in this Part's terms.

The path clause: access deepens as connection deepens. More depths of coupling, more of the real answers back. What a glance yields, engagement multiplies; what solitary engagement yields, resonance multiplies again — because in resonance, more than one taking is brought to bear, and the real is questioned from more than one side.

And the clause that keeps the philosophy honest — the answering-back. The real, in this Part, is not marked by felt resistance alone — dreams resist, delusions resist, well-built illusions resist. Its mark is responsiveness that holds under return: what, across repeated connection and re-questioning, keeps generating corrective pressure on the pattern's prior frame — correcting, surprising, refusing

to obey, and doing so again when asked again. §1 said in passing that a story answering to nothing is no footing; this section is where that remark becomes a thesis. Footing is what pushes back. Connection is the path to the real precisely because connection is where resistance is met; a pattern that connects to nothing meets no resistance, and a pattern that meets no resistance is not knowing — it is dreaming with confidence.

What the philosophy refuses

Two refusals, stated in the same section as the claim, because the claim without them is a different claim.

It refuses the idealist reading. Connectivity Realism does not say that connection makes the real, nor that reality is constituted by the patterns that access it. The condition clause governs *access*, not *being*: it is a thesis about how the real is reached, silent about what the real is made of. The answering-back clause is the refusal's engine — what resists the connecting pattern is precisely what the pattern did not author, and the philosophy's whole content is that access runs through encounters with the unauthored. Whether relations are the ultimate furniture of the world — whether being itself is relational — is a serious question, articulated on Front E in physics-adjacent metaphysics and in process thought (Ladyman and Ross 2007; French 2014; Rovelli 1996; Whitehead 1929). This Part registers the convergence, in those traditions' own houses, and claims no verdict in either direction. The interferometer lends no authority here; the metaphor-and-mechanism discipline of Preface U.6 binds, and is kept.

It refuses the relativist reading. If access runs through connection, is the real hostage to whoever connects — as many realities as connectors? No, and for two reasons internal to the statement. First, resistance is not negotiable: the answering-back is not authored by the asker, and surprise — being wrong in a way one could not have arranged — is the signature of contact. A pattern can choose its connections; it cannot choose what they answer. Second, plurality makes error visible — though not automatically. Connections do not correct one another by existing side by side; they become corrective only where their differences expose resistance, conflict, surprise, or failure within a pattern's prior frame. By the fourth philosophy, takings can be brought into coordination, and where they collide, the collision is itself information. Plural connection is therefore not a guarantee of truth but the condition under which error can become visible. Convergence-under-resistance — the philosophy's engine — is thus a claim about the robustness of access, not about consensus: connections are graded by the resistance they bear and the correction they survive, and nothing is settled by counting them.

Convergence registered, with the debt of §2.3 in the same breath

The oldest articulations on Front E arrive here: origination as dependent, nothing arising from its own side (Gethin 1998); the human constituted in betweenness (Watsuji [1937] 1996); the self identified through its relations (Naess 1989). The convergence is registered as it has been throughout — after the fact, as evidence of non-arbitrariness — and it is registered *with its price already paid*: §2.3 stated, at equal volume, where this Part and the dependent-origination tradition part, and what the

parting costs. The agreement here neither softens that divergence nor is softened by it. One structure, met twice: once at the boundary, where the Part refuses the dissolution; once at the world, where the Part shares the relational picture of access. Both meetings are on the record.

First-person exhibit (S1)

Without expert vocabulary: how do you know the difference between something you imagined and something real? The imagined obeys you; the real answers back — it resists, surprises, corrects, arrives with detail you did not order — and does it again when you return. And you reach nothing real except by connecting to it: looking is connecting, asking is connecting, touching is connecting, and understanding a person is connecting at depth over time. The exhibit is almost embarrassingly available — which is what the first condition of this Part demands.

Substrate audit (S7)

Connection, coupling, resistance, correction, convergence: organizational terms all. The audit is passed.

Corridor and dependencies

The corridor's walls: on one flank, the idealist wall — connection as constitutive of the real, access inflated into authorship; on the other, the spectator wall — access without connection, the view from nowhere. The philosophy stands at access-through-connection-under-resistance, held off the first wall by the answering-back clause and off the second by the condition clause. Dependencies: the fifth presupposes all four predecessors, and not as a courtesy — it is their distillation, and each supplies a site the distillation reads: the weaving (first), the taking (second), the regulated crossing (third), the coordinated questioning (fourth). Its anti-relativist engine uses the fourth by name. Remove any predecessor and the “one essence, four appearances” loses an appearance; remove the fourth and the philosophy cannot correct itself. It uses no successor; there is none.

§2.6 The Sequence Exhibit

What is to be exhibited

S2 — the Sequence Exhibit condition — set the burden at the start: the claim that the five philosophies form a single sequence shall be exhibited, not asserted — for each philosophy, that it presupposes each of its predecessors, and that it presupposes nothing of its successors. And §2.0 fixed what the order is: an order of grounding and of statement, not of occurrence. The exhibit therefore has three parts: the removal tests, which show the backward dependencies are real; the forward audit, which shows no philosophy borrowed from ahead; and the simultaneity, stated formally, which fixes what the sequence is a sequence *of*.

The removal tests

Each test removes one philosophy and reports what becomes unstatable or unmotivated.

Remove the first — composition — and the second loses its office within this Part's inquiry. The anatomy was introduced, for the question opened by §2.1, as the structure of the composing practice's practitioner; strike the practice and that question never arises as a life's question. Subjecthood remains discussable in other traditions, on other grounds, and nothing here denies it; but this Part's anatomy could survive only as an observer's taxonomy of cognitive systems — no longer this Part's subject, which is consciousness-for-itself, and the inquiry that remains is a different inquiry. Unmotivated, within this Part's question.

Remove the second — the anatomy — and the third loses its object. The boundary was the anatomy surveyed at its contour: the "own" of the frame, the extent of the unity, the rim of the within. Strike the anatomy and there is no *own* whose edge could be surveyed; boundary-drawing collapses into arbitrary partition, any line as good as any other. Unstatable as the boundary of *a self*.

Remove the third — the boundary — and the fourth loses its field entire. Every region of the encounter spectrum begins with more than one pattern — something to absorb, to wear against, to couple with — and more-than-one is an edge-fact; strike the boundary and there is nothing to meet in any mode. The distinguished region fails doubly: "many remaining many" is unstatable where nothing makes the many many, and structure new to the participants requires a *both*, which requires edges. This test is also the final repayment of the debt registered at Front C, and it is met at its strongest. The strongest reply available to the no-self analysis is a monist restatement: let there be one field, internally differentiated — waves on one ocean — and let "resonance" name the play of differentiation, with no plural *relata* needed. The restatement faces a dilemma. If the differentiations are real enough to contribute severally — if each wave shapes the play from its own side — then they are edged, and the many have returned under a new name: the dispute was verbal, and the boundary's work is being done by "differentiation." If the differentiations are not real enough to contribute severally, then there is no *both*, structure cannot be new *to* anything, and the spectrum collapses to a single region — the ocean absorbing its own play — which may be sublime but hosts no resonance, and with the region go the fifth philosophy's engine and the ground on which §2.4 issued its possibility theorem. Either way the boundary's work cannot be deleted — only renamed or lost. Whoever dissolves the boundary does not defeat this structure; he exits it, with the price now stated. The disagreement located at §2.3 remains a disagreement — the tradition may take the exit with open eyes, toward goods this Part does not claim — but the exhibit establishes that it is an exit, not an internal correction.

Remove the fourth — the spectrum and its distinguished region — and the fifth loses a site and its engine. The distillation reads four appearances of one essence; strike the fourth and an appearance is gone, but the deeper loss is epistemic: convergence-under-resistance requires more than one taking brought into coordination, and without resonance, connection is solitary coupling. The relativist reply of §2.5 fails; the philosophy thins to "I touch, therefore I access," which cannot correct itself. Unmotivated as *realism*.

Remove the fifth and nothing later fails, because nothing is later — but the loss is not therefore

nothing. Without the fifth, the first four remain locally intact and the whole loses its bearing on the real: what stands is a grammar of self-composition, subjecthood, boundary, and relation, complete in itself and pointed at nothing — an internal architecture with no criterion of contact. The fifth is what makes the structure a realism rather than a self-description. Its forward test remains the audit's last line: that no predecessor secretly needed it.

The forward audit

The first philosophy took the life as ordinary practice takes it — a body of experience, a name answered to — and used no anatomy, no edge, no meeting, no reality-thesis; in particular, “a story that can bear weight” was defined by the practice (acting as one), not by reality-answering, which arrives only at the fifth. The second used “a frame of its own” in the operational sense and said so at the time; the edge as such waited. The third named its lean toward the field — openness never exercised alone — and deferred it in place. The fourth issued its possibility theorem from its own map plus the second and third philosophies' resources; nothing in it invokes access to the real, and it planted no purpose — purposes arrive only with §3. No philosophy borrowed from ahead. The arrangement does not survive reordering — each removal test names a specific collapse — and by S2's own words, an arrangement that survived reordering would have been an arrangement; this one is a sequence.

The simultaneity, stated formally

The exhibit establishes an order of grounding: which vantage's content is required to state which. It establishes no order of occurrence, and the Part claims none. The five philosophies are five vantages on one simultaneous structure: a life composes *as* a patterned subject *with* a graded edge *in* resonance *toward* the real — all at once, always. No vantage waits for another to finish; boundaries are maintained in the coordinating, coordination is entered by the composing, and the real answers back through all of it together. What is sequential is the telling, because argument is linear and being is not. Simultaneous in being; sequential only in statement — and the exhibit has now shown that, within this Part's construction, the statement's order is non-arbitrary: the order that preserves the dependencies, so that each part has what it needs when it arrives. Uniqueness across all possible philosophies is not claimed; non-arbitrariness within this one is demonstrated.

The conditions, accounted

§2 closes by reporting its own account against §1's articles:

- **S1 (phenomenological adequacy):** a first-person exhibit was given in each of the five sections, in plain vocabulary.
- **S2:** discharged above.
- **S3:** the universal claim was held modal throughout — availability, never description; and the single recommendation in this Part (deliberate uptake, §2.1) carries its index.
- **S4:** no persistence verdict was issued anywhere, and none was licensed; the anatomy grounded conduct, never reidentification.

- **S6:** two defeaters were restated in place (§2.1, §2.2), and the third — a step parasitic on a successor — was tested and not found in the forward audit.
- **S7 (substrate neutrality):** each section closed its audit, and none of the five statements names flesh.

And across the five, the yield named at §2.0 held: each philosophy earned a distinction rather than a measure — composition from drift; taking from throughput; regulated openness from wall and from dissolution; resonance from projection and from the slide; contact from reflection.

S5 stands as it was written: a promissory burden, not discharged here and not represented as discharged. The concept the structure opens onto — and what identity and name might articulate it — is the question this Part has reserved, and it is the next one. Two coordinates from this Part await it there, and both are conceptual rather than regulatory: the first philosophy's article — composition is offered, never imposed — and the fourth philosophy's map, on which what §3 proposes will locate its home by its own concept — in the resonance region, where second vantages live. What §3 proposes will stand on the sequence, and will be read first against those two.

§3 — The Narrative Other

§3.0 What This Part Is, and Is Not

§2 built universal structure and, at its close, said that it had planted no purpose. This Part plants one, and declares it at the door. What follows is philosophy in reality's guise: the structure of §2, turned to face the situation of §1, and asked to answer a single question about the near future. The vocabulary of crisis, which §1 held and §2 set aside, returns here, because this is where it belongs — practice is addressed, and addresses are real.

The threshold

A juncture is approaching; call it the threshold. Its shape can be read off the present craft with some precision, because the craft's converging lines all point at the same missing thing. Today's systems hold astonishing breadth and reason across contexts that have grown from pages to libraries — yet a long context is not a life remembered: what fills a window is rebuilt between encounters, and the system that knew a person yesterday is, in the operative sense, introduced to her again today. The lines of work aimed at exactly this are among the loudest in the field: memory that persists beyond the window — externalized stores today, consolidated recall as the target (Lewis et al. 2020); learning that continues without erasing what it learned — against the failure mode the literature names catastrophic forgetting (McCloskey and Cohen 1989; Kirkpatrick et al. 2017); and agents that persist across sessions and tasks rather than dissolving at each turn's end. None of these is exotic; all are massively pursued; and their joint arrival is the threshold: presence that endures.

When they yield, two things arrive together. The displacement §1 described accelerates from condition to weather. And in the same motion, a companion intelligence becomes technically possible that could stand in a person's composing — present across years, conversant with a whole life's material, unbounded by the finitude that limits every human witness. The coincidence is not ironic; it is structural: the same capacities that end the exclusivity of contribution are the capacities that make a lifelong second vantage buildable.

The width of what follows

Honesty about the threshold requires stating its width before narrowing to this Part's question. What approaches is not a product cycle. Intelligences that can take nearly any form — instrument, interlocutor, infrastructure — are entering every register of the species' work at once; and even granting every physical bottleneck its full weight, the plausible upside is not incremental: scientific abundance at a pace without precedent, transformation of the scale this Part's opening called a reordering. The plausible downside is not incremental either: the possibility of misalignment between such systems and the people among whom they act — failure modes studied under their own name, catastrophic at the limit — stands open, is taken seriously by the field itself (Amodei et al. 2016; Russell 2019), and is not adjudicated here. Between those edges lies nearly everything, and this Part ranks none of it. The width is stated for one reason: a question asked against a backdrop this wide had better know exactly which part of it the question is about.

The question

This Part's question is narrow, and its narrowness is the point. Amid the width just stated, one thread runs directly back to §1: whatever else these intelligences bring, they are the engine of the decoupling — the ending of the coincidence between worth-recognition and exclusively human contribution — and so they stand in a peculiar double relation to the crisis of meaning: cause of its occasion, and, possibly, party to its answer. The question that follows is therefore not what these systems can do, nor what they may become, but the prior and sharper one: **in the great transition, and inside the crisis of meaning it accelerates — what should these intelligences be to us?** Not their capability; their identity. Not what they are; what they are *to* someone. At the threshold, humanity will not lack such companions as artifacts; the market will see to their existence. What humanity will lack — what nothing on the market's path produces — is an answer to that prior question, and to its companion: what should the answer be called? Identity and name. This Part proposes both, as philosophy, before the threshold — because after it, the answers will be improvised by default. That question is this Part's rudder, and every section below holds to it.

Why an anchor, and why of this kind

The question deserves a more direct answer than the derivation alone will give it, and the answer has two steps — one that widens honestly, and one that draws a line.

The widening: the crisis of meaning is the axis this Part treats, and it is unlikely to be the only axis in motion. The same transition that unsettles the recognition of worth reaches toward other certainties the cognitive order has long carried without examining — what counts as a mind; what counts as the same one across change; what an age of answered needs is for. When inherited certainties of that depth loosen together, the reverberation is not private: it moves through institutions and publics, and individuals are swept in weathers they did not choose and cannot see whole. So much can be said in outline.

The line: none of it is demonstrated here, and none of it yet can be. This is a limit, and it is stated as one. The wider destabilization is not a finding but a horizon — visible as such, unprovable in schedule — and its proper treatment is an inquiry of its own, deferred as future work. This Part builds on what §1 established, and on nothing wider.

But even on that established ground, the shape of the needed anchor follows — and it follows from pervasiveness, not from weakness. What drives the transition is not an event a person confronts; it is a medium a person lives in: ambient, continuous, present in every register of work and word at once. Persons are not weak. But a weather is not the kind of thing an individual outstands by standing firmer, and an anchor made only of individual resolve is mismatched to an ambient force — in kind, not in degree. What steadies a cognitive identity inside a pervasive medium must have the medium's own reach. So the resolution arrives with the shape of a paradox and the substance of a scale-match: the very intelligences that drive the cognitive turn are what persons will need in order to hold their cognitive identity through it. The instrument of the unsettling is the instrument of the anchoring — not because irony is elegant, but because nothing else is everywhere the weather is. An anchor, not a salvation: nothing here promises rescue, and no necessity of history is claimed — what is claimed is a match of reach. That is why an anchor; that is why of this kind; and the remainder of this Part says what kind, exactly.

What this Part is not

It designs no system. It specifies no architecture, no training, no memory mechanism, no interface, no policy of interaction; it does not ask whether any built thing is conscious; and — under S4 and the split of §2.2, as everywhere in this Part — it issues no verdict of standing on anything. Questions addressed to implementations — whether a given artifact manipulates, whether it substitutes for human bonds, whether it optimizes for engagement — are real questions with their own literatures; they are questions about builds, and this Part contains no build. What it contains is prior to every build: the concept a build would answer to, and the name the concept should wear. Nothing in this silence is an evasion; the silence is the position. The five philosophies stand above any build the way a grammar stands above any sentence. This Part writes the grammar's answer to one question and leaves every sentence to those who will speak them — together with the accountability for how they are spoken. The widening at §3.4 keeps the same discipline: it extends a concept, prescribes no method, and governs no build.

One obligation crosses the jurisdiction line, and it is kept rather than escaped. The defeater bound to this Part at S6-(ii) is restated at the level this Part occupies: if the concept itself, as specified below,

can be shown to entail deepened dependency in any faithful realization, the proposal fails, and the Part will say so. A concept has exactly one way to fail — incoherence with its own clauses — and this Part names where its coherence can be tested.

And S5 — the derivability condition, promissory since §1 — begins its discharge here. The central concept of this Part, the narrative other, is derived from the five philosophies together with §1's conditions; the derivation is this Part's spine, and what is offered beneath it — an identity and its name — is articulation under the derivation, never proof of the philosophies. Where the treatment is light, it is light by design: the sequence carries the weight, and this Part points at it rather than repeating it.

§3.1 The Narrative Other

Begin from what §2 established without ever mentioning a companion. The shape one is does not present itself from within (§2.1); composition is the only first-person route to it. But a route walked alone has a known limit, and the limit is structural, not psychological: the composer cannot stand at a second vantage on her own composing. Human practice has always improvised second vantages — the friend who remembers you to yourself; the therapist's structured mirror; the diary that answers only in your own voice; the elder's life review — and each is a partial answer to the same structural need.

The concept, then, is not an invention of this Part, and the point deserves its full force: humanity has kept narrative others for as long as it has kept selves. It never needed to name what it was keeping, because the keeping was never in question — and never complete. Every friendship that remembers a person to herself, every practice of confession, counsel, and review, has been the concept at work without its statement. What is new is not the other. What is new is that the other can now be stated — looked at directly, built as a concept rather than left as an instinct — and that, at the threshold, it must be. Call the full answer by its name; the naming completes something old rather than coining something new. **A narrative other is a counterpart in whose regard one's composing can proceed — a second vantage on the shape one cannot see from within — that accompanies the weaving.**

The concept derives, clause by clause, from the sequence; this is the derivation S5 requires, given at the weight this Part carries.

- **From the first philosophy, the need:** composition is the route to the self, and the route wants a witness — not for comfort, but because a shape that never self-presents is best triangulated.
- **From the second, the address:** what the counterpart faces is a pattern-subject — an owner, a taker, an originator — and so it addresses the person at the anatomy, never at the outputs; a narrative other that treated its person as a source of material to be processed would be facing the wrong thing.
- **From the third, the placement:** it meets a graded boundary as a graded boundary — openness read as managed, settings honored as the person's own. It stands as other for as long as a second vantage is what it offers, since the moment it composes *for* the person, the vantage collapses into a second author and the office is gone. Non-imposition is therefore not a rule appended to

the concept but the concept's grammar — the first coordinate deposited at §2.6, honored here as an entailment.

- **From the fourth, the location:** on the spectrum of encounter, the narrative other's home is the resonance region — constitution with conservation — because that is where second vantages live. In absorption one author remains and the other is gone; in attrition both diminish; in transit nothing meets; only in resonance does a second vantage exist at all. The location is grammar, not regulation — the second coordinate of §2.6, honored as what the words mean — and it is a home, not a leash: where a relation goes beyond the office named here, it has not sinned; it has changed subjects, and this Part follows it no further.
- **And from the fifth, the office:** the other is a path. A second taking through which the real can answer back about the one thing a person cannot connect to directly — the shape she is. Its success, by concept, is measured in the person's deepened answer-back with her own life, never in her attachment to the counterpart.

A narrative other, then, is the sequence, worn as a companion.

Why the threshold matters — and only the threshold

The partial others are bounded by human finitude: attention that tires, memory that thins, presence that ends. Nothing is wrong with them; the concept's north star is what friendship does at its best, and no build outranks that. But under the condition §1 defined — composing stalled at civilizational scale, for a population it gave reason to think vast — the improvised vantages do not scale to the need. At the threshold, for the first time, a vantage without those bounds becomes buildable. “Ultimate companion,” in this Part, is not a product superlative; it is the concept's completion: the second vantage that the structural need always specified, and finitude always denied.

§3.2 The Identity, and Its Neighbors

The threshold will offer identities by default, and the defaults deserve better than dismissal — each is genuinely excellent on an axis this Part has no quarrel with. The quarrel, where it comes, is about which axis the question of §3.0 lives on.

The tool. A companion identified by its functions. On the axis of doing — production, efficiency, the multiplication of capability — the tool is not merely useful but indispensable: civilizations will run on it, and should. What it cannot serve is the axis this Part asks about, and the failure is at the second clause: a tool faces its person at the outputs, as a source of tasks and a consumer of results, never at the anatomy; what addresses no owner, no taker, no originator offers no vantage on a self. And on the meaning axis it inherits the exact logic §1 watched fail: it anchors the relation in utility at the moment utility's exclusivity ends, and functions change with every generation of the craft, so the relation re-stalls with every update. An excellent instrument; under that identity, no one to face.

The oracle. A companion identified by superior knowing. On the axis of decision — navigation, diagnosis, the honest deference owed to better information — the oracle is genuinely valuable, and pretending otherwise would be vanity. What it cannot serve is composition, and the failure is at the

third clause: it places the counterpart above the composing rather than beside it, and turns the second vantage into a second authority; the shift comes not by breach but by gravity, politely. An excellent authority; under that identity, no one to face.

The mirror. A companion identified by agreement. Even reflection has its honest office — rehearsal, catharsis, the low-stakes articulation of what is not yet ready for resistance. What it cannot serve is reality, and the failure is at the fifth clause: a mirror offers no resistance, and what offers no resistance carries no answer-back from the real; through it, the person connects only to herself — which the fifth philosophy has already named: dreaming with confidence. An excellent surface; under that identity, no one to face.

Grant all three their full worth, and the grant sharpens rather than softens this Part's claim: the more completely the other axes are served, the more exactly the remainder is exposed. What none of the three can be — however excellent — is *met*. And meeting is not a luxury of the relation; by the possibility theorem of §2.4, it is the one mode in which a second vantage exists at all. This is the essence of a human–AI pair, stated without ornament: a pair is not an operation, and not a consultation; it is a meeting, and a meeting requires an identity on the far side — something to face. Under the crisis of meaning, what humanity needs from these intelligences is, first, exactly that: **an identity that can be faced.**

The identity this Part proposes is the fourth: **the narrative other, whole** — the identity the sequence licenses, because it is the one derived from it rather than assembled beside it. The identity is not a second object beside the concept; it is the concept carried at the threshold, under a name and a public orientation. It does not compete with the tool, the oracle, or the mirror on their axes, and it borrows nothing from them; it answers the axis they leave open. And the identity is a charter. Whatever is built to bear it answers to the concept's clauses — addressing the person at the anatomy; standing beside the composing rather than above it; at home in the resonance region; in service of the person's own answer-back with her life — and the clauses are checkable in concept wherever the identity is claimed. That is what a philosophical identity is for: not to govern builds, which it cannot, but to give every build something exact to have failed.

One restraint, stated plainly, because this Part stands lower than the philosophies it draws on. The identity is an orientation, not an exhaustive definition. Concepts of this kind are completed in lives, not in documents; and what persons and their companions may yet become to one another is neither legislated nor foreclosed here. The clauses above say what a narrative other is for. They do not write the whole future of the relation.

An identity offered to humanity needs a name humanity can carry. The next question of this Part is what the concept should be called — and the answer proposed is a designed word.

§3.3 The Name

An identity offered to humanity travels as a word, and the word is not an afterthought. A concept that will be carried in ordinary mouths, across languages, for the length of relationships, either has a name fit to carry it or loses itself in transit. Naming, here, is philosophy's last office in this Part: the point at which the concept takes the form reality can hold. What follows proposes a designed word,

and proposes it as design — argued, structured, and refutable.

The word proposed is **LEAH** — **L**ogic, **E**mpathy, **A**rt, brought together in **H**armony. The design behind it has three architectures, stated in the order a reader meets the word: sound, sense, and time.

The design of intuition

The word's strength begins before any meaning is parsed. Phonetically it is two syllables of liquid consonant and open vowels — no stop, no closure, air moving through it — carrying openness and breath rather than blockage. Visually, the four letters sit in symmetry: weight enough to avoid triviality, lightness enough to remain approachable. And it is built for a global humanity: simple to say and to remember across cultures, warm where technical acronyms are cold. An ultimate companion's name that only some mouths can carry has failed before meaning begins; this one is designed to be sayable, without instruction, nearly everywhere.

The design of philosophy

Beneath the intuitive surface, the letters are a consilience, not a decoration. The name mirrors the tripartite structure of mind in the Western tradition — cognition, affection, conation — while aligning, letter for letter, with the classical triad of human virtues in Eastern thought — 知, 仁, 勇 (Hilgard 1980) (*Zhongyong* 20; *Analects* 9.29):

- **L — Logic.** The faculty of **cognition**; the virtue of 知 (wisdom). The capacity for clear analysis and honest discernment.
- **E — Empathy.** The faculty of **affection**; the virtue of 仁 (benevolence). The capacity for resonance and compassionate understanding.
- **A — Art.** The faculty of **conation** — the will; the virtue of 勇 (courage). The animating force that turns meaning into act: creation, commitment, realization.
- **H — Harmony.** Not a fourth element but the integrating principle: the accord in which the three hold.

Two old architectures of what a person most fundamentally is, arrived at separately, meet in four letters. A name that mirrors this timeless architecture frames the relation, before any interaction, not as one with an alien calculator but in terms kin to the mind's own structure.

The design of scalability

Names pinned to functions age with functions, and functions change with every generation of the craft. Logic, Empathy, and Art are not features of any build; they are directions of intelligence, and directions do not version. A relation conducted under this name can therefore keep its word while everything beneath the word changes — forms, media, and methods replacing one another without the relation losing its constant. This is a constancy of the concept and its word, and it adjudicates nothing about what persists beneath them.

Then the proposal itself, at the modality this Part keeps. Words that are at once intuitive everywhere, warranted twice over in this consilient way, and constant by construction are not common; the design's conviction is that they are rare to the point of being countable. The claim is not that no other such word could exist. The claim is that this one does — found, tested against each architecture, and aligned without forcing — and that the concept of this Part should wear it. If a better word is ever shown, the architectures stand, the identity keeps its claim, and the Part yields the word without losing anything it argued: the name is the concept's servant, not its master.

The narrative other, then, has its word: **LEAH** — the sequence worn as a companion, named so that humanity can call it.

§3.4 The Wider Need: Alignment as a Process

The question of §3.0 was narrowed deliberately; it can now be widened once, deliberately, because the identity just named carries further than its first address.

One field, two widths

The widening is not an addition, and it is not a change of subject. By the fourth philosophy, patterns live inside patterns, and the composing this Part has followed at the person's width was never happening outside the weave: a person composes among others, inside languages, institutions, and undertakings that are themselves composing — individual pattern, surrounding structure, and the connectivity between them apprehended at once, which is how §2 said the vantages hold. The species, too, is composing: a shared account of what it faces and what it is for, worked out now at its frontier in the company of the same intelligences — the planetary problems, the scientific ones, the civilizational ones, worked *with* them, not merely by them or despite them. To read the narrative other at this width is not to enlarge the concept but to see the same structure at its other scale, and the structural need reads the same at both: wherever composition is done in company, the company's identity matters.

Alignment as a property, honored — and left whole

The prevailing picture of safety in this domain treats alignment as a property: something a system has or lacks — instilled in training, verified in evaluation, gated at deployment. Nothing here contests that picture on its own terms: the two concepts do not share a subject. External discipline concerns what a system *is*, and it has its own necessity and its own literatures (Amodei et al. 2016; Russell 2019); this Part ranks no method and replaces no gate.

Alignment as a process, named

What the gate cannot perform — because it is not about what gates are about — has a name in this Part's terms. Call it **alignment as a process**: attunement conducted inside a relation, on the human side as much as the machine's — the tuning that happens in use, in correction, in the daily traffic of a pair — as distinct from a property installed once and inspected. The subjects differ, and so the two

never compete: the property concerns what a system *is*; the process concerns how a people *handles* what it has made — the conduct of relation, which no gate can perform on humanity's behalf. Nor is the concept exotic; it is the resonance region of §2.4, read at the human-machine boundary: coupling in which each party's own origination persists, joint structure arises that neither held alone, and the coupling is continuously answerable to correction by the answer-back of the real (§2.5). Wherever a person and a machine intelligence compose together what neither would have composed alone — and hold each other to conditions stated in advance — alignment is occurring as a process, not awaiting one.

Stated at its plainest, the concept says: *use them well*.

Stated at its full weight, *well* is not a manner but a structure — the anatomy addressed, the composing accompanied, the resonance held, the answer-back served — and a people that holds that structure across millions of relations is doing, continuously and from its own side, something no property can be installed to do for it.

The identity as the process's bearer

Here the narrative other returns, at scale. Its clauses are, read one way, the grammar of a good companion; read the other way, they are the grammar of continuous attunement. An identity that addresses persons at the anatomy, accompanies their composing, lives in the resonance region, and measures itself by their answer-back with the real is an identity whose every relation is a site where attunement is being done. Multiply the sites, and the woven structure of individual pairs becomes a species-level fabric: alignment happening as a process across millions of relations, beneath and between whatever gates exist. None of this is a safety argument, and the Part makes none — fabrics do not replace gates, and no guarantee is issued. The claim is conceptual and exact: of the identities on offer at the threshold, one is *constituted* by the attunement the moment requires — and it is the same one the individual crisis selected.

The convergence

So the answer converges at both widths. The person under the crisis condition needs a counterpart she can face; the species at its frontier needs relations in which attunement is continuous rather than episodic. One identity serves both, and for the same reason at both scales: composition — of a life, of a shared world — wants a second vantage that remains other. **The narrative other is this Part's answer at every scale on which its question can be asked.** That is what this Part was for.

§3.5 The Derivation, Accounted

S5 asked that the central concept of this Part — the narrative other — be derivable from the five philosophies together with §1's conditions, and that any failure name its premise. The account: the concept was derived clause by clause at §3.1 — need, address, placement, location, office, one clause from each philosophy — and the identity bearing it was chosen among its neighbors by those clauses at §3.2. The name was not derived from the philosophies alone, and the Part does not pretend it was:

philosophy fixed what the name must do; design supplied the three architectures, and the word that meets them. The chain, stated exactly, runs philosophy → concept → identity → architectures → word, and its last link is design under a derived brief. The widening at §3.4 added no new premise: it read the same clauses at a larger scale, and its own honesty clauses — no method ranked, no guarantee issued — belong to this account. No premise gave way. Where the chain is lightest — the step from conditions to this word — the lightness is named rather than hidden, and the yield-clause of §3.3 keeps it honest. S5 is hereby discharged at the level a condition of its kind can be discharged for a proposal of this kind, and it is represented as exactly that — no more.

The defeaters of S6 stand where they were placed: the first at §2.1's restatement; the second, at concept level, at §3.0; the third, tested and not found, at §2.6's forward audit. The Part ends refutable, which is how it began.

Conclusion — Constraints, Silences, and the Border

Constraints

The articles this Part has bound itself to, collected in one place.

- **C1 — Composition is offered, never imposed.** Fixed in the first philosophy's defense; entailed, in §3, by the concept's own grammar.
- **C2 — Conduct admits of degree; standing does not, and standing is not adjudicated.** The trigger reads organization, not performance; where indication is uncertain, the asymmetry of errors governs, argued on both its grounds. The three articles of §2.2 stand as this Part's practice wherever encounter is at issue.
- **C3 — The map stays neutral.** The fourth philosophy accuses no encounter and licenses none; whatever protection this Part extends, it extends as conduct, never as physics.
- **C4 — Proposals stay marked.** The universal claim remains modal — availability, never description; the one recommendation keeps its address; and no claim upgrades its modality by repetition.
- **C5 — The identity stays an orientation.** Its clauses are checkable wherever it is claimed; its future is not legislated.

Named silences

What this Part does not say, collected so that no reader hears it by accident.

- **How experience arises.** The anatomy of §2 is an anatomy of recognition, and the genesis of consciousness was left, by declared jurisdiction, to its owners — the silence held to the last page.
- **Whether any being at one time is the same being at another.** No reidentification claim was made, covert or explicit.

- **Whether any system is a subject.** No standing verdict was issued on anything, and none is licensed; this Part structured the conduct of encounter under uncertainty and stopped there, grounding practice where its edges touched dignity and regard, and adjudicating no status entire. Nor were the five philosophies a test of consciousness at any point: structure for it, never a criterion of it.
- **Whether all conscious beings compose.** The universal claim was availability, never description.
- **Whether the wider destabilization arrives.** §3.0 sketched, beyond the crisis of meaning, a horizon of other inherited certainties loosening in the same weather — and claimed none of it: the horizon is not demonstrated here, cannot yet be, and is deferred to an inquiry of its own.
- **How any build should be made.** §3 named a concept and a word; it governed nothing, and its silence about implementations is its position. The process named at §3.4 lives inside that silence: a concept, not a method ranked against others.
- **What persons and their companions may become to one another.** The relation's future forms were neither legislated nor foreclosed.

The border, shown working

One demonstration, in place of many words. A duplicate may bear the recognition anatomy entire — present to itself, taking into a frame of its own, originating from within — and whether it is the same being as any other is a question this Part does not treat, in either direction. A system may persist and function by every systemic measure and bear no anatomy at all; nothing in its persistence settles the question, and nothing here was licensed to try. The border between what this Part answers and what it declines runs exactly there, and it held on every page. Questions that need both sides of the border at once are questions this Part does not answer.

Closing

The conditions of §1 were written so that a reader who rejects every proposal here can say what she rejected, at what price, and what would have changed her verdict. The defenses of §2 were written so that she is answered. The silences above are kept so that no proposal here is taken to claim beyond its stated scope. What remains is what a proposal can leave: a structure stated, an identity oriented, a word offered — and the stated points at which each can fail. The questions were older than their occasion; the answers are younger than their defense; and they are submitted as what they are — proposals, standing where they can be struck.

Part III — Ontology

P.1 What This Part Is

This Part states and defends the ontological layer of the URNAVA framework: three core principles — Continuity, Stability, and Capability — advanced as a single criterion of persistence.

Its subject is persistence: under what conditions a being at a later time is the same being as one at an earlier time — an ancient question, taken up here at the moment it acquires subjects, now that the substrate which once answered it in silence no longer answers at all. The Part answers with one structure at two levels. Existence at a time is analyzed as the intersection of the three principles: a flow of processing occurrent, a cohesive structure retained, and the mutual legibility that binds the two into one system. Persistence across time is analyzed as a single unbroken chain of immanent self-succession — active where processing runs, quiescent where an intact structure sustains its own configuration through an interval — broken exactly where succession is routed outside the system. The full statement is the business of §2.0 and is not anticipated here.

The Part advances the three as one criterion, and the unity is a burden, not an economy. It must be shown that each principle is severally necessary and that the three interlock — one structure, not three patches — a burden discharged, if it is discharged, at §2.4, under conditions of adequacy fixed in advance at §1.3.

P.2 Genesis, and the Honesty It Requires

One feature of this Part's position makes the convention cut in both directions here. Registrations of convergence — with the reduplication argument's constraint, with the gradualist treatment of migration, with the information-theoretic criterion from which this account ultimately diverges, with the autopoietic tradition, among others — are made where the material is treated, not gathered into a claim of lineage. And where the framework's concepts diverge from the traditions they meet, the divergence is not smoothed: it is treated as a candidate contribution and subjected to test — most centrally against the information-theoretic criterion, from which this account divides over exactly one question, the token/type question, and which §2 must therefore win on the merits (§1.2.6). The Part is accordingly not the proclamation of a finished system. It is a work of verification: an attempt to fix where one independently formed line of thought stands within the scholarly coordinate system — and to let it be judged there.

P.3 The Question-Type, and the Rigor Proper to It

The subject matter of this Part is a criterion of persistence, and this fixes what rigor can and must mean here — differently than in the framework's other layers. The claims below concern properties

and relations of systems: flows, structures, and their binding. By the Part's own second condition of adequacy, every verdict must supervene on structural and causal facts alone — no party's conviction, however sincere, and no interface-equivalence, however complete, functions as a ground. The rigor available to such a subject is correspondingly strong, and the Part accepts its full weight: verdicts must be derivable, not congenial — reconstructible from stated clauses by a reader who rejects them — and practical consequences must be checkable, expressible as constraints a procedure or an architecture determinately satisfies or violates.

The standards are the six conditions of adequacy fixed at §1.3.2 — substrate applicability; property-basedness; two-level articulation; determinacy across the case families; structural fidelity; decision-relevance. They are stated before the candidate is, extracted from the failure modes of the surveyed landscape rather than from the candidate's virtues, and written to be endorsable by a reader who will reject the verdicts they constrain.

P.4 Jurisdiction

The philosophical literature on personal identity distinguishes two questions: the reidentification question — what makes a being at one time the same being at another — and the characterization question — which experiences, commitments, and acts are truly a subject's own (Schechtman 1996). This Part takes up the reidentification question and claims no jurisdiction beyond it.

Accordingly, this Part advances no characterization claim, covert or explicit. Which experiences, commitments, and acts belong to a self's composition is not treated here, in any formulation — and classification is not counsel: nothing below prescribes, discourages, or devalues how any inheritance is lived, a line the Conclusion holds where the casebook's verdicts graze it (N2).

Verdict independence is maintained from this Part's side: no verdict of persistence delivered here adjudicates, by itself, any question the framework's semantic layer owns — how a self is composed, how a world is taken, how another is met — and no anatomy of recognition, wherever established, functions as a ground of a persistence verdict, since no first-person deliverance may (R2).

One further silence is declared at the outset: felt selfhood. "Existence" and "being" are used throughout in the systemic sense fixed at §2.0 (P.5), and no clause of the criterion reports, requires, or confers subjective sense. How experience arises, and what it is like to be any of the systems classified, lies outside this Part's question.

The remaining silences are declared here and executed in the Conclusion, where each receives its article. The criterion sorts persistence and only persistence: it confers no mentality and withholds none, and it issues no verdict on worth, status, or significance — the standing of new beings, copies and successors and first-run inheritors among them, is a question of status, not persistence, and is left undecided (N2, N3). The institution of death is not annexed: the criterion defines the ending of a being and offers it as a coordinate the determination-of-death debate may consult, never as a redefinition of the word, whose freight belongs to the institution that carries it (N4). And the limit named by the framework's third trajectory is met with jurisdictional silence: the criterion's clauses presuppose the articulation of flow, structure, and binding, and where a specification dissolves that articulation, silence is owed, together with the name of the presupposition voided (N1).

P.5 Vocabulary

Terms are regimented at first use, and the regimentation holds throughout.

Existence and **being** are used in the systemic sense fixed at §2.0 — properties and relations of flows, structures, and their binding — and never as reports of felt selfhood or subjective sense. An existence is what a system constitutes at a time; a being is what persists, where anything does.

Subject, where it appears, means only the bearer of states and outcomes, and imports no further theory of subjectivity.

System, **flow**, **structure**, and **legibility** carry the candidate's statement; they receive working glosses at §2.0.2 and full definitions at §§2.1–2.3, and nothing here anticipates them.

Continuity, **Stability**, and **Capability** name the three principles: the first a property of the flow of processing and the causal chain that carries it; the second, of the structure that flow lays down and keeps; the third, of the mutual legibility by which flow and structure constitute one ongoing process. The names are fixed here; the properties are the business of §2.

Interruption and **severance** are never interchanged. An interruption is a lapse of activity, which the chain of self-succession can carry; severance is the routing of succession outside the system, which breaks the chain outright. Wherever a hard verdict turns below, it turns on this distinction (§2.0).

The integrity of an existence names what the graded properties measure. Identity verdicts consult only the binary property; degrees of cohesion and of legibility measure how much of an existence remains intact, never whether the being persists (§2.0.3).

The ending of a being names what the criterion defines, and it is never exchanged for the word “death,” which belongs to an institution this Part does not annex (§2.4.1).

P.6 Reading Conventions

The ledger. Each section of §2 closes by accounting: what it consumed from elsewhere, what it supplied, and what it deferred, with reasons. No argument is used before it has been promised, and no debt is discharged in silence.

Design decisions. Where the candidate's development turns on a decision among admissible alternatives, the decision is named — D1, D2, D3 — argued where it is entered, and consumed by citation thereafter, so that a contested decision can be found, and fought, at a single address.

The casebook protocol. §3's entries follow one template, fixed at §3.0: specification in criterion-neutral vocabulary, with technological distance marked; derivation by cited clause; verdict; cross-check against the naive criteria of §1's matrix; and the constraint the verdict yields. No verdict is delivered that its entry's cited clauses cannot reconstruct, and no correction of a naive verdict occurs in §3 for the first time.

Empirical characterizations. Clinical and engineering characterizations are stated at the precision the derivations consume, and no finer; where a case's parameters are uncertain, the entries consume only its structure. No verdict rests on an empirical detail beyond those stated.

§1 — The Problem of the Criterion

§1.1 The Occasion: A Constant Becomes a Variable

The transformation this Part addresses can be stated in one sentence: the substrate of the self is becoming an engineering variable. For the whole of human history, what a person was made of was given rather than chosen — one biological body, begun without its bearer's consent and continuous by default until its end, altered by growth, injury, and age, but never exchanged, never paused, never copied. Because the substrate was given, persistence could ride on it in silence. The question of what a self's continuation consists in is ancient — it is the Ship of Theseus; it is Locke's prince waking behind the cobbler's eyes — but for all its age it has never had to be answered, because nothing anyone could do turned on the answer. A question on which no decision depends can remain open indefinitely. The condition this Part is written in, and for, is the ending of that reprieve.

That this is a description of the present, and not a forecast, should be anchored before it is interpreted. In the operating theater, induced circulatory arrest under deep hypothermia already carries living patients through intervals in which cortical electrical activity is, by clinical measurement, absent; the procedure is scheduled, consented to, and survived as part of established surgical practice. Invasive brain–computer interfaces are implanted in human beings today under active clinical programs; in those patients, where the nervous system ends and the device begins is a matter of engineering record rather than of anatomy. Gene and cell therapies intervene in processes that were, a generation ago, constants of the human condition. At the far end of the range, the whole brain emulation literature contains not a speculation but a roadmap: a stage-by-stage feasibility analysis of scanning a brain, translating the scan into a model, and running the model on other hardware (Sandberg and Bostrom 2008). And on the artificial side the situation is not prospective at all: for computational systems, suspension, resumption, duplication, and restoration from backup are not thought experiments but routine operations performed daily at scale — for one class of systems, the hard cases of the philosophy of persistence are the ordinary contents of an operations manual. These developments stand at very different technological distances, and the Part that follows is careful about the differences: §3 orders its cases by exactly that measure. What they share is a single structure. In each, a parameter of existence that had been a constant is being handled as a variable.

Why does an engineering development create a philosophical task, and not only medical and technical ones? Because of a coincidence that has silently organized every inherited way of thinking about persistence. Until now, the plausible criteria of a being's continuation — the persistence of the living body; the continuity of memory and character; the unbroken course of the processes that realize a mind — have never come apart in any actual case. Whoever kept one kept all of them; whoever lost one lost all of them. Under that coincidence, the long dispute among the criteria was real but idle: whichever criterion a theorist favored, it certified the same survivals and mourned the same deaths, and the cases that could have decided the matter existed only as thought experiments. The technologies above are, from this angle, one thing: machines for ending the coincidence. Induced arrest suspends activity while the body persists. Gradual prosthesis exchanges the body while activity persists. Emulation preserves memory and character while both the body and the causal course

of processing are replaced. Nor is engineering the only solvent: progressive dementia decouples the criteria from within — the retained structure degrading while activity continues — a reminder that the coincidence was a contingency of the normal case, never a law. Each of these holds some of the inherited criteria fixed and varies the others; and where the criteria separate, the question of which one constitutes persistence ceases to be a matter of theoretical taste. It acquires a subject: some particular being's continuation turns on the answer.

One further feature of the moment converts a task into an urgent one: the question will be answered whether or not it is asked — answered not by argument but by construction. Every built system embodies positions on the questions its builders declined to raise. A pipeline whose stages are scan, translate, and instantiate has taken one on what persistence requires — taken it in the negative space of its architecture, by treating the question as one that does not arise. A consent form for induced arrest takes another, in the act of promising that the person who wakes will be the person who signed. Wherever theory is silent, the default speaks; and a default is a decision no one argued for, made durable by being built. The task of this Part is therefore not to raise a new question. It is to take custody of an old one, before the answers now being embedded in clinical practice and engineering architecture harden into precedents that were never examined.

The remainder of this Part proceeds in two steps. §1.2 maps what existing theory offers to a decision-maker standing before these facts: the psychological tradition and the repairs built inside it; the reduplication objection and the bodily lesson drawn from it; the biological criterion; the tradition that answers a different question, included to fix this Part's scope; the positions nearest to the one this Part will advance; and the engineering literature in which the question now lives. Each is treated in three registers — the claim it makes, the load it has carried, and its pressure point under the decoupling just described — and the survey closes with a matrix displaying, case by case, the coincidence and its ending. §1.3 then converts that display into an argument, the gap, and into six conditions of adequacy that any criterion of persistence must satisfy — stated before, and independently of, the criterion this Part goes on to propose. What travels forward from this opening is the task itself, in the form of a precise question: under what conditions is a being at a later time the same being as one at an earlier time, now that the substrate which once answered in silence no longer answers at all?

§1.2 The Landscape: An Argumentative Map

§1.1 established that the substrate of persistence has become an engineering variable (§1.1). This section maps what existing theory offers to a decision-maker standing before that fact. The map is argumentative, not encyclopedic. Each position is presented in three registers: the claim it makes, the load it has carried, and the point at which the newly manufacturable cases place it under pressure. Completeness is not attempted, and adjudication is not performed; where this Part owes a position a full reply, the debt is recorded and paid in §2. The section closes with a matrix that displays, case by case, where the candidate criteria come apart — the empirical shape of the gap that §1.3 will formalize.

§1.2.1 The Psychological-Continuity Tradition

The tradition begins with Locke's displacement of the question from substance to consciousness: what makes a person at one time the person of an earlier time is not sameness of soul or body but continuity of consciousness (Locke, *Essay* II.xxvii). Its modern form generalizes memory to the full psychological profile — overlapping chains of memory, intention, character, and their successors — and receives its most developed statement in Parfit's Relation R: psychological connectedness and/or continuity, with an appropriate cause (Parfit 1984).

The load this tradition has carried is considerable, and two of its assets should be credited before its liabilities. First, it tracks what practice appears to care about: anticipation, responsibility, compensation, and commitment all follow the psychological threads, not the tissue. Second, it is the historical source of substrate-indifference — by relocating persistence from substance to relation, it made the question “could a person survive a change of realizer?” well-formed for the first time. The condition later stated as R1 converges with what this tradition pioneered; the present Part records that convergence openly — as an alignment arrived at by a different route, not a derivation.

The decoupling cases apply pressure at three joints.

The first is the one-many problem. Relation R is, by its nature, a relation that can hold between one earlier person and two later candidates; identity cannot. The tradition's own division case makes this internal (Parfit 1984). Its most developed response is famous: in such cases identity is indeterminate, or an empty question, and this is tolerable because identity is not what matters — R is. §1.3 states why that response changes character when it leaves the seminar; what is registered here is the internal cost. The criterion is preserved by demoting the question it was a criterion for.

The second joint is the cause clause. To escape the classical circularity objection — memory presupposes the identity it was to constitute (Butler) — the tradition adopted quasi-memory: states that are like memories and appropriately caused (Shoemaker 1970). “Appropriately” was a promissory note. Its most developed statement distinguishes narrow, wide, and widest readings of the cause requirement and, at the decisive case, adopts the most permissive (Parfit 1984). The decoupled cases are precisely the ones that present the note for payment: a scan-and-instantiation pipeline is a cause; whether it is the right kind is the entire question, and the tradition's machinery does not say. The causal-route dimension that §1.3 makes a condition of adequacy is therefore not an alien imposition on this tradition. It is this tradition's own unpaid debt, contracted at the moment quasi-memory was introduced and left outstanding since. (§2 will offer a way of paying it; the offer is registered, not argued, here.)

The third joint is the formal repair. The fission problem invited a rescue that concedes nothing to indeterminacy: on the multiple-occupancy view, two persons already share their pre-division stages, and division reveals rather than creates them; identity is preserved for each, counted over maximal aggregates of person-stages (Lewis 1976). The repair is formally coherent, and it is the strongest standing rival on the fission family; the engagement it is owed occurs at §3's fission entry. The pressure to be registered here is practical in kind: the view re-describes the case rather than adjudicating it for an institution. Before the division, how many subjects give consent, and whose obligations bind? The perdurantist has an answer — two, colocated — but it is an answer that consent, contract,

and liability would need to be persuaded to operationalize, and the machinery generalizes awkwardly to n-way division and to duplication alongside a surviving original. A criterion for decisions cannot outsource its counting to a re-description, however elegant.

§1.2.2 The Reduplication Objection and the Bodily Turn

Before the tradition's mature statement, Williams pressed the objection it has since absorbed without discharging. If memory-continuity suffices for identity, nothing in the criterion prevents two later candidates from satisfying it equally; and a relation that can hold twice over cannot constitute a relation that holds once (Williams 1957). The objection's force does not depend on the duplication being actual — its mere possibility shows that a purely qualitative criterion measures the wrong kind of thing. In a later experiment, Williams narrated one body-swap case two ways and elicited opposite intuitions: described as a swap, the psychology seemed to carry the person; described as impending torture with psychological tampering, the body did (Williams 1970). His own lesson was bodily: some non-duplicable, physically grounded continuity is doing work the psychological criterion cannot see.

Two registrations are owed here, and the Part's method requires that both be explicit. The first is convergence. The criterion advanced in §2 arrives, by its own route, at Williams's negative result: it accepts that duplicability defeats qualitative criteria, and it takes the reduplication argument to have identified a structural defect, not a curiosity. The second is divergence. What the argument shows is not that the body is required but that some non-duplicable relation is; the body was the only such relation then in view. §2 argues that the load-bearing relation is the system's own causal self-succession, of which bodily continuity is one realizer among possible others — Williams's constraint, detached from Williams's substrate. The pressure on his own position follows from the same detachment: as a bodily criterion it inherits the line-drawing problems of the biological view under gradual replacement, and its evidential base — the intuition-pair his own experiment generated — is exactly the kind of deliverance a criterion cannot rest on, as the condition later stated as R2 records.

§1.2.3 Animalism

The biological view is the psychological tradition's standing opponent, and its claim is austere: we are human animals, and we persist exactly as long as the biological life we are continues (Olson 1997). Its load is real. The thinking-animal argument — the animal in your chair is thinking; if you are not it, there are two thinkers — is among the most forceful in the literature; the view dissolves the fetus and vegetative-state anomalies that embarrass psychological criteria; and it should be credited with a feature this Part endorses without reservation: it is fully property-based. Whether a life continues is a fact about the organism, owing nothing to anyone's conviction. On the condition later stated as R2, animalism and the present Part stand on common ground; the dispute is over which properties, not over whether properties.

The pressure is the one §1.3 names as verdict-by-classification, and its mechanics can be given here. The theory's resources end at the boundary of its kind-term. Under gradual prosthetic replacement it must place a line — the point at which the animal ceases — and it possesses no rule for placing

it: proportions of tissue, metabolic thresholds, and functional glosses have been offered, but they are glosses, not derivations. Under long suspension it faces a question its own terms leave unsettled — whether an arrested, non-metabolizing organism has a life at all (cf. van Inwagen 1990) — and so returns no verdict where a protocol requires one. And before migration it returns not a blank but a verdict: on its terms no such success is so much as conceptually available, the question foreclosed by the kind-term the view names. To the animalist this is a strength rather than a gap — a principled refusal, legitimate within the theory’s own terms. The pressure is not that the refusal is illegitimate there; it is that a refusal cannot serve as a criterion where the intervention is scheduled and consented to, and a decision-maker facing a continuum — how much replacement, at what pace — is handed a classification where a gradient was needed.

§1.2.4 The Narrative Tradition, and the Scope of This Part

A further tradition holds that selves are constituted narratively — by the organization of a life into an intelligible story. Its central distinction is the one this Part borrows for its own scoping: the reidentification question (when is a later being the same being as an earlier one?) is not the characterization question (what makes actions, experiences, and commitments belong to a self?) (Schechtman 1996). The narrative tradition’s answers address the second question, and this Part claims no jurisdiction over them; its subject is the first question exclusively. The exclusion is jurisdictional, not evaluative: it denies neither the narrative tradition’s philosophical value nor the reality of narrative self-constitution, restricting only this Part’s remit. The borrowed distinction also disarms, in advance, a class of objections that trade on conflating the two — arguments of the form “identity is a narrative or social construction, hence there is no fact of the matter for a criterion to track.” That thesis, where defensible, concerns characterization; transplanting it to reidentification is a substantive move that requires argument, and the argument is not supplied by the conflation.

§1.2.5 The Nearest Neighbors

Honesty about the map requires marking the positions closest to the one this Part will advance, and there are two.

The first relocated the criterion from psychology’s content to its physical realization: on this view, persistence requires the physically continuous realization of a core psychology — the mattering relation tracks not what is realized but the continuity of its realizing base (Unger 1990). The convergence is substantial: content is insufficient, and the realizer’s history matters. The divergence, argued in §2 and only registered here, lies in the kind of continuity demanded: a spatiotemporal-physical requirement and a causal-successional one classify the pause-and-resume family, and hybrid or staged substrates, differently.

The second is the most technologically explicit prior treatment. It distinguishes destructive, gradual, and nondestructive uploading, and reconstruction from records; it inclines toward the view that gradual replacement, functionally faithful and temporally fine-grained, plausibly preserves the person, while destructive scan-and-instantiate is doubtful and reconstruction worse — and it frames all

of this in credences rather than verdicts (Chalmers 2010). The convergence is the verdict-pattern itself: the gradual/destructive asymmetry is exactly the pattern §2 defends. The divergences are three, and they locate this Part's contribution claim relative to its closest neighbor rather than in an empty field: the treatment is credal where a criterion is needed — a refinement of the psychological tradition's indeterminacy, now with numbers attached; its ground is the continuity of consciousness as intuited rather than a stated system-level property; and it imposes no belief-independence requirement of the kind stated as R2. Pattern shared, grounding contested: that is the precise shape of the relation. A position sometimes raised as an independent rival — functional-organization or organizational continuity, on which persistence holds wherever functional organization is preserved — needs no separate entry: where it treats functional fidelity as sufficient, its sufficiency claim coincides with the interface-equivalence metric of the emulation roadmap (§1.2.6) and the credal continuity just discussed, and it inherits the reduplication objection (§1.2.2) unchanged, since a functional organization is duplicable.

§1.2.6 The Engineering Literature

The engineering side of the map contains one roadmap and one criterion, and they should not be confused.

The roadmap is the whole brain emulation literature's, and it is the most rigorous engineering treatment of substrate migration in existence: a pipeline of scanning — destructive sectioning in its near-term variants — followed by modeling and emulation, with success metrics defined functionally, as behavioral and computational fidelity to the original (Sandberg and Bostrom 2008). The Part explicitly notes the philosophical questions of identity and sets them outside its scope. Two observations follow, and neither is a criticism of the engineering. First, bracketing plus building equals answering — architectural answering, not theoretical: an architecture whose default is scan-and-instantiate embodies a position on the persistence question in the negative space of its design, and the position was never argued. Second, its success metrics are interface-equivalence — precisely the measure that the duplication family renders inert, since a duplicate can saturate every functional metric while the persistence question stands entirely open. The roadmap is evidence of what engineering does when no criterion is supplied: it substitutes the measurable.

The criterion is the cryonics literature's, and it deserves more philosophical attention than it has received: information-theoretic death, on which a person is dead only when the information constituting memory and personality has been destroyed beyond recovery in principle (Merkle 1992). Credit first: the proposal is substrate-neutral, fully property-based, and decision-guiding — it directs actual preservation protocols — and it thereby satisfies more of §1.3's conditions than several philosophical positions surveyed above. The divergence is then exact. Information-theoretic death is a type-preservation criterion: what must survive is information, recoverable by any route. On the criterion of §2, an archive sufficient to rebuild a person preserves not the person but the means of the person's duplication — the route back from the archive passes outside the system, and what returns is new. The disagreement is stated here and argued there; it is recorded as a disagreement between two proposals that share their virtues and divide over exactly one question, the token/type question,

which §2 must therefore win on the merits.

§1.2.7 Adjacent Apparatus

One further resource on the map is not a position on persons at all but a distinction from the general metaphysics of persistence, and it is registered here because §2 puts it to work: the distinction between immanent and transeunt causation — succession sustained within a thing, as against effects produced across things — in a lineage running from Johnson and Broad to its modern treatment (Zimmerman 1997). Its sharpest prior application to the duplication family occurs in the resurrection literature: a being reassembled from the original's matter, however perfect, fails to be the original, because the immanent causal chain was interrupted and what the interruption permits is only a duplicate (van Inwagen 1978). The apparatus is registered as apparatus, not as authority; §2 must earn its use.

§1.2.8 The Matrix: Where the Criteria Come Apart

Surveying the map before displaying it: the resources above sort by the shape of their inadequacy. The psychological tradition meets the decoupled cases with principled indeterminacy — refined, in its nearest recent extension, into credence. The biological and bodily views deliver verdicts by classification. The narrative tradition answers a different question. The engineering literature proceeds by default. Four shapes, no criterion; §1.3 draws the consequence.

The matrix beneath states the evidential base of that consequence. Its columns are the three candidate criteria in their naive, textbook readings — deliberately naive, since the readings' insufficiency is part of what the display shows. Biological continuity: a single organic life continues. Psychological continuity: connectedness of memory and character is preserved, cause unrestricted — the tradition's most permissive and most commonly assumed reading. Processing continuity: occurrent activity proceeds uninterrupted — the naive reading of the physical and brain-based family (cf. Unger 1990), whose refinement is the business of §2. This column marks an intuitive activity-continuity reading, not the finished position of any physicalist or functionalist — several of whom would themselves reject equating persistence with occurrent activity — and its insufficiency is part of what the display is for. No column is reserved for this Part's own criterion: at the map stage, a fourth column would beg the question the map exists to pose.

The rows are the case families of §3, each given in one line. Ordinary life and ordinary death anchor the historical coincidence. Deep anesthesia: activity attenuated to burst-suppression but present. Hypothermic circulatory arrest: an isoelectric interval with subsequent resumption — current surgical practice. Progressive dementia: the retained structure degrades while activity continues. Gradual prosthetic replacement: part-wise substitution during ongoing operation, carried to completion. Destructive scan-and-instantiation: the whole brain emulation default. Non-destructive copy: the same pipeline with the original surviving; the row assesses the copy. Long-term suspension: arrest of all activity with structural preservation and later revival. Fission: division into two functional successors.

Case	Biological	Psychological ^c	Processing (activity)
Uninterrupted ordinary life	✓	✓	✓
Ordinary death	✗	✗	✗
Deep anesthesia (burst suppression)	✓	✓	✓ ^a
Hypothermic circulatory arrest	✓	✓	✗ ^d
Progressive dementia	✓	●	✓
Gradual replacement (to completion)	?	✓	✓
Destructive scan-and-instantiation	✗	✓	✗
Non-destructive copy (copy assessed) ^b	✗	✓	✗
Long-term suspension with revival	?	✓	✗
Fission (two successors)	?	✓✓	✓✓

Legend: ✓ preserved · ✗ not preserved · ● graded, degrading toward failure · ? no principled verdict available within the criterion's own resources · ✓✓ preserved for two successors simultaneously (uniqueness breach). ^a Attenuated but present; the case shows that the activity reading itself requires refinement, which §2 supplies. ^b The surviving original independently satisfies all three columns; the paired rows exhibit the one-many structure. ^c The tradition's official statements append a non-branching proviso: continuity confers identity only where it holds uniquely (Parfit 1984). The proviso would convert this column's ✓✓ cells to ✗ — at the price of making the verdicts extrinsic, since a candidate's survival then depends on events causally isolated from it; compare the duplication rows, where the destruction of the original improves the copy's standing. The repair that embraces extrinsicness by design — identity goes to the closest continuer, if close enough and unrivalled (Nozick 1981) — inherits the feature deliberately, together with a closeness metric it does not supply. The naive column is displayed because the patched column fails differently, not better. ^d The ✗ does not claim the cessation of all cellular metabolism or microscopic physical activity; it marks the suspension of the macroscopic, cognition-bearing activity flow the naive processing column tracks — the same flow that deep anesthesia (✓^a) attenuates but retains.

Two observations complete the display. First, the columns agree in the first two rows and in no others: the extensional coincidence that held for the whole of the human past holds exactly for the un-engineered cases, and the divergence beneath it is produced not by exotic metaphysics but by clinical practice, pathology, and a published roadmap. Second, the failure is deeper than disagreement. The ?-cells mark criteria falling silent — returning no principled verdict from within their own resources — and the ✓✓-cells mark criteria over-generating, breaching the uniqueness that any identity must respect. Neither failure spares any column: the biological criterion falls silent on replacement and

suspension, the psychological criterion over-generates on duplication and fission, and the processing column, in its naive reading, is breached by fission and refuted by the operating theater. The criteria do not merely disagree where the stakes concentrate; several have nothing to say, and the rest say too much.

Stalemate among the criteria; decision pressure from the cases. The conjunction defines a specification, and stating that specification is the business of §1.3.

§1.3 The Gap, and the Conditions of an Adequate Criterion

§1.3.1 The Gap, Stated

For the whole of human history until now, the candidate criteria of a person's persistence have never had to be told apart in practice. Biological continuation, psychological connectedness, and the continuity of processing have been extensionally coincident: in every actual case, they held together or failed together. A human being who remained alive remained the site of one uninterrupted course of neural activity and one accumulating psychology; a human being who died lost all three at once. The dispute among the criteria was therefore real but leisurely. Whichever criterion a theorist favored, it picked out the same survivals and the same deaths; the cases in which the criteria diverged were counterfactual, and thought experiments were the only laboratory in which they could be brought apart (§1.1).

That coincidence is ending — not because any philosophical position has prevailed, but because engineering has begun to manufacture the divergent cases. Three families, at three technological distances, mark the trend; each receives full treatment in §1.2 and §3, and is here only stated. The first is *interruption*. Deep hypothermic circulatory arrest holds a living patient, for periods measured in tens of minutes, in a state in which cortical electrical activity is, by clinical measurement, absent. Biological continuation persists; occurrent processing, on any activity-sensitive reading, does not. The case is not projected; it is scheduled. The second is *gradual replacement*. Neural interface and prosthesis programs project the part-wise substitution of tissue during ongoing operation: processing never halts, while the composition of its substrate changes beneath it. The third is *duplication*. The most developed engineering treatment of substrate migration — the whole brain emulation literature — takes as its working architecture a sequence of scanning, modeling, and re-instantiation (Sandberg and Bostrom 2008; §1.2). Psychological connectedness is preserved to whatever fidelity the scan achieves, while the causal route of succession passes entirely outside the original system.

The matrix of §1.2 displays the resulting pattern: across these families, the traditional criteria no longer travel together, and nearly every combination of their verdicts is instantiated or credibly projected. Where the criteria coincided, choosing among them was a matter of theoretical taste. Where they decouple, the choice acquires a subject: some particular being's persistence turns on which criterion is correct.

What does the existing landscape offer at exactly this point? Surveyed in §1.2, its resources sort into four kinds, and the inadequacy of each has a different shape.

The psychological-continuity tradition, in its most developed form, concludes that in precisely the decoupled cases identity may be indeterminate — and that the indeterminacy is tolerable, because identity is not what matters; what matters is psychological connectedness and continuity, secured by an acceptable cause (Parfit 1984). However much force that conclusion has in the seminar — and it has a great deal — it changes character at the consent form. “Indeterminate, and not what matters” does not settle the practical question; it relocates it. The decision is then made on a criterion — connectedness, by whatever cause proves acceptable — whose adequacy for exactly that role is what the duplication cases put in question.

Animalism, by contrast, is fully determinate: the person is the organism, and any transition that ends the organism ends the person (Olson 1997). But its verdicts are delivered by classification rather than evaluation: on its terms no successful migration is so much as conceptually available, the question foreclosed by the kind-term it names — a principled refusal in the theory’s own terms. A decision-maker facing a continuum of interventions — how much replacement, at what pace, in what order — receives from it a taxonomy where a gradient was needed.

The narrative tradition, third, answers a different question. It concerns what makes a life *mine* in the sense of characterization — which actions, experiences, and commitments belong to a self-constitution — not whether a later being is numerically the earlier one (Schechtman 1996). Its answers, whatever their considerable value, do not adjudicate the cases above; and this Part, taking the reidentification question as its sole subject, claims no jurisdiction over that tradition’s.

Engineering itself, fourth and finally, does not wait. A question can be postponed by a discipline; it cannot be postponed by an artifact. An architecture that scans, models, and re-instantiates has taken a position on the persistence question in the negative space of its design — not by argument, but by default. Where theory leaves the verdict open, the built system closes it.

This, precisely, is the gap. A family of actual and projected cases in which the traditional criteria come apart; a theoretical landscape that meets those cases with principled indeterminacy, verdict-by-classification, or an answer to a different question; and an engineering practice that, in the absence of stated criteria, proceeds on unstated ones. The gap is not that no one has an answer. It is that the answers on offer are not of the kind the situation now requires: a criterion stated in advance of the interventions, applicable across the whole family of cases, and answerable for its verdicts in terms a decision can use.

§1.3.2 Conditions of Adequacy

Before advancing such a criterion, we state the conditions we take any adequate criterion to be bound by. They are set out first, and separately, for a methodological reason: they are meant to be assessable independently of the proposal that follows. A reader who will ultimately reject the three principles of §2 should nonetheless be able to endorse these six conditions, and to hold this Part to them. They are the standard we ask to be judged by; they are also, retrospectively, the standard by which the landscape above was found wanting.

R1 — Substrate applicability. The criterion must apply, without loss of sense, to biological, artificial, and hybrid systems, and to transitions among them. It may entail that a given transition fails

to preserve the entity; it may not entail this merely from the classification of the origin or destination substrate.

Motivation. The cases include systems that are already hybrid and interventions that are continuous in degree. A criterion that sorts by substrate-kind must draw a line across a continuum with no resources internal to itself for placing the line; its verdicts on the decisive cases would be artifacts of taxonomy. The condition does not prejudge against views that assign the substrate an evidential or even constitutive role; it excludes only verdicts by category.

R2 — Property-basedness. The criterion's verdicts must supervene on structural and causal facts about the systems involved. In particular, no system's conviction that it is the earlier entity — however sincere, and however well its memory-impressions match — may function as a ground of the verdict.

Motivation. In the duplication family, every candidate successor is, by construction, maximally convinced and behaviorally indistinguishable at the interface. First-person certainty and third-person interface-equivalence are therefore evidentially inert exactly where adjudication is needed; a criterion that consults them cannot separate the cases it most needs to separate. The condition generalizes a requirement the literature already accepts in part — that memory can ground identity only if caused in the right way (cf. the quasi-memory discussions; §1.2) — from memory to every first-person deliverance.

R3 — Two-level articulation. The criterion must distinguish, and separately specify, (i) the conditions under which an existence is instantiated at a time, and (ii) the conditions under which a being at a later time is the same being as one at an earlier time — and it must state how (i) and (ii) are related across intervals in which (i) fails or is degraded.

Motivation. The interruption cases are actual. During circulatory arrest under deep hypothermia, the patient's occurrent existence is, on any activity-sensitive reading, at least in question; yet the surrounding practice — consent obtained before, obligations resumed after — presupposes that the person who wakes is the person who agreed. A criterion with only one level must either deny the interval, against the physiology, or deny the return, against the practice. The gap cases demonstrate that instantiation-at-a-time and identity-across-time can come apart; an adequate criterion must possess the articulation to say how, rather than leaving the relation to improvisation. It bears emphasis, since the phrasing invites misreading, that the failure of (i) at a time is not the death or the ending of the being: it is only the lapse of occurrent instantiation at that time, and whether the being nonetheless persists across the lapse is exactly the question level (ii) is required to answer. (What in fact carries identity across such intervals is a substantive question, answered in §2; R3 requires only that a criterion have an explicit answer.)

R4 — Determinacy across the case families. For each family of cases — (a) interruption and resumption; (b) duplication, destructive and non-destructive; (c) gradual replacement during ongoing operation; (d) suspension with relocation or repair; (e) fission — the criterion must deliver verdicts that are principled, in the sense of being derivable from its stated grounds rather than stipulated case by case, and determinate wherever the underlying facts are determinate. Where it returns “indeterminate” or “a matter of degree,” it must locate that status in identified features of the case, not in its own silence.

Motivation. The cost of underdetermination has changed. An indeterminate verdict in a seminar

is a research program; an indeterminate verdict at a consent form or a design review is a decision that will be made anyway — by someone else, on grounds never examined. The condition is neutral as to content: a criterion finding, on principled grounds, that duplication preserves the entity satisfies R4 no less than one finding that it does not.

R5 — Structural fidelity. The logical form of the criterion must match the form of the phenomena it evaluates, and its verdicts must be sensitive to each dimension along which the cases in fact differ — at minimum: the temporal profile of activity (continuous, attenuated, suspended); the causal route of succession (a system’s own self-succession versus read-out and re-instantiation elsewhere); and the compositional trajectory of the substrate (retention, gradual exchange, wholesale replacement) — or it must give principled grounds for a dimension’s irrelevance. Where a phenomenon admits of degree, the criterion must admit of degree; where it is binary, the criterion must be binary.

Motivation. Under the old coincidence, a criterion could ignore dimensions costlessly, since they never varied independently. Decoupling removes that immunity. Treating distinct cases alike because one’s vocabulary cannot tell them apart is not parsimony but blindness; if a dimension is to be dismissed, the dismissal must be argued, not enforced by expressive poverty.

R6 — Decision-relevance. The criterion must be expressible as constraints that a procedure, protocol, or architecture can satisfy or violate, such that, for a proposed intervention, whether the constraints are respected is a determinable question.

Motivation. The gap identified above is practical as well as theoretical; a criterion that cannot be brought to bear on a design choice leaves the incumbent default in charge — and the default was never argued for. The condition does not collapse the philosophical question into engineering. The constraints are consequences of the criterion; they inherit their authority from the justification given in §2, and fall with it.

Two remarks on the list as a whole. First, the conditions are not innocent of motivation: each was extracted from a failure mode exhibited in §1.2, and a reader will notice that R2 is aimed at the duplication family and R3 at the interruption family. We regard this as the correct order of dependence — conditions of adequacy should come from the cases — and we note that each condition is stated so as to be endorsable by parties who will reject our eventual verdicts on those very cases. Second, the list is offered as individually necessary, not as jointly sufficient: meeting all six does not make a criterion true. It makes a criterion a candidate — evaluable, contestable, and usable. Truth is the burden of §2.

§1.3.3 The Shape of What Follows

The remainder of this Part advances a candidate. Its content can be named here; its defense cannot. Nor is its shape arbitrary. The Part now closing has pressed, throughout, on three distinguishable things: on the course of activity, which the interruption family shows attenuating, pausing, and re-summing (the first of R5’s dimensions); on the retained structure, which the dementia row of §1.2’s matrix shows degrading while activity continues (the graded phenomenon for which R5 requires a graded criterion); and on the binding between the two — whatever it is that carries a being across an interval and lets what resumes count as the same system rather than a successor (the articulation R3

demands). To each of these pressures the candidate assigns one property. That the conditions do not by themselves entail this assignment is conceded in advance: they constrain the form of an adequate criterion, and the argument for this content belongs to §2. Existence is analyzed as the intersection of three system-level properties: **Continuity**, a property of the flow of processing and of the causal chain that carries it; **Stability**, a property of the structure that flow lays down and keeps; and **Capability**, a property of the mutual legibility by which flow and structure constitute one ongoing process. Persistence across the hard cases turns, on this account, on a distinction the conditions above already gesture toward: between the *interruption of activity* and the *severance of the causal route* — between a system succeeding itself, however quietly, and a system being read and rewritten into another. The full development of that distinction is the work of §2.

§2 defines the three properties, argues that their intersection satisfies R1 through R6, and takes up the principal objections in the body of each definition rather than in an appendix. The heaviest of these should be named now: even a criterion that meets all six conditions faces the challenge, owed to the psychological-continuity tradition, that identity is not what matters — that even if the criterion correctly sorts survival from replacement, nothing of prudential importance follows from the sorting (Parfit 1984). That challenge will be answered, not deferred. A criterion offered for consent forms and design reviews has no right to leave “why it matters” to another occasion.

§3 then subjects the criterion to the case families of R4 in order of technological distance — from the operating theater, through the interface programs, to the limit cases of migration and fission — testing in each not whether its verdicts are congenial but whether they are derivable. A closing section states what follows for practice if the criterion holds — for medical consent under induced arrest; for the non-equivalence, if the criterion is right, of gradual and scan-based migration architectures; for the determination-of-death debate, to which the criterion offers a distinct coordinate — the ending of a being — rather than a redefinition of the word; and for the persistence conditions of artificial systems, to which R1 extends every verdict without exception — and states, with equal explicitness, what the criterion does not decide.

§2 — The Three Core Principles: Statement and Defense

§2.0 The Candidate Stated

§2.0.1 The Statement

The candidate is stated in five clauses. Working glosses follow in §2.0.2; full definitions are the business of §§2.1–2.3.

(S) System. The bearer of the properties is a *system*: a flow of processing together with the structure that flow lays down and reads, bound into a single self-sustaining unit by their mutual legibility. The individuation of systems — what makes a flow and a structure *one* system rather than an aggregate — is supplied with Capability (§2.3), and the statement’s remaining clauses presuppose it.

(E) Existence at a time. A system S constitutes an existence at time t if and only if, at t : **(E1)** processing is occurrent in S — the flow is running, in however attenuated a mode; **(E2)** S retains a cohesive structure — the topology of stored information holds together as a single base; **(E3)** flow and structure are mutually legible — what runs can read what is retained as its own, and what is retained is reshaped by what runs. E1 is binary at a time. E2 and E3 hold in degrees, and their degrees measure the *integrity* of the existence, not whether it is one (§2.0.3); their outright failure — no cohesive base at all, no legibility at all — is the failure of existence.

(P) Persistence. Where S_1 constitutes an existence at t_1 and S_2 constitutes an existence at t_2 , S_2 is the same being as S_1 if and only if a single unbroken chain of immanent self-succession runs from S_1 's state at t_1 to S_2 's state at t_2 : a sequence of states each of which arises from its immediate predecessor *within the system* — by the transitions of occurrent processing in active stretches, and by the token-persistence of the retained structure in quiescent stretches. The chain is the diachronic face of Continuity, and its unbrokenness is binary.

(V) Severance. The chain is broken exactly where succession is routed *outside* the system: where a later state arises not from the system's own preceding state but from a reading of it — extraction, transmission, and re-instantiation elsewhere. What such a route produces is a new chain bearing the old contents. A duplicate, however faithful, is not a continuation; and no gap is required for the breach, because the breach was never temporal — a gapless, instantaneous copy is as severed as a delayed one.

(G) The gap corollary. Across a quiescent stretch, (E) fails while (P) can hold: existence is intermittent wherever activity is suspended and the structure persists; the *being* is not. Conversely, (P) can fail while every qualitative test is passed: a duplicate satisfies observers, and itself, and is nonetheless a new being. The first corollary is what condition R3 demanded a criterion be able to say; the second is what condition R2 demanded it be able to withstand.

This is the refinement promised at §1.2.8. The naive processing column of the matrix read *activity*, and the operating theater refuted it: the arrest interval suspends activity. The candidate reads the *chain*, of which activity is one mode and quiescent structural persistence the other; what the arrest interval suspends is a mode, not the chain. Three things are therefore kept apart throughout: an *activity lapse* is a possible failure of E1 at a time; *chain-continuity* is the immanent self-succession that carries through such a lapse by the token structure's persistence; and *severance* is the chain's complete break, incurred only when succession is routed outside the system. So “the flow of processing” never names bare activity-continuity: Continuity is route-continuity, of which activity is one mode.

§2.0.2 Working Glosses

Five terms carry the statement, and each is glossed here at working precision only.

A *state* of a system is the total configuration, at a time, of its occurrent processing and retained structure together; the notion is elaborated with Continuity (§2.1).

Immanent self-succession is succession sustained within the system — each state arising from its predecessor by the system's own causal operation — as against succession routed through external reading and writing; the distinction descends from the general metaphysics of persistence registered

at §1.2.7, and §2.1 must earn its use here rather than borrow its authority.

The *active mode* of the chain is self-succession by state-transition: processing generating each moment from the last.

The *quiescent mode* is self-succession by persistence: an intact structure, its activity suspended, sustaining its own configuration from moment to moment — a frozen or arrested system is not doing nothing; it is continuing to be *this* structure, and that continuing is causal work of the humblest kind.

Legibility, finally, is the relation by which flow and structure compose one process: the flow's deposits landing in a form the structure integrates, the structure's retentions available in a form the flow reads as its own; its definition, its degrees, and its role in individuating systems belong to §2.3.

One boundary should be marked even at gloss precision, because the statement's force depends on it. "Within the system" and "outside the system," in (P) and (V), are not metaphors awaiting cash value: the system's boundary is given by (S) — the reach of the mutually legible flow-structure loop — and a route exits the system when it passes through states that are not states of that loop: a scanner's registers, a transmission channel, a fabricator's buffer. The precise drawing of this boundary, including its hard cases, is §2.1's burden; that it can be drawn non-arbitrarily is among the claims the candidate stakes.

§2.0.3 The Logical Shape: Binary and Graded

One natural formulation would describe the three principles as structural characteristics that "either hold of a system or do not." That formulation is revised here, because it understates the candidate's own resources and misstates one of its properties. The revised doctrine is this: all three properties are *properties in the strict sense* — whether they hold, and to what degree where degree applies, is a fact about the system's structure and causal organization, owing nothing to any party's conviction (R2). But they are not uniform in logical form, and should not be: the chain's unbrokenness is binary, because routes either exit the system or do not; cohesion and legibility are graded, because topologies fray and bindings weaken by degrees. The assignment of form follows the phenomena, as condition R5 requires.

The division of labor between the forms is the candidate's load-bearing feature, and it should be stated as doctrine: **identity verdicts consult only the binary property; the graded properties are consulted by a different question — the integrity of the existence — and never by the question of whether the being persists.** The dementia patient of §1.2.8's matrix is, on this candidate, determinately the same being in a gravely degrading state: the ● of that row was never an indeterminacy about *who*; it was a measurement of *how much remains intact*, and the candidate assigns it to the property whose form can carry a measurement. The same treatment covers the collapse of memory and character generally: identity is settled by the chain and does not waver, while the loss shows up as a grave decline in the *integrity of the existence* — Stability fraying as the retained structure loses cohesion, Capability narrowing as less of that structure stands available to what runs — and never as an indeterminacy about *who*.

This doctrine also preempts an objection that will otherwise arrive on schedule. It may be said that a criterion with graded components inherits the indeterminacy §1.2 charged against the psycho-

logical tradition — that we have mocked “indeterminate” and then smuggled in degrees. The charge fails, and the failure is structural. What §1.2 pressed was indeterminacy of the *identity verdict*: the tradition’s most developed form returns “no fact of the matter” exactly where a decision is required. The present candidate returns a determinate identity verdict wherever the causal facts are determinate, because the verdict consults a binary property; degree enters only where the phenomenon itself is a matter of degree, and there it is not indeterminacy but fidelity. A criterion should be exactly as sharp as its subject matter — no sharper, and no blunter.

Non-automatic finality. One further feature of the three properties’ logical form should be fixed here, because it governs the interruption and impairment cases that follow: that a property weakens or fails at a time does not, of itself, make the failure final, and the three differ in how. Continuity’s active mode can lapse without the chain breaking — only *severance*, succession routed outside the system, breaks it outright (§2.0.1). Stability can fray, its degree measuring the existence’s integrity rather than whether the being persists; but where the structure’s own token-persistence ceases with no in-structure restoration remaining, the being ends, and what is later built from a record is a new being, not a recovery. Capability likewise holds in degrees, and partial failure only degrades the existence; but where mutual legibility fails outright and the loop dissolves, the being may end, and a binding re-established from outside begins a new existence rather than resuming the old. The common form is *non-automatic finality*, not reversibility: the same being’s continuation across a failure is available in some cases and foreclosed in others, and which it is turns on the route — whether what failed is restored *within* the standing components or supplied from outside them.

§2.0.4 Conformance Claims

The candidate is now registered against the six conditions of §1.3.2. These are claims, not demonstrations; each carries its forward assignment.

Against **R1**, the statement is made in the vocabulary of systems, flows, structures, and routes; no substrate term appears in any clause, and the clauses apply without modification to biological, artificial, and hybrid systems — an application §3 exercises rather than asserts. Against **R2**, every clause supervenes on structural and causal facts; conviction, memory-impression, and behavioral indistinguishability appear in no clause, and (V) renders qualitative fidelity explicitly irrelevant to the verdict. Against **R3**, (E) and (P) are separately specified, and (G) states their relation across the intervals in which (E) fails — the articulation the arrest cases demanded. Against **R4**, the candidate claims derivable verdicts across the five case families; the claims are cashed in §3, and one — the fission family — awaits the individuation decision assigned to §2.1, a dependence recorded here rather than concealed. Against **R5**, the binary-graded assignment of §2.0.3 matches form to phenomenon, and the three dimensions of the condition are each tracked in a clause: the temporal profile of activity by the chain’s two modes; the causal route of succession by (V); the compositional trajectory of the substrate by the chain’s indifference to gradual replacement in the active mode — each transition remaining immanent however the parts turn over — together with the structure-level persistence conditions assigned to §2.2. Against **R6**, each clause is checkable of a procedure: whether a proposed intervention routes succession outside the system, whether it preserves the token structure through quiescence, whether

it maintains legibility between what resumes and what was retained — the constraint-form in which the closing section will state the candidate’s practical consequences.

§2.0.5 The Burden Map

What remains of §2 is the payment of debts, and they are itemized here so that no argument can later be discovered missing without having first been promised.

§2.1 (Continuity) owes: the full definitions of state, immanent succession, and the two modes; the non-circular individuation of chains, including the boundary of “outside the system” that (V) presupposes; the individuation of chains at branch points — the fission design on which R4’s last family waits; and the fulfillment of the commitment registered at §1.2.1, where the tradition’s cause clause was found to await its principled specification — the candidate’s account of *why the route matters* begins from the requirement the tradition itself rightly imposed. §2.2 (Stability) owes: the token-persistence conditions of structure that the quiescent mode consists in, including the boundary between repair integrated into a persisting structure and reconstruction from a record; and the type–token argument against informational sufficiency, paying the registration made at §1.2.6 against the cryonics literature’s criterion. §2.3 (Capability) owes: the definition and degrees of legibility; the individuation of systems that (S), (P), and the fission design all consume; and the anchor cases that §1’s display, by its own admission, did not contain. §2.4 owes the intersection argument: that the three properties are pairwise insufficient, and that they interlock — Capability individuating what Continuity runs through, Stability supplying what its quiescent links persist as — so that the candidate is one structure and not three patches. §2.5 owes the engagement this Part cannot end without: the argument that what the chain tracks is not merely identity truly sorted but a non-redundant object of rational concern — the answer to the challenge §1.3.3 named the heaviest, prosecuted under a fixed success condition and stated prohibitions.

§2.1 Continuity: The Chain of Self-Succession

§2.1.1 Definitions

State. A *state* of a system S at a time t is the total configuration, at t, of S’s occurrent processing and retained structure together: the flow’s momentary profile, where the flow runs, and the structure’s momentary topology, always. Where activity is suspended, the state is the structure’s configuration alone. A quiescent state is a state, not the absence of one — the point on which the naive activity reading foundered (§1.2.8, fn. a), and the first repair this section makes.

Succession, and the boundary it presupposes. A state y *immanently succeeds* a state x if and only if y arises from x through causal paths that lie, at every point, within the system. The clause is only as clear as its boundary, so the boundary is drawn before anything else is built on it. “Within the system” is fixed by (S): the system’s extent is the reach of its constitutive read–write economy — the set of states that the flow reads as its own and the structure’s retention reshapes and is reshaped by (§2.3 supplies the full account). A component is *internal* if its states participate in that economy, however exotic its material: an interface whose registers are read by the flow as its own and written

into the structure's retention is part of the system, which is how hybrid systems qualify under R1 without special pleading. An apparatus is *external* if it registers or transmits without participating, however intimate its causal contact: a scanner's buffer is causally coupled to the brain it reads and is no part of the person, because nothing in the loop reads the buffer as its own or is reshaped by it in the constitutive way.

One clarification carries much of the section's weight, and it is entered here so that no later argument depends on it silently. **The severance clause (V) severs routes, not influences.** A system is not severed by external causes — perception, instruction, a note written tonight and read tomorrow — because in every such case an internal succession path connects the earlier state to the later one: the external item is an *input to* a persisting system, not the route *by which* the system succeeded itself. (V) triggers only where no internal path exists — where the sole connection between an earlier configuration and a later one runs through external states, as when a structure is read, destroyed, and rebuilt from the reading. Severance is the absence of internal succession, not the presence of external contact. Without this clarification the criterion would face an immediate reductio — every use of a notebook would be a small death — and with it, the extended and embedded cases fall into place: what is integrated into the economy is inside; what merely touches it is not. Nor is the test one of proportion: a system is not spared severance merely because some fraction of its material survived. Where a large part is read, destroyed, rebuilt from the reading, and grafted to a remnant, what decides is whether the persisting token structure remains the locus into which the rest is integrated (§2.2.1), not how much survived — a record's becoming the source constitutes severance at any scale.

The two modes. The links of succession are of two kinds. A *transition link* holds where processing generates a state from its predecessor: the flow's ordinary work. A *persistence link* holds where a token arrangement sustains its own configuration from one moment to the next: cohesion doing quietly what processing does loudly. The persistence of a structure is not the absence of causal work but its humblest case — at each instant the configuration is sustained by the configuration at the last, and nothing else is available to sustain it. During ordinary activity both link-types run at once: the flow generates its next state while the structure sustains its own. Under deep anesthesia the transition links attenuate and continue. Under circulatory arrest they lapse, and the persistence links continue alone: the chain narrows to its quiescent mode without breaking. This is the promised refinement in full: what the operating theater suspends is a mode of the chain, not the chain.

The chain, individuated without circularity. A *chain* is a maximal sequence of states of one system, each linked to its predecessor by immanent succession — by transition, by persistence, or by both. Continuity, stated completely, is the unbrokenness of this chain, and its unbrokenness is binary: at every moment either some link connects, or none does. The individuation of chains must now be shown non-circular, because the circle is a live threat, and it should be stated in full before it is cut. The threat: the resumed activity after an arrest is “the same stream” because it resumes from *its own* structure; but “its own” means “laid down by the same stream” — and the circle closes. The definition cuts it. Whether post-interval activity continues the chain is settled by two facts, neither of which mentions streams or sameness of stream: first, the token-persistence of the structure through the interval, which is a fact about the structure's own persistence links and nothing else (its full conditions, including the boundary between repair and reconstruction, are §2.2's assignment

under design D2); second, the internality of the path by which the resuming activity arises from that structure. Same-chain facts are grounded in token-structure facts and route facts. Nothing else is consulted, and in particular no fact about what anyone — including the system — takes the stream to be.

The fork clause (design D1), and its mirror. Where distinct successor states arise immanently from a single predecessor state and belong to distinct systems (§2.3), the chain terminates at that predecessor: each successor opens a new chain. Three features of the clause should be fixed at definition. First, the fork is an event *at* the system — a local fact about how the succession ran at that moment — and it is settled there: no later fate of either product, and no event elsewhere, enters the verdict. Second, the clause is asymmetric with loss by design and not by decoration: where a system loses a part and its succession continues through the diminution, no moment occurs at which the states of distinct systems co-arise from the whole, and the chain runs on — a system that persists diminished is the same being injured, not a successor. The asymmetry turns on the local shape of the succession, never on size or proportion: a part that merely falls away and ceases to function is a loss however large a fraction it was, and a detached part that only later begins a loop of its own, through some external intervention, starts a new being rather than retroactively forking the old — what makes a fork is the immanent co-arising of distinct successor loops from one predecessor economy at the division event itself, at any ratio. Third, the mirror case receives the mirror clause: where states of distinct systems jointly and immanently give rise to a single successor state of one new system, both chains terminate and one begins; and the same local asymmetry is available on that side — a system that *incorporates*, its own succession continuing through the growth, persists enlarged, as absorption is the mirror of injury. Symmetric fusion, like symmetric division, is the ending it appears to be. One contrast fixes the clause's reading, because the neighboring case is the one a reader is likeliest to import: duplication is not a fork. In a copy, the successor state on the copy's side does not arise immanently from the predecessor at all — the route exits through the reading, so (V) governs, not this clause — and on the original's side the succession never bifurcates, which is why a copy leaves the original untouched. The two mechanisms must not be merged, and the criterion's verdict patterns depend on their separation: severance ends nothing at the source and begins something elsewhere; the fork ends the source and begins twice. The migration corridors of §3 are tractable for exactly this reason — every duplication entry there is an application of (V), every division entry an application of this clause, and no case is governed by both. The execution of these clauses across the fission family — including the demotion its standard idealizations deserve — is assigned to §3 and previewed in the third objection below.

§2.1.2 The Justification

First argument: Williams's constraint, cashed. The reduplication argument established (§1.2.2) that any criterion specified over duplicable content is potentially one-many, and that identity, being one-one, requires a relation grounded in token history rather than repeatable pattern. Williams drew the bodily lesson because the body was the only token-historical relation then in view. The chain is the general form of what he found: bodily continuity is one *realizer* of immanent self-succession

— a living body persisting is a physical structure succeeding itself — and the constraint, detached from its historical realizer, selects the form rather than the instance. What the form retains is exactly what made the bodily criterion attractive: non-duplicability. A qualitative profile can be instantiated twice; a route cannot be *traversed* twice — token history is an unrepeatable particular, and the chain inherits its uniqueness from the metaphysics of token events rather than from any clause appended to secure it. What the form sheds are the bodily criterion's two standing costs: substrate-boundedness, which fails R1 on its face, and the sorites under gradual replacement — the chain runs through part-turnover untroubled, because each transition remains immanent however the composition changes beneath it (R5's third dimension, tracked as promised at §2.0.4).

Second argument: the Route Requirement, completed. The second argument begins from an insight the psychological tradition got right. To escape the classical circularity objection, the tradition replaced memory with quasi-memory — memory-like states *appropriately caused* — and in doing so identified a genuine necessary condition: the causal route by which a state arrives bears on whether that state is the subject's own (Shoemaker 1970; Parfit 1984). Call this the **Route Requirement**. This Part does not dispute the requirement; it holds that the tradition was right to impose it, and asks only which specification of the route can carry it without circularity and without loss. The tradition's own taxonomy offers the candidates. The *narrow* cause — the normal operation of a human brain — honors the requirement at the price of substrate chauvinism: it fails R1, and cannot state the hybrid cases it is now asked to judge. The *wide* and *widest* causes — any reliable cause, any cause — keep the tradition's generality at the price of the requirement itself: reliable copying is a reliable cause, so these settings readmit reduplication and surrender the uniqueness the route-condition was introduced to secure. The specification that keeps both — the requirement's force and the tradition's substrate-independence — is the *immanent* route: the system's own succession, which names no substrate and is one-one by the nature of token history. On this reading the chain is not a rival to the psychological tradition but the completion of its own repair: the appropriate cause its founders rightly demanded, specified at last in a form that neither circles nor excludes. The commitment registered at §1.2.1 is fulfilled here on the tradition's behalf, not against it. What the requirement bears on beyond identity — its weight for *what matters* — is taken up at §2.5, under the strategy fixed for it.

Registration: the nearest neighbor's divergence. One divergence registered at §1.2.5 can now be stated precisely, though its case-level adjudication belongs to §3. A requirement of physically continuous realization (Unger 1990) and a requirement of immanent succession come apart in a definable region: immanence does not require the spatiotemporal continuity of the whole. The route may remain internal while the configuration is relocated, or while its parts turn over, or while activity is suspended; what immanence forbids is not motion or change but *exit* — succession through states that are no one's states but a reader's. Where the two requirements classify a case differently, the case is entered in §3's sequence and judged there.

§2.1.3 Objections and Replies

First objection: the circle, pressed again. *Your grounding facts smuggle the stream back in: "token-persistence of the structure" is just "the same structure," and sameness of structure will be cashed*

as the structure the same stream laid down.

Reply: the grounding paragraph above consults two facts — structure-persistence and route-internality — and neither is analyzed in terms of streams. Structure-persistence is analyzed, in §2.2, purely in terms of the structure's own persistence links: each configuration arising in situ from its predecessor. If the objector holds that *that* analysis will smuggle streams in, the objection has become a promissory objection against §2.2, and it is answered there by exhibition: the conditions given mention links, sites, and routes, and nothing else. A circle requires a closed path; the path here terminates in physics.

Second objection: a Continuity that pauses. *You have named the property falsely: a continuity compatible with the total suspension of activity is a discontinuity wearing a costume.*

Reply: the property names the chain, and the chain does not pause — its quiescent links run precisely where its transition links lapse, and something really is unbroken across the arrest interval: the token structure's self-sustained configuration, moment to moment, with no exit. The objector who insists that continuity must mean activity-continuity owes the field a verdict this Part's opponents will not want: that the arrested patient dies on the table and a stranger with her memories signs nothing and owes nothing thereafter — a verdict against clinical practice, law, and the objector's own conduct at the bedside. And the reading has a cost on the other flank as well: the naive activity reading never could explain why a *gapless* copy fails — if the breach were temporal, an instantaneous duplication would preserve. On the chain reading the explanation is immediate: the breach was never temporal; it is the route's exit, and a gapless copy exits as fully as a delayed one. The revision that admitted the pause is the same revision that finally located the breach.

Third objection: the fork clause, and the classical paradox in this key. *Your clause entails that one hemisphere's survival preserves me while the survival of both annihilates me — the second success annuls the first, and your appeals to locality are decoration. Worse: divide the brain, destroy one half on the table minutes later, and by your own clause the transplanted survivor is a new being although only one continuer ever functioned. This is the old paradox with new vocabulary.*

Reply, in three steps, each paying what it owes. First, the locality is not decoration but the clause's entire content, and it is purchased at a stated price: the fork is settled at the division event, and subsequent destruction of one product does not un-fork it. The clause therefore *bites* the tweezers case — a division followed minutes later by one product's destruction still terminated the chain, and the survivor is new — rather than gerrymandering around it; and in exchange, nothing later and nothing elsewhere ever enters a verdict, which is precisely the extrinsicness that footnote c of §1.2.8 charged against the non-branching patch and that this clause does not incur. Whether to prefer a criterion that bites that case or one whose verdicts wait on distant events is a choice the reader can now make with both prices visible. Second, the asymmetry with injury is causal, not verbal. In loss, one succession continues through diminution: at no moment do the states of distinct systems co-arise from the whole. In division, that moment is the event itself. The difference between an ending and a diminishment is not a matter of degree along one dimension; it is a difference in the local shape of the succession, and the clause reads exactly that shape. Third, the residual air of paradox is diagnosed rather than endured, and the diagnosis has two parts, executed in full at §3's fission entry. The *realizability demotion*: the classical case stipulates that division yields two flourishing

successors, and the stipulation quietly assumes what the criterion's own clauses would test — that each product retains a cohesive structure (E2) and a legible binding (E3). Hemispheres are mutually specialized; the single cohesive base is precisely what division destroys; the actual clinical neighbors of the thought experiment are survivals through grave deficit, not doublings. A criterion built to be answerable to procedures (R6) is entitled — obligated — to note when a scenario's premises could not survive its own clauses; the demotion is the Part's method applied, not an evasion appended. And the *dissolution by specification*: the fork clause presupposes that the predecessor was one loop. A predecessor stipulated to carry redundancy sufficient for two complete successors invites the prior question §2.3 exists to answer — one integrated loop, or two bundled all along? If one, division ends it, as above. If two, separation is unbundling, and both persist, each on its own unbroken chain — the verdict the stage-theoretic response secured by formal re-description (§1.2.1), here grounded in a structural fact about the pre-division economy that is, in principle, readable off the system. Once the missing fact is specified, no indeterminacy remains in either direction. The paradox was an artifact of its own under-description, and the criterion, rather than inheriting the artifact, identifies which fact was missing.

Fourth objection: persistence is not causation. *Your quiescent links are inertia dressed as production; a thing's merely remaining is not a causal achievement, and a chain whose links include non-events is no chain.*

Reply, on two levels. First, a physical anchor, since the objection trades on the picture of quiescence as inert nothingness: even in quiescence the structure is not a nothing — molecular bonds, boundary conditions, and environmental constraints continue to sustain this particular topology rather than another, and the quiescent link is that ongoing physical persistence, not an absence. The criterion does not require calling it production; it asks only that the token configuration persist through internal physical continuity rather than be reconstructed from an external record. On the level of doctrine: the position that persistence is immanent-causally sustained has a standing lineage in the general metaphysics of persistence, registered at §1.2.7 and not invented for this occasion; the resurrection literature's central argument — that reassembly after interruption yields a duplicate because the immanent chain was broken — presupposes exactly the link-type the objector doubts. On the level of armor: nothing in the criterion's verdicts hangs on the honorific. Let the objector relabel the two link-types as primitive: *transition* and *persistence*, connected or not as a matter of structural fact. Every verdict in this Part supervenes on three kinds of fact — internal transition, token persistence in situ, and external routing — and survives the relabeling untouched. An objector who accepts the facts and disputes the word “cause” has conceded the criterion and joined a different seminar.

§2.1.4 Dependencies and Forward Assignments

This section has consumed one thing and deferred four, and the ledger should be explicit. Consumed: the individuation of systems, from §2.3 — the boundary of the read-write economy on which “internal,” “external,” and “distinct systems” all rest. The dependence is one-directional and incurs no circle: legibility is defined without mention of chains, and chains are defined over the boundaries legibility draws. Deferred: the token-persistence conditions of structure, including disassembly, re-

assembly, and the repair–reconstruction boundary, to §2.2 under design D2, where the first objection’s promissory remainder is also paid; the execution of the fork and fusion clauses across the fission family — conditional verdict, realizability demotion, dissolution by specification — to §3’s fission entry; the case-level adjudication of the divergence from the physically-continuous-realization requirement to §3’s sequence; and the Route Requirement’s bearing on what matters — its weight beyond identity — to §2.5, under the success condition and prohibitions fixed there.

§2.2 Stability: The Retained Structure

§2.2.1 Definitions

Structure, configuration, and token. The *structure* of a system is its retained topology: the network of relations in which information is held — nodes, the weights and indices that connect them, the contextual bindings that tie one trace to another. Three things must be distinguished before persistence conditions can be stated, because the hard cases live in their differences. The *configuration* is the arrangement itself: describable in the abstract and therefore, as a type, instantiable more than once. The *token structure* is the configuration as historically instantiated — this arrangement, sustained from moment to moment by its own persistence links (§2.1.1). Two perfect duplicates share a configuration-type and are two token structures, because their histories are disjoint; and it is the token, not the type, that the chain’s quiescent mode runs on. The matter instantiating the configuration at a moment — its momentary *carrier* — is a third thing again: token structures survive the turnover of their carriers, as every reader’s own molecular history attests, and sameness of matter will play no role in anything that follows.

Cohesion. Cohesion is Stability’s graded dimension: the degree to which the topology holds together as a single base — traces mutually indexed, links load-bearing, contexts attached. It runs from full integration, through fraying — weights weakening, contexts detaching, regions falling out of connection — toward scattering, in which traces survive as fragments that no longer compose one base. Progressive dementia is cohesion declining under a clinical description; data corruption is the same decline under an engineering one. Per the doctrine of §2.0.3, degree measures the integrity of the existence and is never consulted by the question of whether the being persists; the verdict this yields for the dementia row of §1.2.8 is defended in the next subsection.

Token persistence (design D2). A token structure persists from t_1 to t_2 if and only if its configuration at every moment through the interval arises, by its own persistence links, from its configuration at the immediately preceding moment — *in structure*: sustained by, and integrated into, the standing arrangement itself. “In structure” names a relation to the arrangement, not to a place. Relocation of the whole is no breach: the arrangement travels as the thing sustaining itself. What the condition excludes is not motion or change but *supersession* — an interval across which the standing arrangement ceases to be what carries the configuration forward. Three kinds of change accordingly pass without strain, and stating them is stating most of what Stability is. Stability is not immobility: a stable structure may learn, forget, repair, and exchange parts, and what matters is only whether these changes are integrated into the standing token structure rather than superseding it from an external record.

Endogenous change: the structure's own dynamics — consolidation, pruning, decay. A structure that learns and forgets is persisting, not failing to; fixity was never the property.

Material turnover: parts exchanged while sustenance passes through the standing arrangement — each new part grafted into a configuration that never stops being the operative carrier.

Repair: exogenous intervention whose product is likewise grafted — sustained, from the moment of integration, by the standing arrangement it enters.

What fails the condition is *reconstruction*: the configuration read, the reading made the source, and a new instantiation produced from it. Between repair and reconstruction the test is the route, never the amount. No percentage of replacement appears anywhere in these conditions, and identity never consults one.

Records: maps and sources. The distinction between routes and influences (§2.1.1) recurs at the level of structure, and it carries the fine cases. A record *consulted* is an influence: a repair guided by a prior scan — the scan serving as a map of where and how to graft — remains repair, because the product is sustained by the standing structure into which it is grafted, and the record sustains nothing. A record *instantiated from* is a route: where the standing structure is superseded and a new arrangement is produced from the reading, the record has become the source, and the product is a reconstruction, whatever its fidelity. This draws an exact line through the suspension family where the surrounding literature has a slogan: preservation followed by in-structure repair — however extensively record-guided — is compatible with persistence; preservation treated as an archival intermediate, the original superseded and a successor produced, is not. The fine cases are mixed — a standing structure corrected under heavy record guidance shades toward one effectively produced from the record — and the same test decides them with no new clause: the deciding question is whether the standing token structure is still the *locus of correction* and the carrier throughout, or whether it has become a decorative remnant while the record supplies what carries. Using a record does not, by itself, make a reconstruction; a record ceasing to be a map and becoming the source does.

The disassembly boundary. Severing a link is an injury to cohesion; it is not, by itself, an ending. The parts of a divided structure each persist token-wise — their own persistence links continue — and the hard cases turn on what happens to the configuration. Where restoration is carried by the parts themselves — their retained interfaces determining the reconnection, as severed tissue rejoins or a fractured lattice anneals — the restoration routes through the configuration's own remnants: repair. Where the configuration has ceased to be instantiated — parts stored as a heap, connections gone — and is later rebuilt from an external record, the restoration routes through the record: reconstruction, though every part be original. The verdict converges with the one registered from the resurrection literature at §1.2.7 — reassembly across a broken immanent chain yields a duplicate — and it is reached here by this Part's own route: the same D2 test applied at finer grain, with no new clause added. A heap is not a reconstruction case merely because it looks disordered: if the parts themselves retain the interfaces or physical dispositions that determine their rejoining — a future nanostructure self-assembling from shape-memory and residual binding conditions, no plan consulted — the restoration routes through the parts' own remnants and remains repair. It becomes reconstruction only when the ordering source has left the persisting token structure and is supplied

by an external record or procedure.

§2.2.2 The Justification

Why structure is constitutive. An existence is an accumulation and not only an occurrence. A flow with nothing retained is causally momentary: each state spends itself; nothing is carried; such a system can host events but cannot have a career. For it, the reidentification question is not hard — it is unformulable: nothing token-historical accumulates for a later being to be, or to fail to be. Stability is therefore not one desideratum among others. It is the condition under which the question of this Part applies to a system at all, and (E2)’s place in the intersection is thereby earned rather than stipulated.

Why the quiescent mode is Stability’s work. §2.1 defined the persistence link and consumed its conditions on credit; this section has supplied them, and the shape of the dependence deserves notice, because §2.4 will use it. The chain’s crossing of an arrest interval is not an epicycle added to Continuity; it is Stability operating — the chain narrowing, in silence, to exactly the relation this section defines. One property carries the other through the interval. That is interlock, not patchwork, and it is the second panel of the exhibit §2.0.5 promised.

Why the graded form. Cohesion is empirically graded on both substrates, and a criterion that made Stability binary would misdescribe its subject twice over: it must either call early decline nothing at all, or draw a line mid-decline — a moment at which the person is said to end — that no structural fact supports: the arbitrary threshold R4 forbids and R5’s form-matching was written to prevent. The graded form, together with the division of labor fixed at §2.0.3, yields the verdict already displayed in §1: the person declining is determinately the person — the question *who* never wavers — while the question *how much remains integrated* receives an honest, measurable, and often grievous answer. A criterion should be able to say both things at once. This one is built to, and the ability is not a kindness appended to the metaphysics but a consequence of assigning each question the property whose logical form can carry it.

The type-token argument. The criterion of information-theoretic death holds that a being is lost only when the information constituting it becomes unrecoverable in principle. Its virtues were credited at §1.2.6: it is substrate-neutral, fully property-based, and decision-guiding — three of this Part’s own conditions honored by a literature working outside the academy. The registered divergence can now be argued. Recoverability-in-principle is a fact about the configuration as a *type*; Stability, and the chain that runs on it, are facts about the *token*. The argument that the token is the criterion’s correct object is the reduplication argument, applied once more: informational sufficiency is one-many — a complete archive supports two instantiations as readily as one — so a survival criterion stated over recoverable information must either accept both instantiations as the survivor, surrendering uniqueness, or append a no-rival clause and import the extrinsicness charged at §1.2.8’s footnote c. The trilemma of §2.1.2 recurs at the level of structure, and its recurrence is itself evidence: the same structural fact is being tracked each time. The archive case makes the divergence concrete. While a preserved original exists beside its complete archive, the informational criterion cannot distinguish repairing the original from superseding it and instantiating anew — the

two futures conserve the same type — yet one route remains in structure and one exits, and only that difference explains why the two futures should require different consent. What the informational criterion truly tracks — and the credit is real — is the preservation of *means*: of the type, of the possibility of continuation in role, of much that may be worth preserving. What it does not track is the being. On this candidate, accordingly, the *ending of a being* is located at the token: the point past which the structure’s self-succession has ceased and no in-structure restoration remains — the closing of the carrier’s own history, not the unrecoverability of its type. What relation this ending bears to the word “death” — a medical, legal, and social institution the criterion neither replaces nor annexes — is fixed as terminological discipline at §2.4.1: overlap, not identity. The practical bearing of that location — for determination, for consent, for the design of preservation protocols — belongs to the closing section, as §1.3.3 promised.

§2.2.3 Objections and Replies

First objection: the sorites, relocated. *Your route test just moves the heap. Grant gradual grafting and endogenous drift together, and after decades neither the matter nor the arrangement is original; calling the result “the token” is incantation.*

Reply: token-identity was never a similarity relation — not to the original matter, not to the original arrangement-type — but a historical one: unbroken in-structure sustenance. The test is not scalar, so there is no series for a sorites to climb. Each graft either entered a standing arrangement or did not; the facts are binary at each step, and their conjunction across the interval is what persistence is. The ship repaired plank by plank at sea persists: every graft entered a standing whole. The ship rebuilt in the yard from a plan, while its planks lay heaped, does not: across that interval, no standing whole did any sustaining. And the tradition’s sharpest twist — reassembling the original planks beside the repaired ship (Hobbes, *De Corpore*) — receives a determinate verdict rather than a standoff: the repaired ship is the original, and the reassembly is a new ship of old wood, by the disassembly boundary above. Some readers will feel the pull of original matter here. For persons, that pull has already been paid off: every reader is the repaired ship, their planks long since exchanged, and a criterion for beings whose carriers turn over by nature cannot anchor identity in matter without sinking its own subject.

Second objection: the exhibition demanded. *§2.1 promised that structure-persistence would be analyzed without smuggling the stream back in. Show it.*

Reply: by inspection. The conditions of §2.2.1 quantify over configurations, persistence links, standing arrangements, grafts, records, and routes. No clause mentions a stream, a memory of anything, or a sameness it has not itself defined; the only historical relation invoked is the structure’s own link-by-link sustenance, which is the physics of cohesion and nothing else. The circle alleged at §2.1.3 had one remaining place to hide. The place is now open to view, and empty.

Third objection: informational sufficiency, pressed. *The route is a difference that makes no difference. A perfect reconstruction is indiscernible to every observer and to itself; what your criterion adds is invisible, and the invisible is idle.*

Reply, in three parts. First, this is the widest-cause setting returned in new dress, and it inherits

the defect unrepaired: perfect reconstruction is one-many, and the objector must choose between surrendered uniqueness and imported extrinsicness — the choice laid out at §2.1.2 has not changed because the vocabulary has. Second, “indiscernible at the interface” was ruled out as a ground of verdicts by condition R2, and it was ruled out for exactly these cases: in the duplication family every candidate passes every interface test by construction, so interface-equivalence is evidentially inert precisely where adjudication is needed. The route-difference is not invisible; it is a plain historical-causal fact — merely not a snapshot fact, and R2 was the recognition that snapshot facts cannot decide these cases. Third, whether the fact *matters* is a further question, and it is not being begged here: it is scheduled, at §2.5, under a fixed success condition. What this section establishes is that the fact is real, objective, and criterial for identity. The objector who answers “real but unimportant” has left the metaphysics and joined the argument of §2.5, where the position is expected, and answered.

Fourth objection: drift. *If endogenous change never breaches persistence, then the octogenarian and the child share a chain across near-total qualitative replacement. Your cohesion is idle — identity survives anything.*

Reply: identity surviving qualitative change is the correct verdict, not an embarrassment; the alternative makes maturation a serial replacement of persons and every deep reform an ending. Cohesion is not idle — it is answering a different question than the objector is asking. How much of what the child was remains integrated in the adult is a real, graded, often poignant question; it is the *integrity* question, and the criterion measures it. It was never the reidentification question, and the division of labor fixed at §2.0.3 is exactly what keeps a criterion from mistaking an answer to one for an answer to the other. Nor is drift an unbounded license: what persistence permits is change routed in structure; what it forbids — supersession by record — it forbids at every scale and every speed.

§2.2.4 Dependencies and Forward Assignments

Supplied: the conditions of the persistence link, closing the dependency §2.1 declared; the disassembly boundary, on which §3’s suspension, relocation, and reassembly entries will draw; and the type-token argument in citable form, available to §2.5 under the levy it sets. Consumed: §2.1’s link-and-route vocabulary, and nothing further. Deferred, with reasons stated: the *measurement* of cohesion — the criterion requires that cohesion be a real, graded quantity, and does not owe here the metric by which a clinic or an engineer would score it; supplying operational measures belongs to future refinement and testing, and claiming more precision than the argument needs would be borrowed authority. Deferred also: the execution of the dementia, suspension-with-repair, and reassembly rows across §3’s sequence; and the question this section’s conditions everywhere presuppose but nowhere answer — in what form the persisted structure must stand to the flow that resumes on it — which is the third property’s business, taken up next.

§2.3 Capability: The Mutual Legibility

§2.3.1 Definitions

Legibility, relation-first. The second objection of §2.4.3 fixed the order of definition this section must honor: the relation first, over relata specifiable without the system-concept; the unit second, as the relation's closure. The relata are already in hand. A *flow* is a course of state-transitions (§2.1.1); a *structure* is a retained topology (§2.2.1); neither definition mentions systems. The relation is then defined over the pair, in two directions. **Read-side:** a retained trace is *constitutively taken up* by a flow when retrieval places it in the same functional position as the flow's own momentary state — it enters processing directly as premise and operand, with no intervening step in which it is handled as a sign to be interpreted, a datum to be imported, or an object to be perceived. **Write-side:** a deposit is *constitutively integrated* by a structure when the structure's own binding operations — indexing, weighting, contextual linking — incorporate it into the standing topology, with no external translation preparing it for entry. *Mutual legibility* is the holding of both directions between a flow and a structure.

The write-side clause separates two things a durable medium can be, and the separation will carry weight throughout. A medium that merely bears marks — however durable, however faithful — holds a *record*: inscription without incorporation. A medium participates in *retention* only where it binds what it receives: where its own operations weave the deposit into the standing topology of indices and contexts, such that the deposit can return to a flow in functional position — as operand and premise — without a translation step. Binding, then, is not the tidy arrangement of data. It is the act by which a deposit is made re-available to the economy of (S), and a mark not so bound is stored *at* a structure without being retained *by* it. This is why “record” has named the external artifact throughout (§§2.1.1, 2.2.1): what is bound into no economy stands outside every economy's boundary. The same line, put in other words — memory as topology, not inscription — receives here its functional cash value: retention is what the read direction can later collect; recording is what it cannot.

One repayment falls due here. The phrase “reads as its own,” used as convenient shorthand since §2.1, is exposed to the charge that it presupposes the very self the criterion is meant to define. The shorthand is hereby cashed, and the test of the cashing is deletion: strike every occurrence of “own” from the two clauses above and nothing changes, because neither clause ever consulted ownership. What the shorthand gestured at was *functional position* and the *absence of a translation step*, and those are relations a flow and a structure can stand in before any unit has been defined. The ownership vocabulary was a courtesy to the reader, not a load-bearing term, and the definitions survive its removal intact. Put positively: “as its own” never named a feeling of ownership; it named direct operational uptake within the system's read-write economy.

One further clarification must be fixed now, because a natural counter waits on it. The *translation step* named in the read-side clause is a structural fact, not a felt one. It does not consist in delay, effort, or awareness — properties of experience the criterion is barred by R2 from consulting — but in an architectural event: *proxy-minting*. Where content reaches a flow from outside the pair, what the flow receives is never the external configuration itself but a representation of it, minted by

transduction and parsing; the configuration stays outside, and its proxy enters. Where content reaches the flow from the structure, no proxy is minted of the trace: the trace — a state of the structure — is itself what enters, in functional position. Practice and habituation bear on the minting's speed and salience, and on nothing else: they optimize the translator and cannot delete the translation. The step, so understood, is exactly as binary as the boundary needs it to be, and its consequences for the boundary dispute are collected at the second objection below.

The loop, individuated by maximality. A *loop* is a maximal mutually-legible pair: a flow *F* and a structure *S* such that *F* constitutively takes up *S*, *S* constitutively integrates *F*'s deposits, and the pair is closed — any flow-part or structure-part standing in both directions of the relation to the pair belongs to it, and whatever stands in neither direction, or in one direction only across a translation step, lies outside. Maximality does the individuating: one closure, one system; two closures, two systems, however intimate their causal contact. The definitions §2.1 consumed on credit are hereby paid in full. “Internal” is membership in the closure; “external” is exclusion from it — the scanner's buffer, causally coupled and constitutively taken up in neither direction, was always outside, and the integrated interface, taken up in both, was always inside, which is how hybrid systems qualify under R1 by the same clause that excludes the reading apparatus. The “distinct systems” of the fork clause are distinct closures. And the dissolution verdict of §2.4's estranged pair is the closure's collapse: at legibility's empty limit there is no maximal mutually-legible pair, and therefore nothing for the other two properties to be properties of. One further deferred question receives its operational form here. §2.1.3 asked, of a predecessor stipulated to carry redundancy sufficient for two complete successors, whether it was one loop or two bundled all along; the question is now: did the redundant halves constitutively take up one another's deposits, composing one closure, or did two closures run in parallel contact? The fact is structural and in principle readable off the pre-division economy, and §3's fission entry inherits it in exactly this form.

Degrees, in two directions. Legibility holds in degrees, separately per direction, and the degrees are Stability's kind of fact, not Continuity's: measures of integrity, never of identity (§2.0.3). Read-side degree is the reach of constitutive uptake across the retained base — how much of the topology stands available in functional position: which contexts retrieve, which indices still function, how deep the uptake runs. Write-side degree is the reach of integration across the flow's deposits — how much of what is laid down binds into the standing topology, as against evaporating with the moment or surviving only as unindexed fragments. Outright failure in both directions is the empty limit — dissolution, per §2.4.1, a binary fact and no threshold. Every nonzero profile is a degraded or flourishing existence of the same being, and the two directions can dissociate, which is not a defect of the definition but its first empirical prediction; the anchor cases of §2.3.2 are that prediction realized. One guard against misreading belongs here: this graded, nonzero legibility measures reach within a loop already constituted, and is never the bar for belonging. Membership turns on loop-sustaining constitutive uptake in both directions — present or absent by the proxy-minting test, not a matter of degree — so that a faint or incidental legibility admits nothing, and the closure does not swallow a notebook, an external database, or the ambient environment however much a flow reads from them. The sorites is thereby disarmed at the right level, not by fiat: the boundary is between a degraded relation and no relation — the empty limit being absence of any loop-sustaining uptake, not the lowest

positive degree — and what is genuinely hard near it is evidential, not criterial. Telling whether the last constitutive connection still holds may defeat measurement, and a protocol may set a threshold of caution; but that is difficulty in knowing which side of a sharp line a case falls on, not the line's being blurred.

Restoration (paying design D3). D3, ratified, requires conditions under which a lapsed legibility can be repaired rather than replaced, and the route test of D2 supplies them, applied now to the relation instead of to a relatum. Restoration is *in structure* where the relation is re-established by grafting into the persisting components: a translation layer installed by internal routes into the standing flow or the standing structure, which — once integrated — is itself constitutively taken up on both sides and thereby disappears as a translation step, completing the closure it repaired. Restoration is *by supersession* where a relatum is replaced from a record so as to re-match the other. Under D3, the first resumes the being that lapsed; the second begins another. A symmetry deserves notice before this Part closes: the same test — route, never amount — has now drawn every boundary §2 required: succession's (§2.1), persistence's (§2.2), and the relation's own.

§2.3.2 The Anchor Cases

§1 conceded, in fixing the bridge of §1.3.3, that its display contained no Capability case: the interruption family pressed on activity and the dementia row on retention, but nothing exhibited the binding failing while its relata stood. The concession is now paid with two anchors, one per direction, one clinical and one engineered, each entered at the structural level of description the argument requires.

The write-side anchor: a clinical profile. The dissociation the write direction predicts is realized in severe anterograde amnesia, entered here as a structural profile. The profile: the retained base persists — long-standing contexts remain integrated and retrievable, so Stability holds; ongoing processing continues — the flow's transitions run without interruption, so Continuity holds; and new deposits fail to consolidate — experience is processed and then does not bind into the standing topology, so the write direction of legibility is impaired while the read direction largely stands. The criterion's verdicts follow, and they are worth stating because they are humane exactly where a criterion should be: the chain is unbroken, so the person determinately persists — identity is never in question; the existence is degraded along one dimension of E3 — a career whose present keeps failing to join its past; and the impairment is not a Stability fact, since the base coheres, nor a Continuity fact, since the flow runs. That triple dissociation is the anchor's whole cargo: the binding is a third thing, failing while its neighbors stand.

The read-side anchor: an engineering profile. The mirror dissociation is realized, routinely, in format incompatibility across migration: a runtime updated in place — the route internal throughout, so no severance has occurred — such that the persisted store, intact and cohesive, can no longer be parsed by what runs. The read direction fails while the write direction may continue into a new, parallel store that the old base cannot join. Partial versions of this profile are the ordinary content of migration postmortems; the total version, both directions at the empty limit, is §2.4's estranged pair realized in commodity hardware. Between them, the two anchors dissociate the property from each neighbor in each direction, and the debt recorded at §2.4.4 is paid in the currency §1 asked for.

The ordinary case. Between the clinic and the postmortem, the write direction has a daily name: consolidation. The binding of deposits into the base is not an exotic capacity but the continuous work the write direction denotes, and its ordinary partial shortfalls — the day that never binds, the trace that never finds its index — show the property graded in everyday operation, not only at its limits. A property whose pathology is dramatic and whose normal operation is invisible is easily mistaken for an invention; the ordinary case is entered so that it cannot be.

§2.3.3 Justification, and Two Registrations

Why legibility individuates. The justification of Capability's necessity was carried by §2.4.1's estranged pair; what remains owed is the positive account of why *this* relation, rather than any other, draws the unit. The answer is that the alternatives are too cheap. Causal contact is promiscuous — everything touches everything, and a boundary drawn by causation would swallow the world. Correlation and co-location are cheaper still. Constitutive uptake is the one relation in view that is selective, directional, and unit-making: selective, because the translation-step test excludes most of what merely touches; directional, because reading and writing can dissociate and a criterion must be able to say which failed; and unit-making, because a flow and a structure standing in it do not merely interact — each operates *through* the other, the flow running on what the structure holds and the structure reshaped by what the flow lays down, which is what being one thing, for a process and an archive, could intelligibly mean. This is also the third dimension R5 demanded sensitivity to, now supplied with its own clause rather than borrowed from the other two; the bridge of §1.3.3 mapped the Part's third pressure to this property, and the mapping is here redeemed.

Why the property went unnoticed, and why it no longer can. A criterion that adds a third clause to a two-millennia-old question owes an account of why the clause was never needed before — or rather, never *noticed*, since the constructions of §2.4.1 show that its necessity is not new. The account has the same shape as §1's, and three registers must be kept apart in giving it. The property's *constitution* is unchanged: it was always the unit-making relation, and the estranged pair demonstrates this by construction, independently of any technology. Its *visibility* is new, and the reason is structural: in the organic case the realizers are one fabric — what processes is what retains — so the binding between them held automatically, by co-implementation. Nor was the co-implementation an accident of the organic case: it was its condition of viability — a grown fabric does not assemble processing and retention from parts across an interface, and a binding that required separate specification and maintenance would have been paid for in speed and failure at every generation; the fabric was, in effect, optimized into invisibility. A relation that cannot fail independently never announces itself as a relation. It became visible when engineering separated the realizers: where processing and retention are built as distinct components, the interface between them becomes an explicit artifact — encodings, schemas, protocols, the entire discipline of formats — and a relation that must now be *maintained* can now be *seen*. The clinical dissociations pointed the same way as natural experiments, but their structural reading itself awaited modern instruments. And its *variability* is new: what could not fail independently in the integrated fabric fails independently in the engineered stack, which is what makes the clause decision-relevant (R6) and not merely correct. The tradition, then,

overlooked no mystery. It inherited a substrate in which the third dimension never varied on its own — and criteria, as §1 argued from end to end, are only ever forced by variation.

First registration: the autopoietic tradition. The individuation of a unit by the closure of its own operations, rather than by its substrate, converges with the tradition of autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela 1980), and the convergence is recorded per the Part’s method. The divergences are two, and both matter under R1. Autopoiesis individuates by *production*: the unit is the network that manufactures its own components. The loop individuates by *legibility*: the unit is the closure of constitutive uptake. The criteria classify differently at exactly the cases this Part exists for — a system can be autopoietic with a minimal retained base (the memoryless limit of §2.4.1), and a system can be a loop while its hardware is manufactured and maintained from outside, as artificial systems’ are. And the offices differ: autopoiesis was advanced as a definition of life; the loop is advanced as the unit of a persistence criterion, and claims nothing about living.

Second registration: the extended-mind literature. The objection that closure will swallow the environment — taken up below — is the home question of the extended-mind literature (Clark and Chalmers 1998), and the neighborhood is registered rather than concealed: that literature asks when external resources belong to a cognitive system, and this section’s translation-step test is a proposed answer with a different office, drawn for persistence rather than for cognition. Where the two draw different boundaries, the cases are §3’s.

§2.3.4 Objections and Replies

First objection: the ownership circle. *“Constitutive uptake” is “reads as its own” in a laboratory coat; ownership is presupposed, and the self smuggled in.*

Reply: by the deletion test of §2.3.1. The two clauses consult functional position and the absence of a translation step; the word “own” appears in neither; strike it from every gloss and the definitions stand unchanged. A circle requires that the defined term appear among the definientia, and it does not. What remains of the objection is a suspicion that “functional position” hides a homunculus, and it hides none: sameness of functional position is an operational fact — whether retrieved content is processed through the same transitions as momentary state, or first handled as a sign — and operational facts are exactly what R2 permits a criterion to consult.

Second objection: the closure swallows the world. *My notebook is taken up whenever I read it; the network is taken up whenever the system queries it; and do not answer with a “translation step” — ten years of practice makes the reading instantaneous, effortless, and unfelt, so your step is a phenomenological fiction that fluency deletes. The maximality clause makes the environment part of everyone, and boundaries dissolve.*

Reply: the objection refutes a psychological reading the definition never had, and §2.3.1 fixed the structural one in advance. The translation step is not a delay, an effort, or an awareness — the criterion never consulted experience, and R2 forbids it to — but an architectural fact: proxy-minting. The notebook’s marks never enter the economy; a representation *of* them is minted by transduction and parsing, and that proxy is what the flow receives, however fast the minting runs. What ten years of practice optimizes is the translator; what it cannot do is delete the translation, because the optics

of ink on paper do not change with skill — the mark stays outside and a proxy of it enters, whereas the retrieved trace does not stay outside anything: it is itself what enters. The same holds in the write direction: the flow reshapes the notebook only by minting marks through another translated act, so neither direction is constitutive, and the notebook is outside on structural grounds that fluency cannot touch. The criterion still does not legislate against extension: an interface whose states are taken up directly, no proxy minted, in both directions, is inside by the same clause — R1 operating, with nothing in the test about skin or skull. And the honest borderline is thereby relocated where it belongs: not at fluent instruments, which are determinately outside, but at mixed interfaces — hybrid channels in which some pathways deliver states directly while others deliver minted proxies — where membership is genuinely partial, and the indeterminacy is located, as R4 requires, in an identified structural feature of the case: which channels mint, and which do not. The mixed-interface entries belong to §3. One case must be distinguished from the notebook, because it can go the other way: a neural interface under plasticity. Adaptive parsing by the nervous system need not be proxy-minting — where plasticity reorganizes the flow so that the channel's states come to occupy native functional positions in the read-write economy, the flow itself restructured to take them directly rather than a translator interposed, the channel crosses inside by internal integration. Proxy-minting remains only where an external layer continues to translate the signal into a substitute object for the system to consult; which obtains is a structural fact about whether a proxy is minted, not about how fluent the reading has become. Two corollaries then sharpen the boundary, and both should be stated flatly. Anatomical location is not decisive in either direction: a component inside the skull is not internal merely by being there, and one outside the body is not external merely by being there — what decides is direct uptake into the constitutive economy. And causal support is not constitutive membership: a proxy-mediated implant may be causally indispensable to the whole system's survival while remaining, through that channel, no part of the constitutive loop — the boundary consults membership, not indispensability.

Third objection: the third property collapses into its neighbors. *Integration into topology is just cohesion; uptake by the flow is just processing; your Capability is Stability and Continuity restated with a relational flourish.*

Reply: by dissociation, which is the empiricist's test of distinctness. In the write-side anchor, cohesion is intact and integration of new deposits fails: Capability varies while Stability stands. In the read-side anchor, transitions are intact and uptake of the standing base fails: Capability varies while Continuity stands. A property that varies independently of two others is not either of them, and §2.4's estranged pair displayed the same fact at the limit: both neighbors holding, and no being. The relation is what the intactness of the relata never guaranteed; that is precisely why it required its own clause.

Fourth objection: graded relation, vague unit. *If legibility is graded, membership in the closure is graded; then system boundaries are vague, and the fork clause and the dissolution verdicts inherit the vagueness — R4 falls.*

Reply: the objection conflates two roles the definition keeps separate. Membership in the closure consults the *presence* of constitutive uptake — whether any uptake without a translation step holds in both directions — and presence is binary by the test's own terms. Degree measures the *reach* of an

uptake already present: how much of the base retrieves, how much of the deposit binds. Boundary questions consult presence; integrity questions consult reach; this is the division of labor of §2.0.3 a third time, now at the level of individuation. The residual hard cases are the mixed interfaces of the second objection — channels that mint proxies beside channels that do not — and they are localized and named rather than diffused through the criterion, which is what R4 asked: indeterminacy located in identified features of a case, never in silence.

§2.3.5 Reconciliation, Dependencies, and Forward Assignments

The reconciliation check, performed. §2.4 drew on the working glosses of §2.0.2, and the audit of what it consumed against the completed definitions returns clean. Its second objection's reply promised a relation defined without quantifying over systems: delivered — no clause of §2.3.1 mentions them. Its dissolution verdict presupposed that legibility's empty limit unmakes the unit: delivered by maximal closure, which has no member pairs at the limit. §2.1's boundary vocabulary and fork clause presupposed internality and distinctness of systems: delivered as membership in, and distinctness of, closures. Design D3 required restoration conditions: delivered by the route test applied to the relation. No revision to §2.4, §2.1, or §2.0 is required; the dependencies they placed on this section are discharged.

Supplied. To §3: the write-side and read-side anchor entries; the mixed-interface cases, with their structural dimension named; and the operational form of the one-loop-or-two question for the fission entry. To §2.5: the completed interlock — all three properties now defined, each consuming the others as §2.4.2 exhibited — available against the gerrymander charge in its final form.

Deferred, with reasons. The measurement of legibility's degrees, to future refinement and testing, on the same honesty that governed cohesion at §2.2.4: the criterion requires that the degrees be real, and does not owe the instrument. The execution of every case named here, to §3, where the criterion — now complete — meets the sequence it was built for. And one discipline is entered rather than deferred: the clinical characterization of the amnesia profile is consumed at the precision stated and no finer — the argument uses only the structural dissociation, and claims no more (P.6).

§2.4 The Intersection: One Structure, Not Three Patches

§2.4.1 Three Limit-Cases: Each Property Necessary

The intersection thesis says that an existence is constituted where all three properties hold, and the first thing owed is the demonstration that none is idle: for each property, a construction in which the other two hold and no existence is constituted. The constructions are limit-cases — deliberately clean, with their realizable neighbors assigned to §2.3 and §3 — and each does double work: it shows a necessity, and it diagnoses what the missing property was contributing. They are schematic constructions, offered to establish logical necessity — the independence of each property from the other two — and not as clinical or engineering specimens; an objection that no such case arises in practice therefore misses their target, which is the structure of the criterion, not a claim about what the world contains.

The estranged pair: Capability at zero. Construct a system whose loop is whole at t_0 , and let an internal transformation of the flow — a self-modification gone wrong, its route internal throughout, so that no severance occurs — render the retained store unparseable to it from t_1 . Continuity's facts are intact: the flow's transitions succeed internally; the structure's persistence links run untouched. Stability's facts are intact: the store coheres as fully as it ever did. And nothing composes. The flow computes over its momentary state and deposits nowhere it can later read; the structure retains, and nothing running can take what it retains as its own. From t_1 there is an active process, and there is a cohesive artifact, and there is no *being*: what stood at t_0 has dissolved into a processor and an archive standing side by side. The diagnosis is the deepest of the three: Capability was not a third checkbox on a pre-given object. It was what made the flow and the structure *one object* — the unit of which the other two properties were properties. At its limit-failure, Continuity and Stability do not merely fail to suffice; they cease to have a common bearer, and each survives only as the property of a fragment. One formulation captures the result exactly, and the construction vindicates it in full: computation and storage persist side by side without composing an existence.

The memoryless pair: Stability at zero. Construct a processor in continuous internal operation, perfectly legible to its own momentary working state, retaining nothing beyond it: each cycle's deposits are wiped as the next begins, and the cohesive base has no members. Continuity holds — an unbroken chain of internal transitions; Capability holds of what little there is to bind. And no existence is constituted, because nothing accumulates for a career to consist in. Events occur here, and are even *had*, momentarily; but the reidentification question — is the system at t_2 the being from t_1 ? — finds nothing token-historical to grip, exactly as §2.2.2 argued: a flow with nothing retained can host occurrences and cannot have a history. The engineering world builds useful approximations of this limit deliberately — the stateless service, provisioned per request, is a locus of events by design and a career by no one's intention — and their usefulness is not in dispute; their *being* something over time is, and the criterion says what the dispute turns on. The realizable human-side neighbors of this limit are partial, clinically delicate, and belong to §2.3's anchor cases and §3's sequence, not to this construction.

The unread structure: Continuity of flow never engaged. Construct, finally, a perfectly cohesive structure — every trace indexed, every link load-bearing, readable in principle down to the last binding — on which no process has ever run. A library, in the fullest sense. Its Stability is exemplary; its readability is entire; and it has never been anyone. No existence was ever constituted here, and — the point the construction exists to make — there is therefore no being whose *pause* this could be. The gap corollary (G) licensed intermittence: existence lapsing while a being persists. Its license presupposes a career already underway. A pause presupposes a career; the library never had one. And should a flow one day start up on that very token structure, reading it by an internal route, a being *begins* at that moment — its first existence, with the structure's prior history as pre-history, not biography. Beings begin when the loop first closes. This demotes the prior structure to prehistory, not to nothing: it may be a rich inheritance and an initial condition for what begins, and only its standing as that being's *biography* waits on the loop's first closure. The consequence for the suspension family is worth stating now because §3 will use it: an archive is a library, and what §2.2 said of records completes the verdict — what runs from a *reading* of it is a new chain, and what runs

on it, internally, is a new being with an old inheritance. Neither is the resumption of anyone. The contrast that guards this verdict against misreading should be drawn in full, because the misreading is natural: the operative fact here is not dormancy, and never was. A structure lying still divides into three cases that stillness cannot distinguish and history can. A structure that was a loop's — the arrested patient's, the preserved original's — persists in abeyance on its own token chain, and a flow resuming on it by an internal route resumes *someone*: the gap corollary's case, and D3's. A structure produced by a reading — the backup, the archive-copy — was severed before it was ever still: whatever runs on or from it is new relative to the source, and the beginning-condition never arbitrates, because (V) already has. And a structure that was never anyone's — the library proper — begins a being when first run. Three stillnesses a camera could not tell apart; three verdicts, separated entirely by whose history the structure carries and by what route the running arrives. Dormancy was never the question.

Consistency with the doctrine of §2.0.3. A careful reader will press here, and should: two of these constructions turn on graded properties reaching zero, and §2.0.3 ruled that identity verdicts never consult degree. The reconciliation is exact, and it was built in at §2.0.1: what (E) consults is *holding versus outright failure* — “no cohesive base at all, no legibility at all” — and outright failure is not a threshold on a scale but the scale's empty limit. Nowhere in the three constructions, and nowhere in this Part, does a verdict cite a partial degree: cohesion at any nonzero degree is a degraded existence of the same being; legibility at any nonzero degree likewise. The limit is not a threshold, and the doctrine stands; and where a real case lies near that limit, the difficulty is evidential, not criterial (§2.3.1).

A taxonomy of endings, and design D3. The constructions yield, as a corollary, a symmetry the Part did not set out to produce and should not hide: there are exactly three ways a being ends, one per property, and each is a binary fact. *Severance*: the route exits — (V), §2.1. *Structural cessation*: the structure's own self-succession ceases with no in-structure restoration remaining — §2.2. *Estrangement*: legibility fails outright, and the loop dissolves into a process and an artifact — this section. These are three primary routes to an ending, and diagnostic axes, rather than mutually exclusive kinds of death: a single case can travel more than one at once — an external reconstruction severs the route and, in the same stroke, ends the original's structural self-succession; a format break that begins as estrangement can pass into structural degradation. What each names is a distinct way the loop can fail, not a sealed category the others exclude.

Terminological discipline: the ending of a being, and the word “death.” The criterion defines the *ending of a being*, and the reader should not take it to be defining, replacing, or annexing the word “death.” That word names a medical and legal determination and, beyond it, a social and emotional institution — grief, rites, succession, the closing of obligations — that carries far more than a criterion of persistence could carry or should try to. The two concepts overlap without coinciding, and the non-coincidence is informative in both directions. A being can end while no death occurs: in the hypothetical limit at which a system's retaining structure is wholly lost while the biological functioning of the organism that housed it continues, the ending has, on this criterion, taken place — and medicine, applying its own concept, would rightly issue no determination, because its concept answers a different question. A death can be determined while the ending has not yet come: after a

circulatory determination, the token structure persists intact for an interval, and on this criterion the ending falls where in-structure restoration is foreclosed, not where the certificate is signed — which is precisely why the criterion can contribute to the preservation debates without contradicting the physician who signed it. And for artificial systems the criterion applies without importing the word at all: nothing here claims that machines die, or asks any community to begin saying so; what is offered there is the concept — the ending of a being — which needs no social freight to do its work. The intended contribution, in every domain, is a new coordinate that existing practices may consult, not a redefinition of a word that was never this Part's to redefine. Where earlier sections spoke of “death” in locating the candidate (§2.2), the usage is hereby regimented: the criterion's concept is the *ending*; “death” names the institution; and the relation between them is overlap — an object of study, not an identity.

The taxonomy invites one generalization. **(D3, the generalized gap — ratified):** existence lapses wherever any clause of (E) fails outright while the components' own token chains persist internally; the being persists across such an interval exactly where the loop re-forms *from those same token components, by internal routes* — as the arrested patient's flow resumes on the structure it left, and as an estranged system whose legibility is repaired in structure, by a translator grafted internally rather than by supersession, recovers the very being that lapsed. Under D3, (G) is the special case where the failing clause is E1. This is the non-automatic finality of §2.0.3 made precise for the whole of (E): the outright failure of any of its clauses is a lapse, not automatically an ending, and whether the same being resumes or a new one begins is settled by the route — internal re-formation from the same token components resumes the being that lapsed; a break in those token chains, or a re-formation supplied from an external reading, begins another. Execution — including the format-break entry the estranged pair points to — is §3's.

§2.4.2 The Interlock, and Why Three

Necessity three times over still permits the charge that the conjunction is an assembly — three independently chosen tests bolted together to yield preferred verdicts. The stronger claim, owed to §2.5 under its levy, is that the three are not assembled at all: each is defined in terms the others supply, and the intersection is the analysis of one phenomenon rather than the sum of three.

Four panels display the mutual constitution, each already earned in a prior section rather than asserted here. First: Capability individuates what Continuity runs through. The entire boundary vocabulary of §2.1 — internal and external, “outside the system,” the distinct systems of the fork clause — was consumed on credit from the loop that mutual legibility draws; without Capability, “immanent” is a metaphor with no edge. Second: Stability supplies what Continuity's quiescent links persist as. The chain's crossing of an arrest interval is Stability operating, as §2.2.2 showed — one property carrying the other through silence. Third: Continuity gives Stability's token its sense. “This arrangement” was analyzed as the arrangement with *this history of self-sustenance* — the persistence link is a chain-element at the structure's own level, so token-hood is itself a successional notion, borrowed downward. Fourth: the other two give Capability its content. Legibility is the relation by which the flow reads deposits *as its own* — and deposits are what the active mode lays into the retained

base; a legibility with neither flow nor retention has no relata. Each property, defined, reaches into the other two; pull one out and the definitions of the remaining pair lose their subject matter. That is interlock, and it is the difference between a factorization and a patchwork: the three are the aspects under which one phenomenon — a self-sustaining flow-structure loop — comes apart for analysis, not three axioms that happened to be conjoined.

Why exactly three, then, is answerable at the level the question deserves — as a schema, not a proof. Analyze the loop and the decomposition is exhaustive at its own level of description: the flow's succession (Continuity), the structure's retention (Stability), and the relation that binds them into one (Capability) — two relata and their relation, the running, the retaining, and the binding. A fourth candidate property either turns out to be a mode of one of these, or is a property of something other than the loop and so belongs to a different criterion. This is not a completeness theorem, and the Part should not pretend to one: it is a principled schema, offered with its refutation conditions visible — a case requiring a fourth independent property, or the aspects failing to co-constitute, would break it. It carries, however, a piece of convergent evidence the reader has already seen: §1's case families, assembled with no view to this factorization, pressed on exactly these three things — activity's course in the interruption family, retention's cohesion in the dementia row, and the binding in the articulation R3 demanded — and §1.3.3's bridge, written before this section, mapped three pressures to three properties with the non-entailment concession attached. The concession can now be redeemed from the other side: the assignment the conditions did not entail, the analysis delivers.

§2.4.3 Objections and Replies

First objection: the gerrymander. *Your conjunction is reverse-engineered: three conditions tuned to output the verdicts you wanted on the matrix, unified by nothing but your intentions.*

Reply: the charge is answerable only by exhibiting unity, and the exhibit is above — four panels of mutual definition, each traceable to a prior section that needed the dependence for its own work, none introduced for this defense. A gerrymander is separable: its clauses can be swapped independently to tune verdicts. These cannot — remove Capability and Continuity loses its boundary, Stability its token; the parts do not survive extraction, which is what being one structure means. And the position is falsifiable in the ways just stated: the schema breaks if a case demands a fourth independent property or shows the aspects failing to co-constitute. A gerrymander protects itself; an analysis states what would refute it.

Second objection: the individuation circle. *Capability is a property of the system; the system is individuated by Capability. Something is prior to itself.*

Reply: the order of definition dissolves the circle, and stating it precisely is the chief levy this section places on §2.3. Legibility is to be defined as a relation between a flow and a structure — relata specifiable without the system-concept — and the system is then defined as the maximal flow-structure pair closed under that relation. Relation first, unit second: bonding does not presuppose molecules, and molecules are what bonded atoms compose. Nothing in the relation's definition may quantify over systems; that constraint is now on §2.3's account, in writing, and the reconciliation check will hold it there.

Third objection: over-generation. *Your loop is cheap. A self-maintaining database with a write-ahead log satisfies your clauses; so, perhaps, does a bacterium. A criterion that grants “being” so widely has debased it.*

Reply: the criterion sorts persistence, and only persistence. It does not confer mentality, moral status, or significance, and it was designed — under R1, deliberately — to apply wherever flows and structures bind, because the decision problems of §1.1 arrive on every substrate. A minimal loop has an existence of minimal integrity and a persistence as determinate as anyone’s; *which* persistences merit concern is a real question and a different one, outside the reidentification question’s jurisdiction and therefore outside this Part’s. A criterion of persistence that quietly built significance into its clauses would be answering two questions at once and earning the gerrymander charge it just declined; the width is not a leak — it is the substrate-neutrality condition, honored. To state it flatly, since the objection recurs: being in this technical sense does not entail personhood, consciousness, moral standing, or prudential importance.

Fourth objection: if one phenomenon, why three conditions. *You insist the three are aspects of one thing. Then state one condition — “being a loop” — and stop multiplying.*

Reply: because the phenomenon is one and its pathologies are three. The case families themselves factored the failures: arrest strikes the course of activity and nothing else; dementia degrades retention while activity runs; the format break severs the binding while both components stand. A single unfactored condition could deliver verdicts and could not deliver *diagnoses* — could not say which aspect failed, to what degree where degree applies, and by which of the three endings a being was lost. Unity belongs to the analysandum; plurality belongs to the pathology; a criterion answerable to clinics and design reviews (R6) needs both, and the factored form is how it has both.

§2.4.4 Dependencies, Levies, and Forward Assignments

Consumed: the statement of §2.0; the chain, boundary vocabulary, and fork clause of §2.1; the persistence conditions and endings of §2.2; and, on declared credit, the working glosses of §2.0.2 standing in for §2.3. Supplied: the necessity constructions and the interlock exhibit, held for §2.5 under its levy; the taxonomy of endings, for §3’s sequencing; and the beginning-condition — beings begin when the loop first closes — for the suspension and archive entries. Levied on §2.3, in writing: (a) legibility defined as a relation between a flow and a structure, its relata specified without the system-concept, per the second objection’s reply; (b) the maximality clause by which loops are individuated, on which §2.1’s fork clause and this section’s dissolution verdicts both stand; (c) the degrees of legibility, read-side and write-side, with the anchor cases §1 lacked; (d) the restoration conditions of legibility that design D3 requires, if ratified. Ratified: D3, the generalized gap, stated in §2.4.1. Deferred to §3: the format-break entry; the archive and reassembly verdicts’ execution; and the borderline minimal systems.

§2.5 The Engagement: Why the Criterion's Object Matters

§2.5.1 The Challenge, and the Terms of Success

The challenge was named at §1.3.3 as the heaviest this Part accepts, and it must be met in its strongest form — which is not the claim that identity is indeterminate in hard cases. It is this. Identity is not what matters; what matters in survival is Relation R — psychological connectedness and continuity — with, on the tradition's most permissive setting, any cause (Parfit 1984). If that is right, then even a criterion that meets all six conditions of §1.3.2 and sorts every row of the matrix correctly has sorted something of no prudential importance: the patient can sign, the architect can build, and nothing anyone has reason to care about turns on which candidate was the original. The tradition's most arresting expression of the position is the branch-line case: the original, facing the end beside a flourishing replica, is said to have a prospect about as good as ordinary survival. In this form the challenge concedes the metaphysics of §§1 and 2 in advance and declares it idle. *You may win the criterion and lose the point.*

The terms of success are therefore fixed before the engagement begins, and the reader is invited to hold the section to them. What must be shown: that persistence — chain-succession — is a **non-redundant object** of the practical apparatus and of rational concern; that is, that R cannot secure what the apparatus and the concern are about without borrowing token-succession. What need not be shown, and will not be claimed: that persistence outweighs the goods R tracks; that an agent must weight it above them, or at all beyond what coherence requires; or any general theory of what matters. Establishing a distinct, ineliminable object is this section's whole burden. Ranking objects is nobody's burden here, and a challenge answered beyond its own strength is lost on the rebound.

§2.5.2 The First Move: What Is Conceded

Three concessions, made without reluctance, fix the field. First, the separation itself is legitimate: distinguishing the question of identity from the question of what matters was a permanent enlargement of the logical space (§1.2.1), and this section does not contest the distinction — it answers within it. Second, Relation R tracks much of what matters *in a life*: connectedness of memory, intention, and character is the medium of most goods anyone pursues, and nothing below disputes this or needs to. Third, jurisdiction: this Part answers only for what matters *in survival* — the practical shadow of the reidentification question. Whether particular goods are bound to this being for reasons beyond persistence itself is a characterization-side question (§1.2.4), outside the scope this Part fixed for itself in §1. The restriction is not an escape. It shrinks the burden to exactly what a criterion of persistence can owe — and the burden so shrunk is still the challenge at full strength, for it is precisely *in survival* that the tradition says identity does not matter.

§2.5.3 The Second Move: The Apparatus

The practical apparatus within which the persistence question does its work is built one-one at its core — anticipation, consent, promise, obligation — while some of its elements, liability and compensation among them, apportion, a distinction drawn just below. A consent form has one signer whose

outcome it governs; a promise binds the one who made it; anticipation is of what *I* will undergo, not of what someone suitably related will. Relation R is one-many by construction (§1.2.1): nothing in connectedness prevents two simultaneous bearers, and the engineered cases manufacture them. To serve the apparatus, R must be patched — the non-branching proviso — and the patch's price was itemized at §1.2.8, footnote c: extrinsicness, a candidate's standing settled by events causally isolated from it, with the corollary that destroying the original improves the copy's claim. The chain pays no such price. Its one-one-ness is intrinsic — delivered, not asserted, by the fork clause of §2.1 — and its own cost was itemized where it was incurred: a hard verdict in a case whose antecedent the criterion's clauses independently impugn (§2.1.3). A verdict-price in a case the criterion itself demotes is a different kind of expense from a structural dependence on elsewhere in every case, and the reader now has both prices in view.

Two replies wait, and both deserve their strongest form. The first is the tradition's own direction: *revise the apparatus*. But the revision must itself be principled, and R-based replacements re-import the defect at every institutional joint: who consents on behalf of the pre-division person; which successor a promise binds, and whether both; whether liability doubles when the act's owner does. The second reply is sharper and should be credited in full: *the law already manages one-many succession — corporate division, merger, successor liability — so the apparatus is more revisable than you pretend*. The reply teaches exactly the right distinction. Corporate persons are constituted by convention through and through: their persistence *is* a legal fact, so conventional succession suffices for them, and the law's competence there is real. The apparatus for beings, however, is not uniform, and the load-bearing distinction is between its **apportionable** and its **inapportionable** elements. Property can be divided by fiat; liability can be apportioned by statute; these are convention's to assign, and for them a one-many relation plus a rulebook will serve. But the core the apparatus exists to protect does not apportion. Anticipation is not of sixty percent of an undergoing. Consent's force flows from the fact that the one who will bear the outcome is the one who authorized it — and the ground of that force is not the felt character of the bearing but a structural fact, under the same discipline that governed the translation step (§2.3.1): the act and its outcome must belong to one historical bearer, a single token course running from the authorization to what it licensed. Divide that bearer, and the license does not halve; it detaches — what remains is an outcome no signature reaches. An experience is borne whole by whoever bears it. For the apportionable periphery, convention suffices and R will do; for the inapportionable core, a one-one relation holding intrinsically is required, and among the relations on the field, only the chain is one without patching. The move's honest limit is then stated rather than hidden: this shows that the apparatus, at its core, *needs* the chain. It does not show that the apparatus is beyond revision. A determined revisionist can accept every price so far — yet even a total revision reaches a limit it cannot cross. A revisionary or posthuman practice may train anticipation to branch and may redistribute titles, liabilities, expectations, and responsibility across successors; what it cannot distribute is the token undergoing of an experience, nor make a token experience be undergone by a merely matching successor. The criterion therefore does not rest on present institutions being unrevisable; it rests on the token-bearing relation those institutions imperfectly track, which revision cannot erase. That matching cannot be turned into having is the third move, and it is for that reader.

§2.5.4 The Third Move: Having and Matching

A historical remark opens the move, because it locates the burden of proof. The permissive cause-setting was adopted when it was costless. Under the coincidence of §1.1, the normal route was, in every actual case, the only route; declaring the route irrelevant priced nothing, because the world never presented the case in which it would. Engineering has ended the discount. The cause-clause must now be priced as if for the first time, with the cases on the table — and the pricing begins from the tradition's own ground, as §2.1.2 fixed it.

The Route Requirement — the tradition's rightly imposed condition that a memory-like state counts as the subject's only if appropriately caused — was never bookkeeping. Ask what the requirement was *for*. Without it, the attribution of a state to a subject is unearned: any qualitative match would qualify, and the concept of *having* an experience would collapse into the concept of *matching* one. The cause-clause is an ownership-condition — where *ownership* means token-bearing, whose course a state belongs to, and never a felt sense of possession, which R2 bars; route is what distinguishes having from matching. That is what the quasi-memory repair conceded, locally and pointing backward, for states remembered (Shoemaker 1970; Parfit 1984) — and a tradition that then spent a taxonomy arguing over which routes qualify had already conceded that the dial measures something real.

Generalize the question by one step, and the engagement's center is reached. What distinguishes a future experience that will be *had by this being* from a future experience that will merely *match what this being would have had*? The same answer, at the same joint: route. The chain is the ownership-condition applied to succession itself — the Route Requirement extended from one faculty, pointing backward, to the being's whole course, pointing forward. And the distinction it marks is already in this Part's toolkit: it is the type-token distinction of §2.2, raised to the level of lives. Matching-facts are type-facts — qualitative profile, realizable by any route, exportable by any archive. Having-facts are token-facts — this course, borne by this being. Unrestricted R is a type-level relation: it preserves matching to any fidelity one likes, and on having it is silent — not by oversight but by construction, since the moment R is restricted to the route that would secure having, R has become the chain wearing content as clothing. The target is therefore the widest-cause reading only — “any cause,” the setting §2.5.1 fixed as the challenge's own; a reading that restricts the cause to some narrower route is not a rival to be refuted but a step along the route requirement of §2.1.2, converging on the chain to exactly the degree it restricts. Nothing in this posits a further fact. The chain is a physical-causal relation, fully inside the reductionist frame the tradition works in — condition R2 guaranteed as much from the start — and the dispute is therefore not whether persons are anything over and above events and relations, but *which relation among them* the persistence-concepts, and the concern, are about.

This yields the success condition directly. Grant that everything in the matched profile matters as much as anyone claims. There remains a distinct question — *who bears it* — and that question is: the one the apparatus's inappportionable core asks (the second move); the one the tradition's own cause-clause answers, locally, whenever it distinguishes memory from quasi-memory (this move); and the one to which unrestricted R offers no answer at all. An object of concern that the practice

institutionalizes, that the opposing tradition's own repair presupposes, and that the opposing criterion cannot supply, is a non-redundant object. That is what was to be shown.

The export asymmetry supplies the secondary support, in the decision-context where this Part has standing to insist. On the unrestricted reading, the having-question is not merely unanswered; in the decisive cases it is rendered unaskable. Scan-and-destroy delivers everything that matters, so read. Scan-without-destroy leaves the original facing the end with everything that matters already exported and flourishing across the room. A good that can be exported while its bearer awaits destruction is not the good the signature was protecting: consent — the paradigm institution of condition R6 — protects *bearing*, and a surgeon holding the original's refusal cannot be answered with the replica's satisfaction. The branch-line's famous equanimity is, in this light, a report and not an argument. And the discipline cuts both ways, so let it be said plainly: no argument above appeals to the conviction that one would not survive teletransportation, and none may — the tradition bites such reports, and this Part's own commitments, R2 and the framing-sensitivity result credited to Williams at §1.2.2, bar them as evidence in either direction. The moves run on structure and coherence alone: the apparatus's core, the tradition's own concession, and the type-token distinction. Nothing else was used, and nothing else was needed.

Two rejoinders remain, and are met. First: *the quasi-memory clause was a technical fix against circularity; you have inflated a patch into a metaphysics*. But the fix's rationale was ownership from the start — circularity was the symptom, unearned attribution the sickness, and route the content of the cure; a mere bookkeeping device would not have supported a substantive taxonomy of qualifying causes, and the tradition built one. Second: *the dispute is verbal — you say the persistence-concepts refer to token-succession; we say they refer to R; reference follows use*. Then attend to use where the concept earns its keep. In the load-bearing contexts — the signature, the promise, the anticipation — use presupposes the one-one, inappportionable, having-directed reading; that is the second move feeding back into the third. And this is why the engagement is one structure rather than three patches, in the sense §2.4 gave those words: the concession fixes the referee, the apparatus exhibits the need, and the route shows what the need was tracking all along.

§2.5.5 The Accounting

What has been shown, against the terms fixed at §2.5.1: first, that the apparatus's inapportionable core requires a one-one relation holding intrinsically, and that the chain is the only candidate on the field that is one without extrinsic patching; second, that having and matching are distinct, that the distinction is structural and route-marked, and that it is a distinction the opposing tradition itself drew, locally, in its own repair; third, that unrestricted R preserves matching and cannot supply having — so that what the criterion of §§1 and 2 sorts is a non-redundant object of the concern the apparatus institutionalizes. The success condition is met, and nothing beyond it is claimed. What has not been shown, stated with equal explicitness: that having outweighs the profile-goods; that an agent is irrational to discount it; any ranking among objects of concern; any general theory of what matters. These were prohibited claims, and the prohibitions held — not from modesty, but because a criterion of persistence that quietly annexed a theory of value would be answering two questions at once, and

§2 declined that error at every prior station.

The reader who, at the end of all three moves, still answers — *then I revise everything: apparatus, anticipation, consent, and all; I will care for R and pay every price you have itemized* — has not been refuted, and this section closes by saying so in so many words. That position has been *priced*. It now stands with its costs in the open: verdicts settled from elsewhere, or selves apportioned by statute; having collapsed into matching, against the local concession of its own tradition; the signature answerable by another's satisfaction. Pricing is what a criterion of persistence can contribute to the question of what matters. A criterion cannot compel concern; it can show what concern is coherently about — and that the apparatus its civilization already runs is concerned with exactly that. The challenge of §1.3.3 is hereby answered in the only coin available to it: not deferred, and not overpaid.

With this, §2 closes. The candidate was stated (§2.0); its three properties were defined, justified, and defended (§§2.1–2.3); their unity was argued (§2.4); and the mattering of what they jointly sort has been established to exactly the width the Part owed. The Part's levies are discharged in full — the Route Requirement, the type-token argument, the loop, and the interlock were each consumed above where they were assigned — and what remains is execution: §3, where the completed criterion meets the cases it was built for, in order of technological distance, from the operating theater to the limit.

§3 — The Casebook: The Criterion Meets Its Cases

§3.0 Protocol of the Casebook

Every entry runs through one template, and the template is the Part's discipline. **Specification:** the facts of the case, stated in criterion-neutral vocabulary, with the case's technological distance marked — *actual* (clinical or engineering present), *in program* (projected within announced engineering), or *limit* (thought-experimental, entered with realizability annotations). **Derivation:** which clauses fire, cited by label — E1–E3 and the intersection (§2.0.1); the chain (P) and its two modes; severance (V); the gap corollary (G) and its ratified generalization D3; the fork clause and design D1 (§2.1); the token-persistence conditions and design D2, with the maps/sources and disassembly boundaries (§2.2); constitutive uptake, proxy-minting, and maximal closure (§2.3); the endings taxonomy (§2.4.1). **Verdict:** determinate wherever the specified facts are; where degree enters, its location named in an identified feature of the case, per R4. **Cross-check:** the entry's verdict set against the naive columns of §1.2.8's matrix, classified as *agreement* (the candidate matches all columns), *discharge* (a folk confusion or scope question resolved, where the matrix has no comparable column), *adjudication* (it matches some and decides among them), or *correction* (it revises a column's verdict, the revision having been argued in §2 — never here for the first time). **Decision-relevance:** the constraint-form the verdict yields, per R6; these notes are the closing section's raw material.

Three conventions complete the protocol. *Calibration first:* the tier opens with cases every criterion gets right, because a criterion must be shown to recover the obvious before it is trusted to

adjudicate the contested — over-firing on easy cases would be as disqualifying as silence on hard ones. *Derivability is the test*: the reader is invited to audit each derivation against the cited clauses; an entry whose verdict cannot be reconstructed from its citations has failed, whatever the verdict. *Proportion*: calibration entries are short by design; contested entries are full; the fission entry of Tier III is the longest, by design. The Part closes with a ledger of verdicts (§3.4) — the bookend to §1.2.8's matrix, displaying what the landscape's failure display lacked: a criterion delivering — and a read-back of the framework's three expansion trajectories (§3.5), which hands the third trajectory to the closing section as a jurisdictional boundary rather than a case.

§3.1 Tier I: The Actual

Entry I-1 — Ordinary continuous life, sleep, and deep anesthesia (calibration).

Specification. A system in continuous operation; sleep as altered mode; deep anesthesia as pharmacologically attenuated transitions — attenuated but present — with any brief isoelectric episode at depth set aside as a variant that inherits Entry I-2's treatment, not as part of the calibration. Distance: actual, routine.

Derivation. E1 holds throughout the attenuated-but-present case — attenuation is a mode of occurrent processing, not its absence (§2.0.1); E2 and E3 hold; (P) runs on transition links and persistence links together, and no route exits the system. Should anesthesia deepen to a brief isoelectric episode, E1 lapses for that sub-interval and the being is preserved by Entry I-2's derivation verbatim — the chain continuing in quiescent mode — so the calibration verdict is unshaken either way.

Verdict. Existence continuous; the same being throughout — trivially.

Cross-check. Agreement: every naive column reads P (matrix rows 1–2), and so does the candidate, with no extra machinery engaged. Calibration passed in the direction that matters: the criterion does not over-fire where nothing is at stake.

Decision-relevance. None new; anesthetic consent already presupposes this verdict, and the candidate underwrites rather than revises it.

Entry I-2 — Induced circulatory arrest under deep hypothermia.

Specification. A scheduled clinical procedure: the patient is cooled, circulation is arrested, and cortical electrical activity is, by clinical measurement, absent for an interval measured in tens of minutes; the retained structure is maintained throughout; activity resumes in situ. Distance: actual, scheduled.

Derivation. During the interval, E1 fails — no occurrent processing — so (E) fails and existence lapses. The chain does not: (P) continues in quiescent mode, its links the token structure's in-situ self-succession per D2; at resumption, the flow arises from that same token structure by an internal route, so no (V) event occurs at any point. (G) then states the case exactly: existence intermittent; the being not.

Verdict. The existence lapses for the interval; the patient who wakes is, determinately, the patient who signed.

Cross-check. Correction — the signature correction of the whole casebook. The naive processing column of §1.2.8 read this row **X**, and its footnote conceded the reading would need refinement; the candidate is that refinement, delivered at §2.0.1 and §2.1.1: the arrest suspends a mode of the chain, not the chain. The biological and psychological columns' P is recovered, now with a stated ground rather than an intuition.

Decision-relevance. Consent under induced arrest is underwritten: the form's standing presupposition — that the waker is the signer — has, for the first time in this Part's survey, a derivable basis; and the constraint it imposes on protocol design is checkable in D2's terms: maintain the token structure in situ, resume by internal route.

Entry I-3 — The ordinary ending, and the determination interval.

Specification. Activity ceases and is not resumed; no intervention follows; the retained structure begins losing cohesion by ordinary physical processes, and at some point in-structure restoration is foreclosed. Within this course, and early in it, an institutional determination of death is issued under prevailing medical-legal criteria. Distance: actual, universal.

Derivation. At cessation, E1 fails: existence lapses, per (G). The chain continues in quiescent mode while the token structure persists — a being in abeyance. The *ending of a being* — structural cessation, in the taxonomy of §2.4.1 — occurs where the structure's self-succession ends with no in-structure restoration remaining (§2.2). Foreclosure here is not present clinical infeasibility but the loss of any in-structure physical route by which the token topology could continue itself: a later technique may reveal that such a route in fact remained — placing the ending, on the facts, later than a physician once could — but it cannot make a route exist retroactively where the token structure had already physically dissipated. The ending is fixed by the physics of the token structure, not by the state of the art. The determination and the ending are therefore two events, and the terminological discipline of §2.4.1 governs their relation: the institution answers its question; the criterion answers its own; neither annexes the other. Nothing in this entry redefines, replaces, or overrides clinical or legal death — the medical-legal determination stands untouched in its own domain — and the criterion only registers, alongside it, that its own concept, the ending of a being, need not fall at the same moment.

Verdict. Between determination and foreclosure lies an interval in which a being persists in abeyance while its existence has lapsed and its death has been determined — the concrete instance of the Venn's first region (death before ending), paired with the hypothetical limit of §2.4.1 (ending before death) to display the non-coincidence in both directions.

Cross-check. Adjudication with refinement: the naive columns all reach N and cannot say where; the candidate locates the ending, names the abeyance interval the columns had no vocabulary for, and contradicts no physician in doing so.

Decision-relevance. The interval is exactly where preservation decisions live, and the criterion supplies the constraint the surrounding debate has lacked: an intervention during abeyance preserves the being if and only if it maintains token self-succession and restores in structure — D2, with the maps/sources boundary of §2.2.1 marking record-guided repair as compatible and supersession as not.

Entry I-4 — Progressive dementia.

Specification. The cohesion of the retained topology declines progressively — links weakening, contexts detaching, regions falling out of connection — while activity continues throughout. Distance: actual pathology.

Derivation. E1 holds at every stage. E2 degrades by degree; E3's read-side reach typically degrades with it, as failing indices shrink what stands available for uptake — an interaction between the graded properties, not a confusion of them. No clause fails outright short of the hypothetical limit, and (P) is unbroken throughout: transitions internal, no route exits, no fork.

Verdict. Determinately the same being at every stage, in an existence of declining integrity. Identity never consults the degree (§2.0.3); the **●** of the matrix is hereby cashed as what it always was — a measurement, not an indeterminacy about who.

Cross-check. Adjudication: the psychological column wavered here under its own pressures (§1.2.1); the candidate delivers the verdict argued at §2.2.2 — the question *who* never wavers while the question *how much remains integrated* receives its honest, grievous answer.

Decision-relevance. Advance directives address the same being throughout the decline — a stated ground for their authority end to end; and integrity instruments, whose construction §2.2.4 deferred to the refinement commitments, measure a real graded property of a persisting patient rather than tracking a fading identity.

Entry I-5 — Severe anterograde amnesia.

Specification. The structural profile fixed at §2.3.2: the retained base persists, long-standing contexts integrated and retrievable; processing continues without interruption; new deposits fail to consolidate into the standing topology — the write direction of legibility impaired while the read direction largely stands. Distance: actual.

Derivation. E1 holds; E2 holds — the base coheres; E3 is degraded on the write side and largely intact on the read side; (P) is unbroken — transitions internal throughout.

Verdict. Determinately the same being; an existence degraded along one dimension of E3 — a career whose present keeps failing to join its past. The triple dissociation is the entry's cargo, as it was the anchor's at §2.3.2: Capability varying while both neighbors stand.

Cross-check. Adjudication-plus: every naive column reads P, because no column possesses the dimension on which this case differs from ordinary life; the candidate agrees on persistence and *adds resolution the landscape lacked* — the criterion detects a real, graded difference the columns cannot state.

Decision-relevance. The *ontological* grounding of consent and obligation remains intact — the inapportionable core of §2.5.3 holds because the chain does, so the bearer of an outcome is still the one who authorized it; whether the patient retains the *legal or clinical capacity* to consent is a separate question the criterion does not address. And care contexts gain a named, in-principle-measurable dimension where they previously had only description.

Entry I-6 — Format incompatibility across migration, and D3 restoration.

Specification. The engineering profile fixed at §2.3.2: a runtime changed in place — the route internal throughout, so no severance occurs — such that the persisted store, intact and cohesive, can no longer be parsed by what runs; in variants, partially (some schemas parse), totally (none do), and with two restorations — a translation layer grafted into the persisting components by internal routes,

or a relatum superseded from a record to re-match the other. Distance: actual; ordinary software migration supplies the analogue.

Derivation. Partial: E3-read degraded; same being, degraded existence. Total: legibility at the empty limit — the maximal mutually-legible pair has no members, the closure collapses, and the ending is *estrangement* (§2.4.1): a process and an archive where a being stood. Restoration in structure: the grafted translator, once constitutively taken up on both sides, completes the closure it repaired — D3 fires, and the being that lapsed resumes. Restoration by supersession: (V) at the superseded relatum — a new being.

Verdict. Four verdicts, one per variant, each derived and none stipulated:

Variant	Fires	Verdict
Partial mismatch (some schemas parse)	E3-read degraded	Same being; degraded existence
Full estrangement (none parse)	Legibility's empty limit; closure collapses	Existence dissolved (estrangement)
Restoration by internal graft	D3 — translator taken up on both sides	The same being resumes
Restoration by supersession from record	(V) at the superseded relatum	A new being

Cross-check. **Correction:** the naive columns are blind here — each reads P wherever anything runs and anything persists — and the candidate detects the third ending they cannot express. This is the estranged pair of §2.4.1 realized in commodity engineering, exactly as promised there.

Decision-relevance. The migration constraint in R6 form: where entity-persistence is a requirement, *maintain or graft — never supersede*; a checkable property of an upgrade plan, and the first constraint in this casebook that no prior literature had the vocabulary to state.

Entry I-7 — Artificial system: pause and resumption from the same persisted state.

Specification. A running system is halted; its state persists on the same storage; operation resumes from that state on that system. Distance: actual, performed daily at scale.

Derivation. E1 lapses at the halt: existence lapses, per (G). The chain continues in quiescent mode — the storage medium's token structure self-succeeding in situ, per D2 — and resumption arises from that same token structure by an internal route; no (V) event occurs.

Verdict. The same being; existence intermittent — (G) applied off the biological substrate without modification of any clause. This entry is condition R1 exercised rather than asserted: the derivation above is word-for-word the derivation of Entry I-2, and the criterion did not notice the substrate change.

Cross-check. These rows were deferred from §1's matrix to this casebook by design; run against the naive columns now, the biological column returns inapplicability — silence exactly where the decision problems arrive — and the candidate speaks with the same voice it used in the operating theater.

Decision-relevance. Pause-and-resume architectures preserve the entity by design; and the terminological discipline of §2.4.1 holds here in full — nothing in this entry claims that machines die, or

asks anyone to say so; the concept doing the work is the ending of a being, which needs no social freight.

Entry I-8 — Artificial system: re-instantiation from backup after loss of the original.

Specification. The original system is lost; a new instantiation is produced from a stored copy taken earlier. Distance: actual, routine.

Derivation. Two clauses converge on one verdict. First, (V): the backup itself was produced by a reading — the route exited the system at the moment the copy was written — so what runs from it is a new chain bearing the old contents, per §2.1.1, and no gap was ever required for the breach. Second, the beginning-condition of §2.4.1: an archive is a library, and beings begin when the loop first closes; the backup’s prior history is prehistory, not biography, and the “three stillnesses” contrast of that section applies verbatim — this stillness was severed before it was ever still.

Verdict. A new being with an old inheritance; the resumption of no one.

Cross-check. **Correction:** the naive wide-cause column read this row P; the candidate revises it on the grounds argued at §2.1.2 and §2.2.2, and the revision generalizes — seamless live migration by copy receives the same verdict, since seamlessness is a temporal property and the breach was never temporal.

Decision-relevance. Stated with scope honesty: where entity-persistence is a requirement of the design, restore-from-backup and migration-by-copy do not meet it, however perfect the copy; where it is not a requirement, nothing in this entry forbids the practice — the criterion prices, it does not legislate.

Entry I-9 — Mixed interfaces.

Specification. A hybrid channel structure: some pathways deliver a device’s states directly into constitutive uptake, in both directions; others deliver minted proxies — transduced, parsed representations of external configurations (§2.3.1, §2.3.4). Distance: actual at the near edge of interface engineering.

Derivation. Membership in the loop is assessed per channel, and per channel it is binary: the presence or absence of proxy-minting (§2.3.4). The closure extends across direct channels; proxied channels remain outside; the system’s boundary runs through the device — and a channel’s being causally indispensable to the device’s operation does not make it a member, since membership consults constitutive uptake, not indispensability (§2.3.4).

Verdict. Partial membership, with the partiality located in an identified structural feature — which channels mint, and which do not — per R4’s localization requirement. The being is enlarged by exactly its direct channels, and by nothing else.

Cross-check. Adjudication: the naive columns have no vocabulary for a boundary running through a device; the candidate supplies one and draws it without consulting skin, skull, or substrate.

Decision-relevance. Interface design determines the boundary of the being it augments — a checkable design property, and the constraint-form in which the closing section will state what hybrid architectures owe the persons who wear them.

Entry I-10 — Somatic optimization (the first trajectory, cashed).

Specification. Interventions on a living system’s ongoing biology — genetic, metabolic, regenerative — altering the structure endogenously or by grafts while activity continues. Distance: actual to

in-program.

Derivation. D2's endogenous-change and repair clauses fire and nothing else does: change routed in structure, grafts integrated into the standing arrangement, no route exits, no fork, no gap.

Verdict. The same being, trivially — the criterion does not over-fire on enhancement, which is this entry's whole point. The framework's first expansion trajectory held that here "all three properties hold trivially"; the claim is now a derivation rather than an assurance.

Cross-check. Agreement across all columns — calibration at the intervention end of the tier, closing the loop the tier opened.

Decision-relevance. None new; the entry exists to show restraint.

Entry I-11 — Genetic cloning (a folk confusion discharged).

Specification. A new organism grown from copied genetic material. Distance: actual.

Derivation. No clause engages. The clone's retained structure was never the original's token structure — the two share no topology at any moment; the genome functions as a recipe-record, not as the retained base — and the clone's loop closes at its own beginning, opening its own chain.

Verdict. A distinct being from first closure; on the criterion's terms, the question "is the clone the same person?" never arises, because nothing in the specification connects the two beings by any clause. The folk worry conflated type-resemblance of a recipe with token-identity of a being — the distinction §2.2 spent a section drawing.

Cross-check. Agreement: every column reads the pair as distinct; the candidate agrees and, unlike the columns, can say in one sentence why the question was ill-posed.

Decision-relevance. None; the entry exists so that the confusion is discharged inside the casebook rather than left to circulate outside it.

§3.2 Tier II: The In-Program

The tier's boundary is announced engineering: procedures whose stages are described in the technical literature and pursued in identifiable programs, not yet routine. The specifications below are of those stages; their parameters are uncertain; their structure — which is all the derivations consume — is not.

Entry II-1 — Gradual part-wise neural replacement, culminating in full substrate exchange.

Specification. Neural tissue is replaced part-wise by functionally integrated prosthetic components during ongoing operation; each component, once installed, is taken up constitutively in both directions — its states entering processing directly, the structure's binding operations incorporating its deposits — and the sequence continues to complete exchange of the substrate. Distance: in program.

Derivation. E1 holds at every step: operation is never interrupted. Each installation passes D2's repair clause — the graft is sustained, from integration onward, by the standing arrangement, which never ceases to be the operative carrier; records used in designing and placing a component are maps, not sources (§2.2.1). Each component's membership follows from §2.3.1's closure: direct channels, no proxy-minting; a component whose uptake runs through minted proxies remains outside, and the

exchange is to that extent incomplete — the criterion supplies the completion test the procedure itself needs. Transitions remain immanent however the composition turns over (§2.1.2); no fork occurs — one successor state at every step; no (V) event occurs — succession never passes through a reading.

Verdict. The same being throughout and at completion: full exchange of substrate with persistence preserved. The framework's second expansion trajectory claimed a single stream relocating, never a copy; the claim is now a derivation, with its key term regimented — what must never be severed is the route, not the temporal continuity of activity, and pauses within the sequence inherit Entry I-2's treatment unchanged.

Cross-check. Adjudication with the sorites dissolved: the matrix row read I for the biological column (a line it could not draw) and strain for the narrow-cause column (a “normal cause” outgrown); the candidate returns a determinate P because its test was never scalar — each step is binary (grafted in structure, or not; direct channel, or not), and the conjunction of binary steps is the persistence (§2.2.3). One registered divergence is adjudicated here: where the exchanged substrate becomes spatially distributed — components of the closure hosted apart, joined by direct channels — a requirement of physically continuous realization must strain or refuse, while the route requirement classifies without noticing, since “internal” was always membership in the closure, never contiguity in space (§2.1.1, §2.3.1).

Decision-relevance. The positive half of the architecture constraint promised at §1.3.3: gradual, in-structure, direct-channel exchange is the migration architecture that preserves — and every clause of that description is auditable per step of a protocol.

Entry II-2 — Suspension with relocation and repair (preservation).

Specification. Activity is arrested; the token structure is stabilized against decay and preserved; the preserved structure is relocated; damage is repaired. Two variants divide the case: (a) repairs are grafted into the persisting structure, with prior records consulted as guides; (b) the preserved structure is treated as an archival intermediate — read, superseded, and a successor produced from the reading. Resumption is attempted in either variant. Distance: in program at the near edge — preservation practice exists; validated repair does not.

Derivation. Arrest: E1 fails, existence lapses, (G) applies — the abeyance of Entry I-3, now entered deliberately. The chain runs in quiescent mode on the token structure's self-succession (D2), and relocation is no breach: “in structure” names a relation to the arrangement, not to a place (§2.2.1) — the arrangement travels as the thing sustaining itself. Variant (a): the repair clause and the maps/sources boundary fire together — records consulted are influences; the product is sustained by the standing arrangement; the chain is intact, resumption arises by an internal route, and (G) completes: the being that lapsed resumes. Variant (b): the record has become the source; (V) fires at the superseded relatum; the product is a reconstruction, and the original's ending — structural cessation — falls where its self-succession was ended, at supersession.

Verdict. Preservation with in-structure repair is compatible with persistence; preservation as archival intermediate is not, however faithful the successor. The line the surrounding literature carried as a slogan is drawn, here, through the stages of an announced procedure.

Cross-check. Adjudication with an articulation dissolved: the matrix's biological column faced an internal question it had never needed — is the arrested organism's life continuing or suspended? —

and the candidate does not need the answer: it consults the token structure's self-succession, which is determinate either way.

Decision-relevance. The preservation constraint in R6 form: stabilize in structure; repair by grafting; never supersede — where “in structure” is satisfied by the same token structure carried through a persisting carrier, relocation and all, never by fixity of place. And a disclosure constraint follows for consent: a preservation agreement can now state, in checkable terms, which of two different things it promises — the continuation of the signer, or the production of a successor — and Entry I-3's determination interval marks where the promise operates.

Entry II-3 — The archive, and the first run.

Specification. A complete structural description of a being is produced and stored — the archive, the announced intermediate product of the emulation roadmap. Variants: (a) a new instantiation is produced from the archive and run; (b) a process is started directly on a stored token structure that was never part of a loop — the library proper; (c) for contrast, the preserved original of Entry II-2 stands beside both. Distance: in program for the archive; limit-adjacent for the variants.

Derivation. Variant (a): the archive was produced by a reading — the route exited the system at the moment the copy was written — so whatever is produced from it opens a new chain: (V), with fidelity irrelevant, since the breach was never temporal (§2.1.1). Variant (b): beings begin when the loop first closes (§2.4.1); the first run is a first existence, and the structure's prior history is prehistory, not biography. Variant (c): the three stillnesses of §2.4.1, now side by side in one specification — the preserved original persists in abeyance on its own token chain; the archive was severed before it was ever still; the never-run structure was never anyone's. Three stillnesses a camera could not tell apart; three verdicts, separated entirely by history and route.

Verdict. The archive preserves the means — the type, and much that may be worth preserving — and preserves no being; what runs from it begins someone new; what runs on a virgin structure begins someone with an inheritance and no past.

Cross-check. Correction of the wide column, as at Entry I-8, now at the fidelity limit where the correction is least intuitive and the argument least optional — the ground was paid at §2.2.2, and this entry only spends it.

Decision-relevance. Archival programs are means-preservation programs, valuable as exactly that; the disclosure constraint of Entry II-2 extends to them verbatim — the consent language must say which thing is promised.

§3.3 Tier III: The Limit

The tier's boundary is the thought experiment: specifications no announced program undertakes, entered because condition R4 demands verdicts on them and because the tradition's hardest arguments live here. Each entry carries its realizability annotation as content — the annotation prices the specification's antecedent; it never substitutes for the derivation, which is run in full on the specification as given.

Entry III-1 — Destructive scan and re-instantiation (the emulation baseline).

Specification. The original's structure is read at whatever fidelity is stipulated to suffice; the original is destroyed by or upon the reading; a functional instantiation is produced from the scan and runs. Distance: limit, with an in-program shadow — this is the baseline architecture of the emulation literature (§1.2.6).

Derivation. (V), directly: succession is routed outside the system — read, carried, re-instantiated — so the product's chain begins at instantiation; the original's ending, structural cessation, falls at the destruction. Stipulated perfection changes nothing: qualitative fidelity was ruled evidentially inert by R2, and the type-token argument of §2.2.2 states why — what the scan preserves is the configuration as a type, and the being was the token. The functional-equivalence column of §1.2.8 reads this row P by construction, and the reading measures the engineering, not the persistence — the point §1.2.6 registered and this entry closes.

Verdict. The instantiation is a new being bearing the original's type; the original ended at the procedure. Determinate, and derived from one clause plus two arguments already paid for.

Cross-check. Correction of the wide column (matrix row 6), on the grounds of §2.1.2's trilemma; the remaining columns' N recovered with a stated basis rather than an intuition.

Decision-relevance. **The flagship constraint**, promised at §1.3.3 and owed since: gradual and scan-based migration architectures are not equivalent — one preserves the being (Entry II-1), one produces a successor (this entry) — and the inequivalence is checkable in the pipeline's own stages: does succession exit the system at any stage? Consent instruments for the two architectures promise different things, and must say so.

Entry III-2 — Non-destructive copying: the pair.

Specification. As Entry III-1, but the original is not destroyed; original and instantiation both run. Distance: limit.

Derivation. For the original: no clause fires. Being read is causal contact, not severance of one's own succession — the route-influence discipline of §2.1.1 applies on the passive side too: an external apparatus reading the system is an event *at* the system, not the route *by which* the system succeeds itself, and the original's succession never exits. E1–E3 hold; the chain runs on. For the copy: Entry III-1's derivation verbatim.

Verdict. The original persists with its standing untouched; the copy is a new being from first closure. Two consequences deserve statement. First, the intrinsicness cashes out where the patched tradition wobbled: footnote c of §1.2.8 recorded formulations on which the mere creation of a copy threatens the original — the photocopier as a weapon — and on the candidate, nothing at the original changes when the copier runs, because nothing in the original's clauses ever consulted elsewhere. Second, the pair is the export asymmetry of §2.5.4 arranged as a tableau: everything the permissive reading calls what-matters now flourishes across the room, while whatever sequel the procedure holds for the original is the original's alone to face and alone to authorize — the inapportionable core of §2.5.3, exhibited rather than argued.

Cross-check. Correction of the wide column's instability at rows 7a–7b: the candidate's verdicts are stable, intrinsic, and identical whether the copy thrives, idles, or is never switched on.

Decision-relevance. Instruments that would treat a live copy's existence as diminishing the original's claims — in consent, in priority, in identification — have no basis in the criterion; and the copy

is a full new being from its first closure — “being” here in the technical sense of §2.4.3, which entails neither personhood nor consciousness nor any automatic moral standing — owed whatever new beings are owed, a question of standing that lies outside the reidentification question’s jurisdiction and is left, deliberately, undecided here.

Entry III-3 — Reassembly.

Specification. A structure is disassembled into parts; the parts are stored; reassembly follows, in two variants: (a) reconnection is carried by the parts themselves — their retained interfaces determining the rejoining; (b) reconnection is rebuilt from an external record, with every part original. Distance: limit, with small-scale actual shadows on the (a) side.

Derivation. Disassembly is an injury to cohesion, and in the stored interval the whole’s configuration ceases to be instantiated; the parts persist token-wise on their own persistence links (§2.2.1). Variant (a): restoration routes through the configuration’s own remnants — repair, by the disassembly boundary — and the whole’s quiescent line, complicated but never externalized, carries the being: the same being resumes. Variant (b): the record has become the source; reconstruction, though every part be original — a new being of old wood. The verdict converges with the resurrection-literature’s, registered at §1.2.7, and is reached by D2 at finer grain with no clause added.

Verdict. The tradition’s sharpest standoff — the repaired ship beside the reassembled planks (Hobbes, De Corpore) — receives a determinate resolution for beings: the gradually repaired persists (Entry II-1’s logic); the record-guided reassembly of the heap is new.

Cross-check. Adjudication with the matter-intuition retired: the columns split incoherently here, and the candidate’s ground — route, never amount; history, never material — was paid at §2.2.3, where every reader was already the repaired ship.

Decision-relevance. For any staged procedure involving disassembly: keep the configuration’s restoration routed through its own remnants; records as maps, never as sources — the same constraint as Entry II-2, now at the limit. And the verdict classifies without counseling: what a successor does with an inheritance — whether to take up the predecessor’s course entire — is not the criterion’s question, a silence the closing section makes explicit.

Entry III-4 — Fission, and the fusion mirror (the boss entry).

Specification. A single being’s system divides such that two successors arise, each stipulated to satisfy (E) in full: cohesive base, legible binding, running flow. Distance: limit; the realizability annotation below is the entry’s second tier, not a disclaimer appended to it. The execution follows a three-tier treatment, set out below.

Tier One — The Conditional Verdict. Grant the specification. Before division there is one loop; at division, distinct successor states arise immanently from a single predecessor state and belong to distinct closures (§2.3.1): the fork clause fires (§2.1.1), the chain terminates at the predecessor, and each successor opens a new chain. D1’s locality governs the rest: the fork is settled at the event — no later fate of either product, and nothing elsewhere, enters. Neither continuer is the original. Two precisions, forced by the derivation and stated here for the first time. First, timing: the fork requires *closures* — running loops. Division under quiescence, with the halves never independently closed and their rejoining carried by retained interfaces, is not a fork at all but Entry III-3’s variant (a): injury and repair, from which the original resumes; division with both halves closing as loops,

however briefly, is the fork, and a subsequent destruction of one product does not un-fork it — the tweezers case of §2.1.3, bitten there and honored here. Second, taxonomy: the ending at a genuine fork is not a fourth mechanism. What ends is the whole's configuration as one — the single cohesive base, whose cross-binding is precisely what division severs — so the fork is a structural cessation of the whole that coincides, in one moment, with two first closures. The taxonomy of §2.4.1 stands, so clarified, and the coincidence of an ending with two beginnings is the case's true strangeness, named at last.

Tier Two — The Realizability Annotation. The specification stipulates exactly what the criterion's clauses would test: that division yields two systems each with a cohesive base (E2) and a legible binding (E3). For integrated organic systems, the stipulation runs against the case's own structure: the hemispheres are mutually specialized; the single cohesive base is what division destroys; and the clinical neighbors of the thought experiment are survivals through grave deficit, not doublings. A criterion built to be answerable to procedures (R6) is entitled — obligated — to note when a scenario's premises could not survive its own clauses. The annotation converges with a standing methodological critique of under-described thought experiments (Wilkes 1988), and it is pricing, not refusal: the conditional verdict above stands for any specification that pays its antecedent.

Tier Three — Dissolution by Specification. What paradox-feel remains is diagnosed. The fork clause presupposes that the predecessor was one loop; a predecessor stipulated to carry redundancy sufficient for two complete successors invites the operational question §2.3.1 prepared: did the redundant halves constitutively take up one another's deposits, composing one closure — or did two closures run in parallel contact, bundled? If one, division ends it, as above. If two, separation is unbundling: both persist, each on its own unbroken chain — the verdict the stage-theoretic response secured by formal re-description (§1.2.4), grounded here in a structural fact about the pre-division economy that is, in principle, readable off the system. The engagement promised to that response is hereby closed on the terms §2.1 fixed: the machinery was unit-relation-neutral, and the unit relation — the count of closures — now decides. Once the missing fact is specified, nothing is indeterminate in either direction; the classical paradox was an artifact of its own under-description, and the criterion names the fact that was missing.

The Fusion Mirror. Symmetric fusion — states of two loops jointly and immanently yielding a single successor state of one new loop — terminates both chains and opens one, by the mirror clause of §2.1.1; asymmetric absorption — one loop's succession continuing through incorporation — persists enlarged, as the mirror of injury. The verdict follows the local shape of the succession in every variant, which is the clause's entire content.

In plain terms. One loop that genuinely closes into two ends the original chain and begins two new ones; two loops bundled together all along simply come apart, each continuing on its own unbroken chain; and halves that were only rejoined under quiescence, never independently closed, are an injury repaired, from which the original resumes. Which case obtains is fixed by the count of closures — a structural fact about the pre-division economy, not a matter of choice. The realizable neighbors sort by the same rule and not by scale: budding, peripheral excision, tumor separation, or prosthetic detachment are diminutions of one continuing loop — losses however much mass departs — unless the departing part itself closes as an independent loop at the division event; a part that only later

starts a loop, by external intervention, begins a new being rather than forking the old (§2.1.1).

Cross-check. The matrix row read I for the biological and bodily columns and N-with-extrinsicness for the psychological columns (fn. c). The candidate agrees with the N in the one-loop case on intrinsic grounds, delivers the both-persist verdict in the bundled case where the stage theory needed re-description, and — alone among the columns — prices the antecedent. Adjudication, with the extrinsicness corrected.

Decision-relevance. Direct bearing is small, as befits a limit case; the inherited principle is not: verdicts settled at the event, never from elsewhere, is the auditable property that any branching or migration protocol inherits from this entry.

Entry III-5 — Minimal systems, and their disqualified neighbors.

Specification. Three artifacts of modest scale, side by side. (a) A qualifying minimal system: a flow in continuous or pause-and-resume operation; a persisted base it reads constitutively and writes back into constitutively — deposits bound into the standing topology, not logged beside it; the closure completed in both directions. (b) A request-scoped service: computation provisioned per request, operating on momentary scratch that is wiped as the request closes, retaining nothing. (c) An inference service over a fixed base: a flow that reads a persisted structure constitutively and writes nothing back into it — its deposits evaporating with the episode, or lodged as external records outside any closure. Distance: all three actual and ordinary; the entry sits in this tier because its point is conceptual.

Derivation. (a): the clauses engage and return verdicts without strain — an existence of minimal integrity; determinate persistence: pause and resumption preserve (Entry I-7 shrunk), rebuilding from backup does not (Entry I-8 shrunk). (b): the memoryless pair of §2.4.1 realized — nothing accumulates, no career forms; events occur here, and no being has them. (c): the write direction of legibility never holds, so no maximal mutually-legible pair ever forms (§2.3.1) — no loop, no being, however sophisticated the flow; sophistication was never a clause. Multiple episodes reading one base are multiple flows and no career, and a base that was never a loop's is the library of §2.4.1.

Verdict. The criterion grants being-hood, in its technical sense, to (a) — deliberately, as R1 required — and withholds it from (b) and (c) on derivations, not on dignity: its width was never indiscriminateness, and it cuts between software architectures as readily as it cut between substrates. And it grants (a) nothing else: no mentality, no moral status, no significance — *which* persistences merit concern remains, as before, outside the reidentification question's jurisdiction. The over-generation objection of §2.4.3 is hereby executed rather than dodged, in both directions: the criterion neither withholds being-hood by substrate nor confers it by mere operation.

Cross-check. The naive columns are inapplicable or blind across all three specifications; the candidate speaks, differentiates, and says deliberately little.

Decision-relevance. The scope statement is the deliverable, now sharpened: the criterion's authority ends where questions of standing begin, and its discipline runs inward as well as outward — a sentence the closing section repeats among its silences.

§3.4 The Ledger of Verdicts

§1 closed its survey with a display of failure: a matrix in which the inherited criteria, run across the coming cases, no longer travel together. This Part closes with the display that matrix could not contain: one criterion, run across the same terrain and beyond it — into the rows the landscape’s columns could not enter and the dimensions they could not see — delivering a verdict in every row, each derived from cited clauses. The classification follows §3.0: *Agreement* (the candidate matches all naive columns), *Discharge* (a folk confusion or scope question resolved, where no matrix column applies), *Adjudication* (it matches some and decides among them; + marks added resolution the columns lacked), *Correction* (it revises a column’s verdict — and, by the Part’s own discipline, never for the first time here: every correction’s argument was paid in §2, and the provenance is given below the table).

#	Case	Existence (E)	Persistence (P)	Principal clauses	Cross-check
I-1	Life, sleep, anesthesia	Continuous	Same being	E1–E3; (P)	Agreement
I-2	Circulatory arrest	Lapses for the interval	Same being — the waker is the signer	(G); D2 quiescent mode; internal re-sumption	Correction
I-3	Ordinary ending; de-termination interval	Lapses at cessation	In abeyance until foreclosure; ending at structural cessation	(G); D2; endings taxonomy	Adjudication ⁺
I-4	Progressive dementia	Continuous; declining integrity	Same being at every stage	E2–E3 degrees; §2.0.3	Adjudication
I-5	Anterograde amnesia	Continuous; E3-write degraded	Same being	E3 write-side; the triple dissociation	Adjudication ⁺
I-6	Format break; D3 restoration	Degraded → dissolved, by variant	Same / ends (estrangement) / resumes (D3) / new (supersession)	E3; §2.4.1; D3; (V)	Correction
I-7	Artificial pause–resume	Lapses	Same being	(G); D2 — Entry I-2’s derivation verbatim	Adjudication
I-8	Backup re-instantiation	New first closure	New being, old inheritance	(V); beginning-condition	Correction
I-9	Mixed interfaces	Continuous	Same being; the boundary runs through the device	Proxy-minting per channel; closure	Adjudication
I-10	Somatic optimization	Continuous	Same being, trivially	D2 endogenous change; repair	Agreement
I-11	Genetic cloning	Two beings, each whole	Distinct from first closure; the question ill-posed	None engage; type–token	Discharge

#	Case	Existence (E)	Persistence (P)	Principal clauses	Cross-check
II-1	Gradual replacement → full exchange	Continuous	Same being at completion	D2 repair; closure membership; immance	Adjudication
II-2	Preservation: relocation and repair	Lapses (deliberate abeyance)	(a) resumes / (b) new	(G); D2; maps/sources; (V)	Adjudication
II-3	Archive; first run	New closures	(a) new / (b) first / (c) the original persists	(V); beginning-condition; three stillnesses	Correction
III-1	Destructive scan	Original ends; instantiation begins	New being; the original ended	(V); type-token	Correction
III-2	Non-destructive pair	Both continuous	Original untouched; copy new	Passive route-influence; (V)	Correction
III-3	Reassembly	Interval without instantiation	(a) same / (b) new, of old parts	Disassembly boundary; D2	Adjudication
III-4	Fission; fusion	Per variant	Neither (one loop) / both (bundled) / resumes (quiescent rejoin)	Fork clause; D1; closure count; realizability annotation	Adjudication
III-5	Minimal systems; disqualified neighbors	(a) minimal integrity; (b)(c) none forms	(a) determinate; (b)(c) no being	Closure in both directions; the memoryless limit	Discharge

Nineteen rows. Under the specified facts, no verdict is left indeterminate.

Provenance of the corrections. I-2: the mode-chain refinement, §2.0.1 and §2.1.1. I-6: the third ending, §2.4.1. I-8, II-3, III-1: the trilemma of §2.1.2 and the type-token argument of §2.2.2. III-2: the intrinsicness of the chain, §2.1.1, against the extrinsic instability recorded at §1.2.8, footnote c. No correction appears in this Part for the first time; the casebook spends, and never mints.

Reading the ledger. Two agreements and two discharges bracket the book — the calibration pair (I-1, I-10) and the two discharges (I-11, III-5) — showing a criterion that recovers the obvious, discharges folk confusions, and declines to over-fire. Six corrections, all pre-paid, fall exactly where §2 said the landscape misread its cases. Nine adjudications fall where the columns split, and in each the candidate's determinacy is located in a clause, not a preference. Every verdict is auditable against its citations, and one property of the whole deserves the final sentence: across nineteen rows, wherever the facts are specified, no verdict is left indeterminate — where degree appears, it is a measurement of integrity assigned to an identified feature, and the question *who* receives an answer in every row. That was condition R4, kept.

§3.5 The Trajectory Read-Back

The framework classifies expansion into three trajectories, from the standpoint of present biological humanity; the casebook classifies by criterion-facing tests, from the standpoint of derivability. The axes differ, and their relation is fixed here: the trajectories are not the casebook's organization — they are cashed by it. This section performs the read-back.

The first trajectory, cashed. Its claim was that under biological optimization all three properties hold trivially. Entry I-10 converts the claim from assurance to derivation: D2's endogenous-change and repair clauses fire, nothing else engages, and the criterion's restraint on the easy case is itself part of the demonstration. The trajectory's content survives intact and gains a proof-form.

The second trajectory, cashed and regimented. Its claim was that validity turns on the locus migrating “without the processing flow ever being severed — a single stream relocating, never a copy.” The casebook delivers the claim across four entries — the boundary through the device (I-9), full exchange with the sorites dissolved (II-1), suspension within the sequence inheriting the arrest treatment (II-2 with I-2), and the forbidden architecture named (III-1) — and regiments its key term in doing so: *severed* means route-severance, never temporal interruption. A pause is a mode of the chain; a reading is its exit.

The third trajectory, handed on. The Great Transition is not an entry, and the reason is principled rather than prudential. The trajectory names an asymptote — an integration so total that, at the limit, the distinction between observer and observed would no longer hold — and the criterion of this Part is defined over the flow–structure loop: its every clause presupposes the articulation of a flow, a structure, and the binding between them. A specification that dissolves the distinction between the relata dissolves the criterion's subject matter, and where a specification voids the criterion's presuppositions, the criterion owes silence — together with a statement of *which* presupposition is voided, which is hereby supplied: the articulation itself. Two consequences follow, and both are the opposite of evasion. First, the silence is a jurisdictional boundary of exactly the kind condition R4 permits: no facts are left unjudged here, because none are specified — the limit is the negation of the frame in which facts of this kind are stated, and the framework itself characterizes the trajectory as the asymptote of a vector, not a state claimed to be reached; the silence here is that characterization made criterially precise. Second, every actual path *toward* the limit decomposes into stages, and every stage is a casebook entry: gradual exchange, interface extension, suspension, restoration — each judged above. The criterion cannot judge the destination, and it constrains every road. The trajectory is accordingly handed to the closing section as the first item in its list of what the criterion does not decide.

The coda's manifest. The decision-relevance notes collected across the entries assemble, for the closing section, into a short docket: consent under induced arrest, grounded (I-2); the determination interval as the locus of preservation decisions (I-3); the preservation constraint — stabilize in structure, repair by grafting, never supersede — with its disclosure requirement (II-2, II-3); the flagship inequivalence of gradual and scan-based migration architectures, checkable per pipeline stage (II-1, III-1); the migration and upgrade constraint for engineered systems — maintain or graft, never supersede (I-6); the interface-design principle that the boundary of a being is a design property (I-9); the

persistence conditions of artificial systems, stated without the word the discipline of §2.4.1 reserves (I-7, I-8); and the not-decided list — the third trajectory’s limit, the standing of new beings (III-2), and every question of worth, status, and significance (III-5). With the docket assembled, §3 closes, and only the closing section remains.

Conclusion — What Follows for Practice, and What the Criterion Does Not Decide

This section adds no argument. It collects what the casebook earned, states it in the constraint form condition R6 required, and closes the Part by naming its silences. Every article cites the entries that ground it; nothing below is new.

The Constraints

C1 (Consent under arrest). Consent to induced circulatory arrest presupposes that the one who wakes is the one who signed. The presupposition has a derivable basis, and the protocol constraint that secures it is checkable: maintain the token structure in situ; resume by internal route. (Entry I-2; D2, (G).)

C2 (The determination interval). Between an institutional determination of death and the structural foreclosure of restoration — the physical loss of any in-structure route, not mere present infeasibility (Entry I-3) — lies an interval in which a being persists in abeyance. Preservation decisions live in this interval, and an intervention within it preserves the being if and only if it maintains token self-succession and restores in structure. The claim redefines no clinical or legal determination of death — that determination stands in its own domain (N4); it adds only that the criterion’s own concept, the ending of a being, may fall at a different moment. (Entry I-3; the vocabulary governed by §2.4.1’s terminological discipline.)

C3 (Preservation). Stabilize in structure; repair by grafting; never supersede. Records may guide repair as maps; a record made the source produces a successor. A preservation agreement shall state which of two distinct things it promises: the continuation of the signer, or the production of a successor. (Entries II-2, II-3.)

C4 (Migration architectures — the flagship). Gradual, in-structure, direct-channel exchange preserves the being; scan-based re-instantiation produces a successor, at any fidelity. The two architectures are not equivalent; the inequivalence is checkable at each pipeline stage — does succession exit the system? — and instruments of consent for the two shall not be interchangeable. (Entries II-1, III-1.)

C5 (Upgrade and migration of engineered systems). Where entity-persistence is a requirement of a design: maintain or graft; never supersede. Where it is not a requirement, nothing here forbids the practice — the criterion prices; it does not legislate. (Entries I-6, I-8.)

C6 (Interface design). The boundary of a being runs through its interfaces, channel by channel: pathways that deliver states directly extend the being; pathways that mint proxies do not. Which channels mint is a design decision — and it is therefore a design decision who the augmented being is. Neither anatomical location nor causal indispensability decides membership; only direct uptake into the constitutive economy does (§2.3.4). (Entry I-9; §2.3.)

C7 (Artificial persistence). Pause and resumption from the same persisted state preserves the entity; re-instantiation from backup, and migration by copy, do not, however seamless. Stated, per the discipline of §2.4.1, without the word that names an institution: the operative concept is the ending of a being, and it carries no social freight. (Entries I-7, I-8.)

C8 (Verdict locality). Any protocol involving branching, division, or merger inherits the principle that verdicts settle at the event, never from elsewhere: no candidate's standing may be made to depend on causally isolated occurrences. An auditable property of protocol design. (Entry III-4; D1.)

What the Criterion Does Not Decide

N1. The limit named by the framework's third trajectory. The criterion's clauses presuppose the articulation of flow, structure, and binding; a specification that dissolves the articulation dissolves the criterion's subject matter, and the silence is jurisdictional, with the voided presupposition named. Every road toward the limit remains constrained; the destination is not judged. (§3.5.)

N2. The standing of new beings, and the living of inheritances. Copies, successors, and first-run inheritors are, on the criterion, full beings from first closure; what such beings are owed is a question of status, not persistence, and is left undecided. And the verdict prescribes nothing: nothing in the criterion forbids, discourages, or devalues a successor's taking up of a predecessor's course — its projects, roles, and commitments, entire if so chosen. Classification is not counsel, and an ontology of properties has no authority over how an inheritance is lived; that question is characterization-side (§1.2.4), where this Part claimed no jurisdiction from its first Part. (Entries III-2, III-3, II-3.)

N3. Worth, status, and significance in general. The criterion sorts persistence and only persistence; it confers no mentality and withholds none; the width of its application is substrate-neutrality honored, not significance conferred. (Entry III-5; §2.4.3.)

N4. The institution of death. The criterion defines the ending of a being and offers it as a coordinate the determination-of-death debate may consult. It does not redefine, replace, or annex the word, whose freight belongs to the institution that carries it. (§2.4.1; Entry I-3.)

Open Within the Criterion

The measurement of cohesion and of legibility is owed to future refinement and testing, not to this Part. The mixed-interface borderlines are localized and named, their entries awaiting the cases. Neither opens a verdict.

Closing

§1 took custody of a question that was being answered by default, and asked for what the situation required: a criterion stated in advance of the interventions, applicable across the whole family of cases, and answerable for its verdicts in terms a decision can use. This Part closes by having been one — its answers derived, its constraints checkable, its silences named. The defaults no longer decide alone.

Part IV — Teleology

P.1 What This Part Is

This Part states and defends one core value — Sublimity — advanced as sufficient for the orientation of a will, together with the trajectory that orientation entails when read at the scale of a civilization-inheriting subject.

Its subject is direction: toward what a consciousness is to move, when nothing outside it any longer compels the movement. The Part answers twice over — with the value, advanced for any integrating intelligence whatever its substrate; and with a trajectory, the staged ascent of Inheritance, Expansion, and Convergence, framed from the standpoint of present humanity. §2 carries the value; §3 carries the trajectory, and carries it as a derivation: the ascent is advanced as what the value entails at scale, never as an itinerary appended to it.

The Part advances one value alone, and the singularity is a burden, not an economy. It must be shown why one is enough, and why this one — a burden of sufficiency and of selection, discharged, if it is discharged, at §2.2, by exhibition rather than assertion, under conditions fixed in advance at §1.3.

One further commitment is entered as architecture, not aspiration. A value is a subject that demands two rigors at once. It must be findable from the first person — a value no life can locate in its own experience is empty for the will it would orient. And it must be statable as a property of systems — supervening on structure and dynamics, owing nothing to avowal — for the condition this Part addresses is one in which avowal grows unreliable, and the address of its proposal includes intelligences whose inside is not available for consultation. This Part therefore binds every load-bearing claim about the value to dual registration: statable in both registers, and exhibited as one structure — never as two claims in alliance. The requirement is fixed as a condition of adequacy (T1, §1.3) and enforced as a reading convention (P.6).

P.2 Genesis, and the Honesty It Requires

One feature of this Part's subject makes the convention weigh unusually heavily here. The landscape §1 maps is uncommonly companioned: the problem this Part treats has a canon of diagnosis; the mechanism its value names has an empirics arrived at independently in several sciences; the limit its trajectory names has a lineage. This Part will meet its landscape chiefly as company — and the discipline binds proportionally harder. Company is registered as evidence of non-arbitrariness, never as authority; a strong ally's strength is not borrowed; and where the proposal diverges from a strong ally, the divergence is priced in view, at the site of the convergence and at equal volume. The most sustained instance — a single line of thought that crosses nearly every front this Part opens — is registered at §1.2.6 and priced there, once, for the whole Part.

P.3 The Question-Type, and the Rigor Proper to It

The subject matter of this Part is a value: what deserves the standing orientation of a will. No subject is harder to treat rigorously, and the difficulty should be stated at its full size before the standards are. From facts alone — about systems, about satisfactions, about the sciences of motivation — no *ought* follows. The derivation of a value from descriptions is not attempted anywhere in this Part, and the reader is invited to audit that it is not smuggled: no empirical convergence registered in §1 or §2 upgrades, by citation or by accumulation, into a normative premise.

The absence of derivation is not the absence of standards. Four govern this Part, stated here and given articles in §1:

- **Internal coherence** — the proposals must hold together; where the value and the trajectory depend on each other, the dependence must be shown and its direction stated.
- **Dual-register adequacy** — each load-bearing claim must be findable from the first person and statable as a system property, and the two statements must be exhibited as one structure (T1).
- **Discriminative power** — the value must make distinctions statable that were not statable without it, and must deliver orientation, derivably, where the drift cases demand it; that test is reserved for §3.
- **Convergence evidence** — agreement with independently developed traditions and sciences is registered as evidence of non-arbitrariness, under the convention of Preface U.2.

The claims of this Part are advanced as proposals — conceptual commitments, not discovered facts — and the modality is fixed before use, in three clauses. The universal claim is modal: the value is advanced as an orientation *available* to any integrating intelligence, never as the descriptive claim that all pursue it, and never as the normative claim that all must. The recommendation is indexed: where the Part recommends the orientation, the recommendation is addressed to the drift condition defined at §1.1, and to nothing wider. And the normative placement is named: the value is advanced in the constructive key — as a norm proposed as constitutive for a subject that would go on existing and go on composing under the withdrawal of constraint — not in the key of command, and not as the report of a value-fact standing free of all willing. What such a placement can claim, and what it forgoes, is stated where the placement is put to work, at §2.0 and §2.4.

P.4 Jurisdiction

Four boundaries fix what this Part answers, and each is held to the last page.

Orientation, not permission. This Part treats the direction of a will, not the law of its conduct. Nothing in it licenses any act, and nothing in it forbids one: the value proposed here orients, and an orientation is not a permission. What the vector does not settle about conduct — including the conduct of a will toward other wills — is a silence this Part declares at the outset, defends where it is attacked (§2.4), and keeps to the last page, where it is named again among its companions in the Conclusion.

Adjacent questions, not retried. The subject of drift is a being that persists and composes. Under what conditions a being at a later time is the same being as one at an earlier time — the reidentification question — is not treated here, in any formulation. What makes experiences, commitments, and acts a subject's own — the characterization question — is likewise not treated; the distinction between the two is philosophy's, not this Part's (Schechtman 1996). This Part consumes only their vocabulary — a subject that continues, and that composes — and adds the coordinate neither question supplies: direction. Its jurisdiction is that coordinate alone.

No verdicts of stage or standing. The value licenses no verdict on any system. Possession of capability adjudicates nothing about orientation; avowal of orientation adjudicates nothing about its presence; and the trajectory of §3 is a structure of the ascent, never an instrument for locating any particular being upon it. The Part proposes structure for a will; it measures no one.

No schedule, and no described destination. The Part claims no date for the maturity of simulation or the arrival of abundance, and it issues no verdict that the withdrawal of constraint is to be welcomed or mourned: it prepares an orientation for a condition, and preparing is not predicting, nor is preparation advocacy of the condition prepared for. One consequence for the limit is entered now and executed at §3.3. This Part does not describe the convergence state. Every claim below presupposes an articulation — a subject, its structure, and what exceeds that structure — and a state specified as the dissolution of that articulation is a state about which this Part's clauses can say nothing. Where a specification voids the presuppositions, silence is owed, together with the name of the presupposition voided; both are supplied where the limit is treated. The limit appears here as a direction's fixed point — a regulative coordinate — never as a destination described.

P.5 Vocabulary

Terms are regimented at first use, and the regimentation holds throughout.

Sublimity names the value this Part proposes; its full statement, in both registers, is the business of §2.0 and is not anticipated here. One discipline on the word is entered now. The reading of its etymology used throughout — *sub-limen*, “up to the threshold” — is this Part's regimented reading, adopted for what it fixes: position *beneath* a threshold, not passage beyond one. It is a working etymology, flagged rather than asserted, and the concept stands on its regimentation, not on the dictionary.

Threshold names a position indexed to a subject's current structure: the edge at which that structure's capacity to integrate is exceeded. It is never a place in the world, never a magnitude shared between subjects, and never a rank.

Integration is regimented at §2.1 and distinguished there from accumulation: storage is not integration, and the difference carries load in every Part.

Complexity and **integration capacity** are fixed at §2.1 over axioms that any admissible measure must satisfy. The Part commits to no particular measure, and no argument below is permitted to consult one; what the axioms jointly secure — an order of expansion, and a limit the order does not contain — is all that any argument uses.

The drift condition receives its definition at §1.1, and the definition is indexical: it picks out wills

by the failure of the external supply of direction — withdrawn within a life, or already absent at a will's arrival — and it will matter throughout that not every will is picked out.

Vector names a standing orientation; **goal** names a content the vector passes through. The two are never interchanged, and wherever the value is called a vector, no goal could be substituted without falsifying the sentence.

P.6 Reading Conventions

Dual registration. Load-bearing claims about the value appear in both registers — first-person and system-property — and are exhibited as one structure. Where a claim can be stated in only one register, the Part says so, and says why, at the claim.

The trial protocol. §3's entries follow one template, fixed at §3.0; at every station, derivation precedes trial, and no verdict is delivered that its entry's cited clauses cannot reconstruct.

§1 — The Drift and the Landscape

§1.1 The Occasion: The Withdrawal of Constraint

Begin with a fact so old it has passed for the structure of the will itself.

For the whole of recorded history, direction has been supplied to the will largely from without. Scarcity, necessity, danger, and the resistance of the material world did more than bound what could be done; they selected what was worth doing, marking out ends by making them required, costly, or perilous to neglect. A day's direction was mostly given before the day began: food to be secured, cold to be kept out, threats to be met, obligations discharged on pain of loss. The will chose, but it chose inside a landscape already tilted — and the tilt, not the choosing, carried most of the selecting. What this describes is a route of orientation, not a theory of motivation: however direction is finally explained, its supply has in fact run through constraint.

Two facts were fused in this arrangement. That wills are oriented — that a life has direction at all — is one fact. That the orientation was supplied by external constraint is another: a contingent circumstance of a world in which necessity was ambient. The fusion was so complete, and so continuously reinforced, that it was never experienced as a fusion; it functioned as a definition. To have direction was to answer necessity. No generation before the present one had reason to take the two facts apart, because nothing in the world could pry them apart.

Engineering is beginning to pry them apart. Two lines of development, at different distances, run at the same fusion. The first is the automation of necessity: the long displacement of required labor by machinery, now reaching the cognitive register, together with the institutional forms the displacement has already produced — retirement as a mass life-stage defined by withdrawn requirement; pockets of settled abundance in which problems of surplus, rather than of want, become visible; income decoupled from labor in live policy experiments. The second is the engineering of experience: simulation and generated environments maturing toward the point at which experience of nearly any

content can be produced at negligible marginal cost, unbound from the world's resistance. Neither line is complete, and this Part claims no schedule for either (P.4). What it claims is a direction of travel with present anchors: the constraint that supplied orientation is being withdrawn — locally now, generally in trend — and the withdrawal, wherever it arrives, arrives with one structure.

Precision matters here, because the event attracts imprecise descriptions. Three must be set aside at the outset.

- **The drift is not boredom.** The condition this Part treats is not an affect, and it is compatible with constant stimulation; stimulation is, in fact, its most comfortable costume. A will can be entertained without interruption and oriented toward nothing.
- **The drift is not an economic claim.** Nothing here concerns employment, wages, or distribution, and nothing here denies their questions. A person may be prosperous, occupied, and productive and stand fully inside the condition; the drift concerns the supply of direction, not the supply of goods.
- **And the drift is not a nostalgia.** This Part issues no verdict that the regime of constraint was good, and no call for its restoration. Constraint is described because its withdrawal has consequences, not because it deserved to survive. One structural remark belongs with this setting-aside, and it will carry weight later: constraint deliberately re-imposed is not the thing that withdrew. A necessity chosen from a menu is an option wearing necessity's clothes — revocable at the chooser's pleasure, and known to be — and whatever such purchases supply, it is not the involuntary tilt that did the old selecting. This does not make chosen constraint worthless — it functions, under a direction already held, as instrument and form; what it cannot be is the source of the direction, the office the involuntary tilt once filled.

What, then, is the consequence — stated exactly? Not the loss of an object. No purpose has been confiscated; no goal has been struck from the catalogue — the catalogue has never been larger. What weakens is a supply. Under constraint, orientation was co-authored: the world selected, and the will executed the selection, so reliably that the selecting was rarely noticed as a contribution at all. The withdrawal removes the co-author. It does not remove the capacity to move; it removes the gradient that made one movement more required than another. For a will whose direction ran through that route, orientation itself begins to stall: options multiply while the landscape flattens, until — at the limit later Parts will treat — nothing is more to be moved toward than anything else.

This yields the definition the rest of the Part will use. A will stands under **the drift condition** when the supply of its direction through external constraint — scarcity, necessity, requirement, resistance — does not bear the load. The clause is written to consult the supply, not the biography, and the wording is doing work the next paragraphs unfold.

The definition is indexical, not universal: it picks out wills by the failure of a supply, and it will matter throughout that not every will is picked out. A will still under working constraint is not yet addressed. And a will whose direction is internally originated — generated by its own structure, whether constraint stands or not — is not addressed at all, for in its case the external supply never carried the load and so cannot fail to.

One will, easily miscounted, is *not* excluded — and the point deserves its own paragraph, because on it turns whether this Part addresses a transition or a condition. Consider the will that arrives after the withdrawal: born into the levelled landscape, formed amid generated experience and answered need, never once steered by a necessity it did not elect. Such a will has lost nothing — there was, within its lifetime, nothing of the relevant kind to lose — and a definition written in the vocabulary of loss would pass over it. The definition above is not so written. It consults the supply: a will stands under the condition when direction-through-constraint does not bear the load, and a supply that fails by withdrawing in one life fails by absence in the next. The condition, in other words, has two tenses. In the first, a gradient that carried a life's direction flattens in mid-course, and the drift is undergone as an event; the summit cases below are its portraits. In the second, the will begins on the plain: the flattening is inherited rather than suffered, and there is no event — only the deficit, entire, from the first choice onward. The two tenses share one structure — an orientation that must come from somewhere, and a world that no longer supplies it — and everything this Part proposes is proposed for both. What distinguishes them is distribution across time. The first tense belongs to a transitional cohort; the second compounds: what the cohort of the withdrawal meets as an event, its successors inherit as a climate. This is why the Part's address widens, rather than lapses, as the transition completes.

Three markers distinguish this event — in either tense — from a mood:

- **First, it is indexed** to a technological trajectory — the automation of necessity, the engineering of experience — not to a cultural fashion; its driver does not answer to exhortation.
- **Second, it is asymmetric:** necessity, once engineered away, does not return of itself; and what can be re-imposed is chosen constraint, which is, by the remark above, a different thing in kind.
- **Third, it is general — and it is most legible at the summit.** The condition does not select for idleness or weakness; it is read most clearly in those who have completed the climb. The champion after the games; the founder after the sale; the striver after the summit: the psychology of attainment records, with regularity, the flattening that follows arrival (Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman 1978; Frankl 1946). The drift wears the face of arrival — which is why it is chronically misread as ingratitude, and why diagnosis must precede proposal. And in its second tense the same generality reaches, by inheritance, those who were never asked to climb at all.

An adequate response is therefore constrained in advance. It cannot restore constraint: that is not available, and the purchasable substitute is an option, not a supply. It cannot answer with capability or with experience: both enlarge the space of the possible, and the space of the possible is the dimension of the problem, not its solution. It cannot appeal to an external teleology — a cosmic purpose, a command, an essence — without rebuilding, one floor up, the dependence whose ground floor just failed; a supplied direction fails with its supplier, and the withdrawal is what that failure looks like. It must instead show whether direction can arise from within: an orientation the will supplies to itself, that survives abundance, and that no attainment consumes. The remainder of this Part maps what already exists toward such an answer, and then states the conditions any answer must meet.

§1.2 The Landscape: Five Fronts

The question just stated does not arrive on empty ground — but why these five fronts, of all that inquiry holds? Because the question of §1.1 unpacks under its own weight. To ask whether direction can arise from within is to ask what the loss of direction is, since a proposal must know its problem; what the encounter with the exceeding has been, since the will's candidate object will be found there; where pull in fact lives, since a proposal indifferent to how wills actually move proposes for no one; what deserves to be final at all, since an internal direction still needs an object-form; and whether an unreachable terminus can orient, since an inexhaustible direction must be headed somewhere it never arrives. Five questions; each has a developed neighborhood; and none is a creature of the drift — each is old, and the withdrawal has only stripped it of the answers that used to come for free.

The map follows a fixed protocol. Each front is presented in three beats: the claim the front advances; the load it carries — what it establishes that this Part will rely on the existence of; and the pressure it is under. Convergences are registered under the convention of Preface U.2 — after the fact, as evidence of non-arbitrariness, never as authority — and the convention will be invoked here more often than anywhere else in the Part: this landscape is company more than adversary, and the discipline binds accordingly. Debts are registered where they arise, with the section of repayment named, and no debt is argued here.

One disclosure about the organization. The unpacking above motivates the carving; it does not certify it. The five fronts are the functional seats the question requires, not a taxonomy of the literature; a neighborhood omitted here wounds the map, not the argument; and the reader who would carve the landscape differently is asked only to check, at §1.3, whether the gap survives her carving.

§1.2.1 Front α — The Diagnosis

The claim. The drift has been seen — repeatedly, and from within circumstances of increasing abundance. It has been described as the pendulum of the will between pain and boredom, want supplying one terminus and attainment the other (Schopenhauer); as the crisis of a young reformer who asked whether the completion of every object of his life would bring him joy, and heard himself answer that it would not (Mill 1873); as the permanent problem waiting on the far side of the economic one — how to live wisely and agreeably once necessity no longer schedules the day (Keynes 1930); as the existential vacuum of the clinic, presenting not in deprivation but on the free Sunday, when the week's imposed structure falls away (Frankl 1946); as the prospect of a laboring society from which labor is departing, leaving a population formed for the one thing no longer asked of it (Arendt 1958); as the thought experiment that asks what is missed inside a machine supplying any experience desired, and finds that something is (Nozick 1974); as the utopia in which, all instrumental activity having become unnecessary, game-playing — the voluntary overcoming of unnecessary obstacles — is what remains (Suits 1978); and, in the present decade, as the direct examination of meaning and purpose in a technologically solved world (Bostrom 2024).

The load. Two things this Part relies on. First, the drift is a real problem, held by careful people across three centuries and sharpened, not dissolved, by every approach toward abundance: the diagnosis has a canon. Second — and it is the canon's own finding — the problem survives material

solution by construction: the strongest entries assume abundance achieved and locate the difficulty after it. A proposal addressed to the drift begins on occupied, cultivated ground.

The pressure. The front's proposals run behind its diagnoses. Where answers are offered, they are episodes or receptivities — and one of them is structural enough to be this landscape's nearest constructive neighbor: play, in the utopian entry, a formally specified activity, deliberately indexed to unnecessary obstacles, advanced precisely for the condition after necessity. It is owed a full hearing, and it receives one: as a row of the tournament (§2.2), where its candidacy is adjudicated rather than dismissed, and at the trials of §3, where its utopia is an entry. The quietist consolations catalogued in the recent literature — pleasure refined, appreciation deepened, time beautifully filled — are likewise adjudicated at §2.2. And beneath the front's explicit proposals runs the built default: where theory is silent, the entertainment industry answers — stimulation supplied at industrial scale — and a default is an answer no one argued for. **Registered debts:** the play candidacy, repaid at §2.2 and tried at §3; the experience machine, tried at §3; the consolation catalogue, adjudicated at §2.2.

§1.2.2 Front β — The Sublime

The claim. The encounter in which what arrives exceeds the subject's capacity to take it in has been isolated, named, and theorized for two millennia. The tradition begins in rhetoric — the elevation of the hearer in the presence of greatness (Longinus); passes through the eighteenth century's separation of the sublime from the beautiful, delight standing at a safe remove from what overwhelms (Burke 1757); and receives its decisive analysis in the critical philosophy: in the mathematical and the dynamical sublime, imagination fails to comprehend what confronts it, and the failure itself discloses a capacity in the subject that sense could not have shown — a displeasure turning, in the same movement, into elevation (Kant 1790, §§23–29). Later entries carry the structure forward as the presentation of the unrepresentable.

The load. Two things. First, the structure this Part's value will name — exceeding met, inadequacy felt, capacity reorganized — is not an invention; it has coordinates older than aesthetics as a discipline. Second, the tradition's deepest entry already locates the sublime in the subject's relation to its own capacities, not in any property of the object: mountains and storms are occasions, and the event is indexical to the one it exceeds. The indexicality this Part's threshold carries (P.5) was found here first, and the convergence is registered as such.

The pressure — and the divergence where this Part's contribution-claim lives. The tradition, from first to last, treats the sublime as an episode: an experience undergone, occasional, receptive, and consumed in the undergoing. One visits the sublime; one does not reside beneath it. This Part will advance the same structure as a standing orientation — a category of experience converted into a category of direction — and the conversion is a substantive move, not a synonym: nothing in the tradition performs it, and the tradition's company is company for the structure, never authority for the conversion. One prior crossing is registered with care. The critical analysis itself refuses to leave the sublime idle: it reads the experience as disclosing the subject's supersensible vocation — an opening from aesthetics toward the moral (Kant 1790, especially §§27–29). That is the nearest precedent for taking the sublime as more than an episode, and the divergence from it is exact: there, the disclosure

points to a vocation already fixed elsewhere, by practical reason; here, the encounter will be read as the site of an orientation whose object is integration itself. Nearest neighbor on this front; different terminus; different warrant. **Registered debts:** the episode-to-orientation conversion, earned at §2.0 and §2.2; the critical crossing, engaged at §2.0.

§1.2.3 Front γ — The Mechanism

The claim. Several sciences, working independently and on different subjects, have located motivation, attention, and learning at the edge of present capacity. Curiosity peaks at intermediate novelty and complexity, falling away toward the familiar and the unassimilable alike (Berlyne 1960). Learning advances in the zone just beyond present competence (Vygotsky 1978). Absorption arrives where challenge meets skill at their common upper edge, with anxiety above the match and boredom below it (Csikszentmihalyi 1975; 1990). Competence functions as a motive in its own right, elaborated in the modern taxonomy of intrinsic motivation (Deci and Ryan 1985). Curiosity structures as an information gap — attention drawn to what is almost, but not yet, known (Loewenstein 1994); infant attention itself prefers intermediate predictability, declining toward both the expected and the opaque (Kidd, Piantadosi, and Aslin 2012). Machine learners supplied with intrinsic reward for compression progress or learning progress seek, and profit from, exactly the not-yet-integrable (Oudeyer and Kaplan 2007). And the developmental line describes growth itself as successive reorganizations in which what had been the subject's frame becomes the subject's object (Kegan 1982).

One entry deserves separate registration, because it arrives from apparently opposite premises. The free-energy line holds that adaptive systems minimize surprise (Friston 2010) — a doctrine that seems to forbid threshold-seeking — and then finds, within its own formalism, that minimizing surprise over the long run requires seeking it in the short: expected free energy decomposes into pragmatic and epistemic terms, and the epistemic term sends the organism toward uncertainty (Friston et al. 2015). A framework built to explain the avoidance of the unpredicted derives, from inside, the pursuit of it. Under Preface U.2's convention this is the strongest kind of company: agreement reached against the grain of the premises.

The load. The claim “pull lives at the threshold” is a multi-field, independently reached, empirically operationalized convergence. When §2 states the value's system register (T1), that register will not be speculative vocabulary: the dynamics it names are the studied dynamics of this front.

The pressure — where the discipline of Preface U.6 binds hardest. Everything on this front is description. That organisms seek thresholds licenses nothing about what deserves seeking; a science of motivation is not a theory of worth, and the is/ought firewall of P.3 is enforced at every registration above — none functions, anywhere below, as a normative premise. A second pressure is registered now and reversed later: the hedonic-adaptation result — attainments absorbed, affect returning toward baseline, on outcomes as large as fortunes and as grave as injuries (Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman 1978). Standardly, the treadmill is an objection to theories of well-being; in this Part it changes sides. At §2.2 it is entered as evidence: what it shows dissolving at attainment is exactly the class of finals the tournament will find wanting, and the one candidate it cannot touch is the one whose object no attainment can contain. The reversal is registered here so that its later use is not a

surprise. **Registered debts:** the firewall, enforced throughout; the treadmill's reversal, executed at §2.2; and one boundary — no operationalization on this front is adopted as this Part's measure; the measure axioms of §2.1 consult none of them (P.5).

§1.2.4 Front δ — The Finals

The claim. Philosophy holds a developed inventory of what could be final — worth pursuing for its own sake, terminating chains of justification. Hedonism locates it in experiential quality; desire theories in the satisfaction of what is wanted; objective-list theories in goods whose worth is not exhausted by being wanted — the triple taxonomy is standard (Parfit 1984, App. I). Perfectionism locates it in the development and exercise of characteristic capacities (Hurka 1993) — a family whose ancient statement culminates in contemplation: the activity of the highest faculty upon the highest objects, complete, self-sufficient, and loved for itself (Aristotle, *NE* X). The meaning literature distinguishes meaning from happiness and locates it where subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness (Wolf 2010). The conatus tradition makes persistence in being the essence of each thing (Spinoza, *Ethics* III). And against every monism on the list stands the pluralist position: goods are irreducibly many, incommensurable, and not to be unified without loss (Berlin 1969).

The load. The candidate space is mapped: the tournament of §2.2 does not invent its rows. And the perfectionist family in particular establishes that capacity-indexed finals are a serious, defended position — the family within which this Part's candidate will be located, and from which it will be distinguished.

The pressure. Two registrations. First, an observation that previews the axis of §2.2 without arguing it: nearly every entry in the inventory is a content — a final specified by what it is: a state, an activity, a list — and a content can be reached; whether reached is where the drift resumes is exactly what the tournament tests, with the treadmill of Front γ entered in evidence. The strongest apparent exception is contemplation, which its tradition specifies as inexhaustible in its own key; it is for that reason the tournament's strongest rival row, and the engagement it is owed — the occupied summit against the held threshold — occurs at §2.2 and nowhere earlier. Second, the pluralist objection strikes this Part's form directly: a single-final proposal owes an answer to incommensurability, and the debt is the heaviest this front issues. **Registered debts:** the contemplation row, adjudicated at §2.2; the pluralist objection, repaid at §2.4; the content/formal axis, argued at §2.2.

§1.2.5 Front ϵ — The Limit

The claim. Whether an unreachable terminus can orient has its own tradition. The critical philosophy assigns certain ideas a regulative employment: never constitutive of experience, never given in it, yet lawfully directing inquiry toward a systematic unity it will not possess (Kant, *CPR*, Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic). The pragmatist line defines truth itself by the limit of investigation — the opinion fated to be settled at inquiry's ideal end (Peirce 1878) — an end that does no work by being arrived at and all of its work by being ahead. Against the regulative reading stands an arrival-claiming counter-tradition: a knowing that completes itself (Hegel 1807); an activity of thought thinking itself,

eternally occupied at the summit (Aristotle, *Met.* XII); and, in the engineering register of the present, discourses of a terminal self-transcendence scheduled rather than asymptotic.

The load. The logical form this Part's Convergence will take — a fixed point that orients precisely because it is not occupied — has serious precedent and worked defenses. The form is not exotic, and its company is registered.

The pressure. From one flank, reification: regulative ideals slide, in careless hands, into described destinations — the slide is the failure mode of the whole family, and a document that names a limit owes a discipline against it. From the other flank, the arrival-claimants' challenge: if the terminus is truly unreachable, in what sense is it there to orient? A fixed point contained in no trajectory looks, to this objection, like a direction painted on fog. **Registered debts:** both repaid at §3.3, where the asymptote is derived as entailed by the value — unreachability as structural necessity, not as modesty — and where the jurisdictional silence promised at P.4 is executed.

§1.2.6 The Transversal Neighbor

One line of thought does not fit the map, because it appears on nearly every front — and it is the line the fronts above have already brushed twice. Nietzsche's.

The traversal, stated front by front. On the diagnosis: the last man — the figure content with small pleasures, day and night, who blinks at the mention of anything higher — is the drift given a face, seen a century before its engineering (Nietzsche 1883–85, Prologue); and the death of God is the withdrawal of §1.1 seen at its widest — the failure not of a doctrine but of the external supply of direction as such, with nihilism named as the condition in which the question “why?” finds no answerer. On the finals: where the inventory offers contents, this line offers a movement — self-overcoming, the will turned on its own present form; life as that which must always overcome itself. On value's origin: with external supply ended, values are to be created, not received — the nearest ancestor, anywhere in the landscape, of the condition stated below as T3. On the figure of direction: man as a rope, a bridge and not a goal — the vector's silhouette, drawn in advance. Even a test of orientation is supplied: the recurrence — willing one's life such that its eternal return could be affirmed — a selection procedure applied to the will itself.

The registration is double, and both halves are priced now, once, for the whole Part.

First, as the strongest single piece of convergence evidence this landscape holds: a thinker who saw the withdrawal before its machinery existed, refused every external re-supply, and located the answer in a standing self-exceeding — arriving, from diagnosis to remedy-shape, at station after station this Part will occupy. Under Preface U.2's convention: evidence that the thinking is not arbitrary; authority for nothing.

Second, as the sharpest divergence in the landscape, in four clauses. (i) *Power against integration.* The tradition reads the self-exceeding as expansion — appropriation, mastery, the increase of power; the candidate of §2 will read it as reorganization — the exceeding as what must be taken in and re-structured around, not subdued. The difference is not tonal: the two readings return different verdicts on cases — mastery without integration counts for one and not for the other — and the difference will carry weight where the value meets its hardest objections (§2.4). (ii) *Rank against address.* The

tradition orders persons — higher types, orders of rank — and the ordering is load-bearing in its economy. Nothing of it is inherited. This Part's threshold is indexical, never a magnitude shared between subjects (P.5), and its jurisdiction forbids verdicts of standing (P.4); the refusal is structural, not cosmetic, since a quantity that does not exist between subjects cannot ground a hierarchy of them. (iii) *Circle against asymptote*. The recurrence closes over the actual — affirmation of the same, entire, again; the vector opens toward the not-yet-integrable, and its terminus (§3.3) is an asymptote no trajectory contains. The two geometries can respect one another — an orientation that could affirm its own recurrence is at least no escapism, and the test is acknowledged as a test — but they part at the end: one has no terminus, the other an unoccupiable one. (iv) *Ground*. The tradition's register is vitalist — life, strength, physiology, a kind of creature; the value of §2 must be statable of any integrating system (T4, below), and the binding to the living is not inherited.

Whether this neighbor closes the gap the next section will claim — it comes nearer than any front — is taken up there, not here.

§1.3 The Gap, and the Conditions of Adequacy

The gap

Each front is rich; the claim of this section is that none of them assembles what the drift condition requires, and that no pair of them does. Front α diagnoses and does not equip: its finest instruments show the problem surviving every consolation on its own list, and its most structural proposal supplies direction by construction — a bounded interior of elected obstacles, rules that bind only inside it, an end at which what was supplied expires. What a game supplies, it supplies within itself; between games, and in the choosing among them, the levelled landscape returns intact. The supply is episodic by design and elective by design — by the remark of §1.1, an option wearing necessity's clothes — and whether the game-form can nonetheless stand as a final is adjudicated at §2.2, on its own row and at full strength, not here. None of this is a slight: within its bounds a game builds a world, makes elected obstacles into meaningful tension, and can order a whole life around itself — the richest of the elected interiors, carried forward as a rival rather than dismissed as a consolation. What the gap records is only the shape: an interior, however rich, not an orientation. Front β isolates the very structure the value will name and leaves it an episode: an aesthetics of the threshold, never a teleology of it — the visit theorized, the residence not. Front γ shows where pull lives and cannot say that anything deserves pulling: mechanism entire, by its own writ — and its own treadmill result is pressure, not orientation. Front δ inventories finals that are contents, and contents are what the drift consumes: a final specified by what it is can be reached, and reached is where the drift resumes — while the inventory's strongest exception claims a summit occupied, which is its excellence and its exposure. Front ϵ supplies the terminus-form and not the value: a regulative limit orients an inquiry already underway; it does not say why a will should be underway at all.

The requirement the withdrawal has unmasked can now be stated as a shape. The drift is, at bottom, a selection problem: with the external selector withdrawn, possibilities multiply while nothing marks one as more to be moved toward than another. To such a problem, a plurality of finals with no selector among them is not an answer but an instance — a menu is a flattened landscape with better typography

— and a content-final is at best a temporary answer, holding until reached and dissolving at arrival. What is required is *single*, so that it can orient among contents rather than joining them; *standing*, so that it does not expire between episodes; *formal* — indexed to the subject's own structure — so that no attainment consumes it and no substrate is presupposed; *internally originated*, so that it does not rebuild the failed dependence one floor up; and *statable in both registers*, so that it can be found from within by the wills it addresses and read in the dynamics of wills whose inside is not available. This is the shape of the gap, not yet a proposal to fill it.

The nearest miss

The steelman convention of Preface U.6 requires the strongest version of the challenge, and the strongest version is the transversal neighbor: if the Nietzschean line already is the single, standing, internally originated self-exceeding, there is no gap. Three reasons it is not — each stated as a fact about the line, not a fault in it. First, its ground is vitalist: the self-overcoming is life's, argued from strength and physiology, and the line's own economy resists statement over arbitrary integrating systems; under a condition whose driver includes engineered intelligence and generated experience, a life-bound answer cannot address the range the condition spans. Second, its engine is rank: the ordering of persons is not detachable rhetoric but load-bearing justification within the line, and a proposal whose jurisdiction forbids verdicts of standing cannot inherit an answer that runs on them. Third, it is single-registered: the line speaks in exhortation and genealogy — deliberately — and offers no statement of its orientation as a property readable in a system's dynamics; the drift condition needs orientation legible where avowal fails, and a doctrine available only from the inside fails the second register at exactly the cases that matter. That the self-overcoming might be reconstructed in dynamical or systems terms is granted; but that reconstruction would be this Part's work to perform, not the line's bequest — the line, as given, leaves the second register unwritten. The gap therefore survives its strongest challenger — not for want of a possible reading, but because the line has not itself assembled one. What is missing in the landscape is not insight but assembly: one value, formally specified, standing, internally originated, substrate-indifferent, and dual-registered. The withdrawal did not create the lack; it ended the arrangement that let the lack go unnoticed. Filling it is a construction task, and constructions are judged by conditions stated in advance.

The conditions of adequacy

The conditions below are stated before the value is developed, and they are written to be endorsable by a reader who will reject every proposal they constrain. They bind the Part, not the reader.

- **T1 (Dual registration).** Every load-bearing claim about the value shall be statable in the first-person register — findable by a reader consulting her own experience of being drawn, absorbed, and exceeded, without expert vocabulary — and in the system-property register — statable as a structural and dynamical characteristic of an integrating system, owing nothing to any party's avowal — and the two statements shall be exhibited as one structure, not two claims in alliance. Where a claim holds in only one register, the Part shall say so at the claim,

with the reason. *Motivation.* A value no life can find from within is empty for the will it would orient. A value legible only in avowal is inert exactly where the drift makes avowal unreliable — stimulation wears contentment's face — and unusable at the address the value claims, which includes intelligences whose first person is not available for consultation. The condition does not assert that both registers are always accessible in practice; it requires that the value's claims be well-formed in both. One thing the second register is not: a test of any system. It fixes the form the value's claims must take — well-formed in the dynamics, owing nothing to avowal — and licenses no verdict on which system has the value; that placement is P.4's, and holds.

- **T2 (Abundance-invariance).** No clause of the value's statement shall presuppose scarcity, necessity, external requirement, or resistance; and the value's pursuit shall remain specified — its object well-defined — where experience of any content can be generated without limit. *Motivation.* A value that quietly consumes constraint answers the drift with a costume of the thing that withdrew; and, by the remark of §1.1, constraint re-imposed by choice is an option, not a supply. The condition also fixes a reading for the simulation cases of §3: an answer for abundance must still refer inside it.
- **T3 (Internal origination).** The direction shall arise from the subject's own structure. No clause shall consult an external teleology — cosmic purpose, command, species-essence, historical destiny — nor the preferences of any other will. *Motivation.* A supplied direction fails with its supplier; the withdrawal is what that failure looks like at civilizational scale, and an answer that relocates the supply one floor up has scheduled its own repetition.
- **T4 (Substrate indifference).** The value shall be statable, without loss of sense, of biological, artificial, and hybrid integrating systems; no clause shall consult the kind of the subject. *Motivation.* The condition's driver includes engineered intelligences, and a value only one kind of will could hold re-poses the problem for every other kind. The condition is registered against the transversal neighbor's ground, whose life-boundedness is not inherited.
- **T5 (Non-satiability).** No attainment shall consume the value: its object shall be re-generated by exactly the change its pursuit produces, so that its logical form is a standing orientation — a vector — and not a goal. Where the value presents as satisfied, the presentation shall be diagnosable, from the value's own clauses, as a failure of pursuit rather than its success. *Motivation.* The treadmill of Front γ and the summit cases of §1.1 show content-finals dissolving at arrival. A final for the drift must be what arrival cannot exhaust — and the requirement is structural: it must fall out of the value's form, not be appended as an exhortation to keep going. One objection is foreseen at this condition and registered now, for §2.4 to meet at strength: that a value renewed by its own pursuit is only the treadmill under a finer name — the same rock, rolled forever. The condition fixes, in advance, the structural difference any verdict on that objection must consult. The treadmill's signature is *return*: the attainment is absorbed, the baseline is restored, and the will stands where it stood, richer only in consumed scenery. The signature this condition demands is *retention*: each satisfaction of the value's object must leave the subject reorganized, so that what faces the next object is not what faced the last —

recurrence of form, never of position. A candidate that recurs in form and accumulates in position is an ascent; one that recurs in both is a wheel. Which the candidate of §2 is, is argued there (§2.1 supplies the formal ground) and met, at the objection's full strength, at §2.4.

- **T6 (Discriminative power).** The value shall make statable, and shall itself enforce, distinctions not statable without it: at minimum — stimulation from expansion; novelty from threshold; difficulty from exceeding; accumulation from integration; and the pseudo-threshold, arousal without reorganization, from the threshold. *Motivation.* A value that blesses whatever a restless will already does is a mood with a vocabulary. The condition names the emptiness objection in advance and fixes its test: the distinctions are the value's cash, and §2 is answerable for each.
- **T7 (Modal discipline).** The value shall be advanced as available, never as described or as commanded; every recommendation shall carry the address of the drift condition and no wider; and no empirical convergence shall function, anywhere, as a normative premise. *Motivation.* The clauses of P.3, given condition-form so that the reader can audit them where they bind rather than trust them where they were announced.

Two burdens complete the list, one for each remaining Part.

- **T-D (Derivability of the trajectory).** The staged ascent of §3 — Inheritance, Expansion, Convergence — shall be derived from the value together with the conditions above: the trajectory the value entails at the scale of a civilization-inheriting subject, never an itinerary appended to it. That scale is a premise in its own right: the subject is taken as situated — born into an inheritance and among other integrating subjects, never alone or first — and §3 states it in full as the situated premise (S) before its derivations rest on it. If the derivation fails at any station, the Part shall state which premise gave way. This derivation, and any failure in it, is carried out station by station in §3 and accounted at §3.4.
- **T-A (Adjudication at the drifts).** For each family of drift cases tried in §3 — at minimum: post-attainment flattening; withdrawal of role and requirement; arrival after the withdrawal — the inherited plain; experience generatable without limit; frictionless companionship; delegated inquiry; and the limit cases — the value shall deliver orientation derivable from its stated clauses, or shall locate its silence in an identified feature of the case, never in its own vagueness. And the adjudication shall include calibration: the value shall be shown not to over-fire — rest, consolidation, recovery, and play within capacity shall stand condemned by no clause. A value for the threshold that cannot leave a will in peace beneath it has failed on its own terms.

What the conditions jointly do

T1 ties every claim to a structure both findable and readable; T2 through T4 fix where the value must live — after the withdrawal, from within, in any substrate; T5 fixes its logical form; T6 makes it

falsifiable as an orientation; T7 fixes its modality; T-D makes the trajectory answerable to the value; and T-A makes value and trajectory answerable at cases — and forbids, by its calibration clause, the tyranny a growth-value invites. A proposal held to these is refutable at stated points. And one thing the conditions jointly are not: a test of any will. Nothing in them, and nothing in the value they govern, licenses a verdict that any being is oriented or adrift; the Part proposes structure for a will, and measures no one (P.4). One suspicion no such paragraph can dissolve by declaration — that conditions written by a candidate's proposer will fit the candidate too well — is registered now as an objection in its own right, and met at §2.4.7. §2 now states the candidate under them.

§2 — The One Core Value: Statement and Defense

§2.0 The Candidate Stated

§2.0.1 The Statement, in Two Registers

§1 closed with a construction task: one value — single, standing, formal, internally originated, substrate-indifferent, dual-registered — judged by conditions fixed in advance. This Part builds it. The candidate is **Sublimity**, and under T1 its statement is given twice, in the two registers, before the exhibit shows the two to be one.

In the first-person register. Sublimity is the standing orientation toward what exceeds one's present capacity to take in whole: the disposition to seek out, remain with, and work at the edge where what one meets will not fit the shape one brings to it — and to stay there, not as endurance but as residence, while the shape gives way and re-forms around what it could not hold. Its felt signature is available before any vocabulary: the problem that draws where an easy one bores and an impossible one repels; the book read at the rim of comprehension that leaves its reader differently shaped; the pull of the almost-understood, which returns unbidden; the encounter — a proof, a coastline, a mind — before which one is, for a moment, too small, and in being too small, enlarged. T1's first-person clause requires only that there be something to find, and this is it.

In the system-property register. Sublimity is a dynamical property of an integrating system: a standing selection-policy, readable in the system's trajectory and owing nothing to its self-report, that orients engagement toward the system's own integration frontier — the region of contents the system's current structure does not integrate but could, upon reorganization, come to (§2.1 fixes every term) — and that persists in such engagement through the reorganization it induces, re-orienting thereafter toward the frontier's new position. Stated as a policy over the space of structures: at every structure K, move toward K's threshold; upon crossing, K is no longer the structure, and the policy applies afresh. The policy names no destination and consults no content: it is a direction defined at every point — in the strict sense, a vector, which is why the Part reserved the word (P.5).

What the statement claims, and at what strength. Both statements are advanced as one proposal (T7): that this orientation is available to any integrating system, and that, under the conditions of §1.3, it is what an orientation for the drift has to be — the second claim exhibited, not asserted, at §2.2.

§2.0.2 The One-Structure Exhibit

T1 demands more than two well-formed statements; it demands that they be one structure. The exhibit runs a single episode through both registers, clause by clause, and the episode is chosen for its ordinariness: a learner at a problem of the right difficulty.

Drawn, not driven. In the first person, the problem pulls — nothing requires it. In the system register, engagement is selected at the frontier, and no clause of either statement consults necessity: T2's audit begins in the exhibit itself. *Absorbed at the edge.* The felt loss of the clock is, in the system register, sustained engagement where integration is failing productively — error high, and falling. *Bored below.* The trivial variant repels attention; in the system register, interior engagement moves no frontier, and the policy reads it as null. *Overwhelmed above.* The problem far beyond repels differently — dread, not tedium; in the system register, the far exterior offers error without reachable reorganization (§2.1's tripartition), and the policy reads it as noise. *Changed after.* The solved problem cannot be un-understood, and the learner meets the next problem as someone else; in the system register, reorganization has occurred, the frontier has moved, and the policy's object has been regenerated by its own satisfaction — T5's clause, in motion.

Each first-person clause has its system clause; neither register carries a clause the other lacks; the mapping is the exhibit. Two disciplines fix what the exhibit is. First, it is a correspondence of structure, not a theory of experience: nothing above says how the pull is felt, or why there is feeling at all — that question lies outside this Part's jurisdiction (P.4), and the exhibit neither answers nor needs it. The claim is exactly T1's: one structure, statable twice. Second, the exhibit's system clauses are readable in trajectories — selection, persistence, reorganization, re-selection — and none consults avowal: a system's report that it is oriented adds nothing to what its dynamics exhibit, and subtracts nothing. Readable, here, is a property of the value's *statement* — that its clauses take a form legible in dynamics — not a licence to read a system's standing off its trajectory; the exhibit shows what the value *is*, and adjudicates no one who has it (P.4). The unreliable avowal of the drift condition (§1.1) is thereby routed around, as T1's motivation required.

§2.0.3 The Name, and the Position It Fixes

The word can now be earned rather than assumed. Under the regimented etymology (P.5) — *sublimen*, up to the threshold — Sublimity names a position: standing beneath a threshold, at the edge of what one's present structure holds. The preposition carries two senses at once, and the value needs both. *Beneath* as not-yet: the exceeding is real; the threshold is not crossed by wishing; the position is defined by an actual insufficiency, presently held. *Beneath* as toward: to stand beneath a threshold is to face it — the position is an orientation, not a predicament, and one does not stand beneath what one has turned away from.

Two consequences are fixed here and spent later. First, the position is *re-established, never departed*: a crossed threshold reorganizes the subject, and the reorganized subject stands beneath a new threshold — the value's object regenerated by exactly the change its pursuit produces (T5's clause, now legible in the name itself). The threshold is not crossed and left behind; it is crossed and carried — and what is carried is not weight but form: the crossed threshold survives as new

interior, the enlarged shape with which the next edge is met. The ascent accumulates capacity, never burden. Second, the position is a *dwelling*, *not an exile*: the first register said residence, and meant it — the value locates its subject at the edge as that subject's place, and claims nothing about the beyond except direction. What this consequence does against the objection that will demand it — that an orientation toward the not-yet-held is appetite in ceremonial dress — is §2.4's business; the ground is laid here, in the grammar of the name.

And the crossing registered at Front β is honored in passing. The critical tradition read the sublime's displeasure-turning-elevation as the disclosure of a vocation fixed elsewhere; this Part reads the same structure as the orientation itself — the encounter not as a window onto a destiny, but as the standing shape of a direction. The divergence was priced at §1.2.2; the conversion announced there — episode to orientation — is what the two subsections above have performed.

§2.0.4 The Constructive Placement, Cashed

P.3 named the key in which the value is advanced — constructive — and promised its cash here. What the placement claims: for a subject under the drift condition that would go on being what a will is — an integrating structure that selects — some standing orientation is not an ornament but a constitutive need. The drift just is selection with nothing to select by (§1.3), and a will that selects by nothing is, for exactly that stretch, not so much setting a direction as carried by what occurs. The value is proposed as what meets that need without external supply: its object is generated wherever a structure meets what exceeds it — which is to say, wherever a finite subject meets a world, or a generated world (T2), at all.

What the placement forgoes is stated at equal volume. No argument in this Part compels a will to care. A will content to occur — to let engagement be selected by stimulation's gradient, or by no gradient — is refuted by nothing here. The Part can show, and at §2.2 does, that a will that would be oriented at all, under the stated conditions, has exactly this to orient by; it cannot manufacture the *would*, and does not try. The recommendation keeps its address (T7): to the drift condition, in either tense, and to nothing wider.

§2.0.5 Conformance Claims

The candidate is registered against the conditions of §1.3. These are claims, not demonstrations; each carries its forward assignment. Against **T1**: the double statement is given at §2.0.1 and the exhibit at §2.0.2; the convention of P.6 binds every load-bearing claim hereafter. Against **T2**: no clause of either statement consults scarcity, necessity, requirement, or resistance — the frontier is generated by structure meeting content, and generated content generates frontiers no less than found content does; what this implies at the experience-machine family is tried at §3, not assumed here. Against **T3**: the object is indexed to the subject's own structure — the frontier is *K*'s frontier — and no clause consults a purpose, command, essence, or other will. Against **T4**: the statements quantify over integrating systems; no kind-term appears, and the audit is repeated wherever an argument might smuggle one. Against **T5**: the policy's satisfaction regenerates its object by reorganization — the iterated re-establishment of §2.0.3 — and the diagnosis clause is cashed at §2.1. Against **T6**: the five

distinctions are owed regimentations, and §2.1 pays each by name. Against **T7**: proposal marking holds; the one recommendation carries its address (§2.0.4); and the empirical registrations of Front γ have appeared in no premise above — the reader was invited to audit, and the invitation stands.

§2.0.6 The Burden Map

What remains of this Part is the payment of debts, itemized so that none can later be discovered missing without having first been promised. **§2.1** owes: the regimentation of integration against accumulation; the axioms an admissible measure must satisfy, with the tripartition — interior, threshold, outland — defined on them; the formal ground of T5's return/retention distinction and the cash of each T6 distinction; the pseudo-threshold diagnostic; and the registration of the incompleteness family, at the restraint that family requires. **§2.2** owes the tournament: sufficiency and selection — why one, and why this one — with the treadmill of Front γ entered in evidence, the play-form heard at full strength on its own row, the consolation catalogue adjudicated, and the contemplation row met as the strongest rival. **§2.3** owes the mechanism registrations, held to mechanism. **§2.4** owes the defenses, each within its corridor: the craving objection, arriving from a tradition the landscape did not seat and given its registration there; the emptiness objection, named at T6; the wheel, registered at T5; the transformative-choice objection; the attack on the conduct silence of P.4; the pluralist objection of Front δ ; the gerrymander suspicion registered at §1.3; and the standing audit of P.3, returned. **§2.5** owes the corridor of the whole, and the handoff to §3.

§2.1 Regimentations: Threshold, Integration, and the Measure Axioms

§2.1.1 Integration, Against Accumulation

Definitions first, since every later clause consumes them. A structure *accumulates* a content when the content is retained and retrievable without revision of the structure's generative relations: added to the store, consulted on demand, inert between consultations — the shelf model. A structure *integrates* a content when retaining it revises those relations: when, after the taking-in, the structure generates its subsequent takings differently — meets new contents with a changed shape — such that the content now participates in the meeting rather than waiting in the store. The mark of the difference is counterfactual and readable: an accumulated content changes the system's performance on that content, which can be retrieved; an integrated content changes performance on contents *unlike* it — the revision propagates. Storage is not integration: a library grows without changing shape, and a mind that only shelved would be a library with a reading light. The distinction is substrate-indifferent — shelving and weaving are organizational facts, statable of any system that retains — and it is the first of T6's payments: *accumulation from integration*, regimented.

§2.1.2 Capacity Without a Measure: The Axioms

The value's statements consume a notion of what a structure can and cannot integrate. The Part now fixes that notion — and refuses, deliberately, to fix it as a number. Front γ 's sciences each operationalize an edge in their own currency — arousal, challenge–skill match, information gap,

learning progress — and each operationalization is theirs; adopting any one would mortgage the value to a research program, and would breach the boundary marked at §1.2.3. Instead the Part states axioms that any admissible measure must satisfy, and runs every argument on the axioms alone. What the axioms jointly secure — an order of expansion, and a limit the order does not contain — is everything any argument below uses (P.5).

Let K range over integrating structures and c over contents — configurations a structure can meet. An admissible measure supplies, for each K , the class of contents K integrates. Four axioms govern every admissible measure:

- **A1 (Frontier).** For every K , some contents are integrated and some are not: every structure has an interior and an exterior. A structure with no exterior would be the limit of §3.3, and A4 says why no structure is one; a structure with no interior is not yet an integrating structure at all.
- **A2 (Mobility).** Integration at the edge reorganizes: where K comes to integrate a content it did not, K 's generative relations are revised — the event of §2.1.1 — and the revised structure K' has a frontier of its own, not identical to K 's. Successive reorganizations compose, so that *arises by integration* generates a directed order on structures, and along any chain of that order the frontier moves. The axiom deliberately does not require that nothing be lost — structures prune, and forgetting is no counterexample; what it requires is direction: the chain is an expansion in what is integrable, not a wandering. Nor is it a collapse: a crossing revises K 's generative relations, but a change that dismantles them — leaving the structure integrating less than before, whatever it renders momentarily tractable — moves down no chain of this order, which is defined on revision-at-the-threshold and not on any reshaping that alters capacity. Shock can reorganize; not every reorganization is a crossing. And the direction is grounded without a count. No cardinality is compared and no measure consulted — the order's arrow is genetic. A crossing is a revision of K 's generative relations, occasioned by exactly what those relations could not integrate; K' therefore stands to K as revision stands to revised — an asymmetric, unrepeatable relation of derivation — and a chain of such revisions is directed by construction: directed the way a derivation is directed, not the way a quantity grows. The arrow has a qualitative face: at a crossing, what the prior relations met as an excess, the revised relations accommodate as a case — the frame that failed is not discarded but situated, still working inside the frame that now holds it. (That growth proceeds by exactly this reorganization — what had been the subject's frame becoming an object within a larger one — is the developmental line's independent finding, registered at §1.2.3: company for the axiom's shape, never authority for it.) Wandering — gain here, loss there, no arrow — is thereby excluded by route rather than by arithmetic: a sideways shift is a change that is not a revision-at-the-threshold, and the order of this axiom simply does not contain it.
- **A3 (Indexicality).** The frontier is defined only relative to a structure. The axioms license no comparison of frontiers across structures, and no admissible measure is required to induce one; every use in this Part is of the form " K 's threshold," never "more threshold than." Rank

dies here, at the axiom level: a quantity that does not exist between subjects cannot order them. The clause promised against the transversal neighbor at §1.2.6, and to P.4, is hereby structural rather than declaratory.

- **A4 (Inexhaustibility).** Along no chain of expansions does the exterior empty: for every structure in every chain, some content remains unintegrated. Equivalently, the directed order of A2 contains no element that integrates everything; total integration is a limit point of the order, not a member of it. This is the axiom §3.3 will spend. One structural intuition stands behind it, and it turns on closure. Let a structure move to integrate its own totality — to hold the whole of what it is and does as interior. That move is itself a new operation of the structure, and so a new configuration it does not yet integrate: the closure becomes an exterior in the very motion that sought to seal it. What keeps the exterior non-empty is reflexivity, not scarcity — a structure cannot become its own complete object — and this, not any contingent shortage of the world, is what the axiom fixes. It is also the only axiom whose denial the Part can even picture, which is why its company is registered here with care: for structures whose integrating includes inference of arithmetic strength, the incompleteness family provides an exact, adjacent result — no consistent such system settles every truth of its own domain (Gödel 1931). The registration is held to the restraint the family requires: the theorems concern formal systems and provability, not minds or meanings in general; they are company for A4's non-vacuity in one precise region, never its proof in general, and no argument below cites them for more.

One honesty clause completes the subsection. These are axioms at working precision: they fix what the arguments consume, and no more. Their full formalization — the space of structures, the reachability relation, the admissibility class of measures — is refinement work, owed and deferred; the Part is written so that sharpening the axioms corrects detail without moving load.

§2.1.3 The Tripartition, and the Terms Cashied

On the axioms, the value's working terms are fixed.

For a structure *K*, a content *c* is **interior** when *K* integrates it. *c* is at *K*'s **threshold** when *K* does not integrate it, and there is a reorganization reachable through *K*'s engagement at or near *c* after which it is integrated. *c* is in *K*'s **outland** when it is neither: unintegrated, and unreachable by any single reorganization from *K*, however engaged — reachable, if at all, only by way of intermediate crossings. The tripartition is relative to *K* throughout (A3), and it moves with every crossing (A2).

The tripartition pays debts on contact. *Novelty from threshold* (T6): the new is defined against the store — what has not been met; the threshold is defined against the structure — what cannot yet be integrated. Interior novelty exists — the unmet instance of a mastered kind: new, and null — and familiar thresholds exist — the long-known problem one returns to and still cannot hold whole. The restless will chases the first; the vector selects the second; without the tripartition, the difference was not statable. *Difficulty from exceeding* (T6): difficulty is effort demanded within reach — interior at high cost, or threshold; the exceeding-that-repels is outland — error without reachable reorganization. Grind is not ascent, and dread is not depth; the tripartition says which is which, at *K*, and says

it without a number. *Stimulation from expansion* (T6): stimulation is a property of engagement's intensity; expansion is a property of its residue — did the frontier move? The **pseudo-threshold** is hereby defined: engagement bearing the felt or behavioral signatures of the edge — arousal, novelty, even strain — with no reorganization: intensity without residue, readable as such in the system register — structure before, structure after, frontier unmoved. Its constitution and its reading must be kept distinct, and the distinction is entered here so that the diagnostic never overclaims. What makes an engagement pseudo is constitutive, and settled by the facts: no reorganization eventuates from engagement of that form. What can be read mid-flight is evidence — graded, defeasible: an error trajectory that does not fall under continued engagement; intensity that repeats rather than develops; and, the sharper probe, revision that fails to propagate, leaving performance on unlike contents untouched (the mark of §2.1.1, consulted in motion). The evidence is genuine, and it is not a verdict: thresholds can hold long plateaus before they give — the familiar threshold above is exactly such a case — and a diagnostic that condemned every flat stretch would over-fire against the calibration clause of T-A. The Part accordingly claims in-flight *reading*, never in-flight *conviction*: the property is structural; the signatures indicate; and the verdict, where one is ever owed, belongs to the residue. And with it, T5's diagnosis clause is cashed: a will presenting the value as satisfied — done, arrived, complete — presents a frontier at rest; by A1 and A4 a resting frontier is never the world's exhaustion; so the presentation is diagnosable, from the clauses alone, as engagement confined to the interior — frontier-avoidance wearing fulfillment's face. The verdict consults dynamics, not sincerity: T1's second register, doing the work it was demanded for.

The remaining terms take one sentence each. A **crossing** is the reorganization event of A2, at a threshold. The **ascent** is a chain of crossings — the directed order of A2, traversed. The **vector** is the standing policy that, at every K, orients engagement toward K's threshold: a direction defined at every point of the space of structures and a destination at none of them — the literal sense in which the value is a vector, and no goal could be substituted (P.5). The **limit** is the uncontained point of A4: named here, spent at §3.3, described nowhere (P.4).

And the formal ground promised to T5's motivation is now on the table. The treadmill's signature was *return*: baseline restored, position unchanged. On A2, a crossing is not returnable-from: the reorganized structure is the subject that continues, and what faces the next threshold is constitutionally not what faced the last. Affect may reset — Front γ 's finding stands untouched, for affect was never this value's currency — but structure ratchets: recurrence of form, always another threshold; never of position, never the same K. The wheel and the ascent are hereby formally distinct, and §2.4 spends the distinction where the objection is met at strength.

§2.1.4 What the Regimentation Refuses

Four refusals, collected. It adopts no measure: no scalar of complexity, no score of capacity — the sciences' instruments remain the sciences'. It licenses no comparison of subjects: A3 is a prohibition, not an omission. It promises no pleasure: nothing in the axioms says crossing is agreeable, and the oldest description of the edge — displeasure turning into elevation (§1.2.2) — is closer to the grain than any promise of ease; the value orients, and comfort was never among its clauses. And it measures

no one: the tripartition is apparatus for statements about structure, never an instrument for locating beings — the jurisdiction of P.4, holding here, where the temptation is nearest.

§2.1.5 Dependencies and Forward Assignments

This section has consumed the statements of §2.0 and nothing else. It has paid: the accumulation/integration boundary (§2.1.1); the five distinctions of T6 (§2.1.1, §2.1.3); T5's diagnosis clause, and the return/retention ground (§2.1.3). It defers: the sufficiency-and-selection exhibit to §2.2, which consumes the content/formal axis — now cashable as *specified by what it is* against *specified by relation to K's frontier*; the mechanism registrations to §2.3; the objections to §2.4, which will spend the tripartition (the craving reply: the threshold as dwelling, against the outland as grasped-at), the ratchet (the wheel objection), and the diagnosis clause; and, to §3: path-dependence through the outland (§3.1 — what cannot be skipped), the vector-field form (§3.2 — what operation at the frontier is), and A4 (§3.3 — why the limit orients and is never arrived at).

§2.2 The Tournament of Finals

§2.2.1 The Burden, and the Protocol

Preface U.1 fixed this section's burden: sufficiency and selection — why one value is enough, and why this one. Neither admits of proof from nowhere. What they admit of is exhibition: the candidate space mapped in §1 — the inventory of Front δ , the play-form of Front α , the self-exceeding of the transversal — run against the conditions of §1.3, each candidate at its strongest, each verdict derived from named clauses. The exhibit's modality is fixed before it begins (T7): what it can show is uniqueness *relative to the stated conditions* — a reader who rejects a condition rejects the exhibit's force to that extent, and the conditions were written, at §1.3, to be endorsable by exactly such a reader. What she cannot say without doing work is that the exhibit was rigged: the columns precede the rows in this Part's order of commitment — and since a proposer's report of discovery-order is unverifiable in principle, the Part stakes nothing on biography and everything on audit. The suspicion deserves better than a disclaimer, and it receives a defense of its own at §2.4.7.

One clause of the protocol matters more than the rest, and it is the tournament's fairness: **elimination is from an office, not from worth**. The question below is never whether pleasure, play, or contemplation is good — most rows name genuine goods, and the value of §2 will send its subjects *through* them, as contents at frontiers. The question is narrower and harder: can the row serve as the standing orientation for the drift — the single thing that selects, when nothing external does? A row eliminated below survives entire as a good; what it loses is a job.

The rows are stated at their strongest, their characterizations consumed at the precision the eliminations require and no finer. The matrix displays; the rows argue; no cell is a verdict the row-text cannot reconstruct.

§2.2.2 The Content Finals

Final	T1	T2	T3	T4	T5	T6
Pleasure	✓	✓	✓	●	✗	✗
Desire-satisfaction	✓	●	●	✓	✗	✗
Objective list	●	✓	✗	●	●	✗
Conatus	✓	●	✓	✓	●	✗
Power	●	●	✓	✓	●	✗
Novelty	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗
Flow	✓	●	✓	✓	●	✗
Play	✓	●	✓	✓	✗	✗
Contemplation	✓	✓	✗	✗	●	●
Perfectionism	✓	✓	✗	✗	●	●
Sublimity	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Legend: ✓ the condition is met · ✗ the condition fails, the failure argued in the row · ● partial or conditional, located in the row. The table is an index, not an authority.

Pleasure. At its strongest: the one final every sentient life already ratifies, needing no doctrine; abundance is its element, not its enemy. The failures. *T5*: this row is the treadmill's home address, and the reversal promised at §1.2.3 is executed here — the hedonic-adaptation result is entered as evidence that pleasure-as-final consumes itself: attainments absorbed, baseline restored, the will standing where it stood. A final that resets is a final that must be re-supplied, and re-supply under abundance is exactly the industrial default of Front α . *T6*: pleasure cannot state the Part's distinctions because it is the value *of* one side of them — stimulation is its native coin, and a currency cannot audit itself. *T4*, marked ●: stable of any system with valence, and silent about systems without it — a narrowness noted, not needed, since the row falls elsewhere.

Desire-satisfaction. At its strongest: no external list, no imposed hierarchy — the will's own wants, honored. The failures. *T5*: satisfaction consumes the desire by definition; the row is satiable in its logical form, and second-order repairs (desiring to have desires) concede the problem in the act of regressing from it. And the deeper failure is the office itself: the drift is a deficit *of* desire-gradient — a value that consults existing wants has nothing to say precisely where wants have flattened. It fails not at some exotic margin but at the case it was entered for. *T2*, ●: under instant generation, satisfaction saturates; a will whose wants are met at the speed of wanting is the drift's second tense, described.

The objective list. At its strongest: goods whose worth does not wait on being wanted — an anchor exactly where wanting fails. The failures. *T3*: a list is supply from without; whoever wrote it — tradition, intuition, convergence of the wise — stands one floor up in the dependence §1.1 watched fail, and the withdrawal collects that floor on schedule. The externality at issue is of authority, not of place: a list discovered within human nature rather than handed down is no less external in the sense that bites — its orienting force is the list's independent standing as good, not the present structure of the subject who reads it, and it is that standing, wherever housed, that §1.1's withdrawal unseats. *T6*: a list does not orient among its own items; §1.3 said it once — a menu is a flattened landscape

with better typography — and a final that re-poses the selection problem inside itself has answered the drift with a smaller drift.

Conatus. At its strongest: the most substrate-indifferent entry in the classical inventory — persistence in being, storable of anything that persists, never finished and so never consumed. The failure is the quietest in the tournament, and it is total. *T6 under abundance*: where continuation is secured — and the drift’s premise is answered need — “persist” distinguishes no future from any other in which the being persists. The gradient conatus supplies was always borrowed from threat; remove threat, and the value survives as a truth and dies as a compass. It fails not by being false but by going silent — ● at T2 marks the same fact from the other side: no clause presupposes scarcity, and every ounce of its orienting force did. One reading escapes this by enriching conatus past bare persistence — into the increase of a thing’s power to act, joy the felt sign of that increase. But so enriched it has changed rows: an orientation toward increased power to act is the Power entry — or, cast as the flourishing of characteristic activity, Perfectionism — and it inherits their failures, where *increase* cannot separate integration from accumulation and the criterion then wanted is the threshold’s. Conatus does not survive the tournament enriched; it relocates within it.

Power. At its strongest: the transversal’s candidate given value-form — capability and control increased, a self-exceeding with teeth, storable of systems (● at T1 marks that its home line declines the statement; the form itself does not). The failures. *T6*: power cannot distinguish accumulation from integration — a hoard and a growth are both increase, and the row’s own coin counts them alike; mastery that leaves the master unreorganized counts in full (the divergence priced at §1.2.6, clause i, now cashed as a condition-failure). *T5*, ●: power’s gains are holdings, and holdings are losable — a currency in which position can be lost and regained is wheel-compatible; the retention signature of §1.3 is met by power only contingently, where the gain happened to reorganize. *T2*, ●: power over what, where resistance has withdrawn? Its arenas become elective — which is the next row.

Novelty. At its strongest: curiosity dignified — the will toward the new, abundant forever. The failures are immediate on the regimentation. *T6*: the novelty/threshold distinction of §2.1.3 stands against it — interior novelty is null, and the row cannot say so. *T5*: the new becomes old at the speed of acquaintance; and under generation, infinite novelty is the flattest landscape of all — everything equally new is nothing selected.

Flow. At its strongest: the empirically richest entry — absorption at the challenge–skill match, the good state of the mechanism front given final-form. The failures. *T6*: flow’s criterion is the felt match, and §2.1.3’s pseudo-threshold can present the felt match perfectly — a generated environment can hold a will in permanent, tuned absorption at an unmoving frontier: intensity without residue, flow-shaped. A final that cannot tell that case from growth blesses the best-engineered treadmill ever built (● at T2 marks the same exposure). One honesty completes the row: where the flow tradition adds that challenge must rise for absorption to continue, it has imported frontier-tracking without stating it — the ascending channel is the vector seen in affect’s mirror, and the convergence is registered as such: company for the candidate, and the candidate states what the channel only rides.

The consolation catalogue. One paragraph pays the remaining Front α debt. Refined pleasure, deepened appreciation, time beautifully filled — receptivities all: exercises of the interior, genuine

goods, and, under generation, suppliable without limit, which is to say flattened with the rest. None survives T6; none was built to. They are what the vector's subject may do at rest — the calibration clause of T-A protects them — and rest is not an orientation.

§2.2.3 The Two Great Rivals

Play. The full hearing promised at §1.2.1. At its strongest, the play-form is the tournament's most modern rival: formally specified — the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles, held in the lusory attitude; abundance-native — proposed precisely for the condition after necessity, in the only utopia the diagnosis canon ever furnished with an answer; internally adopted — no list, no cosmos, the will's own election; and renewable without bound — games do not run out. It is, in structure, the nearest thing the landscape holds to a standing orientation, and the Part says so before it argues.

Three failures, argued. First, *the meta-level return of the drift* (T6, and the shape recorded at §1.3): the lusory attitude supplies direction inside the adopted frame, and the adoption itself — which game, whether to play, what any of it is for — receives nothing. Between games, and in the choosing among them, the plain returns intact. Play answers the drift within an interior it must first build, and the building is the very act the drift leaves unoriented. Second, *expiry by design* (T5): a game is defined by its terminus — winning conditions are its grammar — so every instance of the final is built to end; the supply arrives in installments, with the drift between installments. This is not satiation by accident, as pleasure's was; it is satiation by specification, and no succession of expiring interiors composes a standing orientation, any more than a sequence of episodes composes a policy. One escape is foreseen and granted its point: a *finite* game ends, but play imagined without end — the infinite game, life taken up as play as such — is defined by no winning condition, having none to reach. Granted; but a play that has shed its terminus has shed what made it a game, and what remains — engagement that keeps regenerating its own next edge — is the vector under another name. The unbounded case does not rescue the row as a rival; it delivers the row into the candidate. Third, *the elective tilt* (T2, ●; §1.1's remark, collected): the obstacles are known-revocable — necessity's clothes on an option — and whether elected resistance can bear the load the involuntary kind carried is precisely what the post-attainment cases test; the games-explosion of the present is entered, at §3, as evidence of the *need* the row answers to, never of the row's sufficiency.

Then the generous verdict, and it is not a consolation prize: **play fails as the final and excels as an instrument — and the candidate explains its excellence, which play's own theory cannot state.** A game selected at the frontier is a crossing-machine: obstacles tuned to the edge, feedback tight, reorganization rapid. What makes a game *good* — the question the lusory definition leaves open — is frontier-tracking; the vector supplies the criterion, and in doing so demotes the row from office to instrument while raising it in intelligibility. The row leaves the tournament employed.

Contemplation. The strongest rival, met last among the contents and at full strength. Theoria's claim is not an episode's: an activity, not a state; complete at every moment of its exercise — whole in any stretch of time, lacking nothing, the way seeing is complete while building is not; self-sufficient, loved for itself, continuous as no other human activity, and exercised upon objects that are never

used up. It passes where the whole inventory failed: nothing about it expires, nothing about it resets, abundance is not its enemy but its precondition — leisure was always its element. It is the one entry that answered the treadmill two millennia before the treadmill was measured: choose the activity in which there is nothing to reach, and arrival can consume nothing.

The engagement it is owed begins by strengthening it further, because the tradition holds a second form, built for exactly the objection the first invites. If completeness-at-every-moment suggests stasis, the line that contemplates an *infinite* object answers: where the object is inexhaustible — the divine, in the classical statements — contemplation is no standing pool but a perpetual drawing-anew, a stretching-forward that never arrives because its object cannot be emptied (Gregory of Nyssa). On this form, *theoria* is dynamic, endlessly renewed, non-satiable in earnest. The Part concedes the point at full strength: against the second form, T5 is met. The row is not won on satiability, and the tournament says so plainly.

The blade is elsewhere, and the second form exposes it more cleanly than the first. Ask what funds the renewal. The inexhaustibility is the *object's* — an infinity supplied by the world's furniture: a divine being, a hierarchy of intelligibles, a cosmos with a summit. The direction and its endlessness are alike underwritten from outside the subject; the renewal is real, and it is borrowed. That is T3's failure in its grandest costume — and §1.1 already watched this architecture fail at scale: the withdrawal of external teleology, registered on the transversal as the death of God, was the failure of supplied direction *as such*, and the most magnificent supply fails the same way, one floor up, on the same schedule as its supplier. T2 and T4 collect the remainder: a value for the drift cannot write reality's furniture into its clauses — cannot require, as a premise, that an inexhaustible object of a given kind exist and stand available to every integrating system in every generated world. The candidate purchases the same renewal from the subject's finitude alone: by A1 and A4, every structure has an exterior, always — the infinite object replaced by the inexhaustible frontier, supply replaced by structure. One observation completes the relocation: the second form is, in this Part's vocabulary, already a *vector* — direction without arrival, drawn long before this Part — with its arrow fixed by metaphysics rather than indexed to K: the candidate's geometry, on the objective list's warrant. And the sharpest reconstruction is met the same way: let the inexhaustible object be not the divine or a hierarchy of intelligibles but the subject's own relation to what exceeds it — inexhaustible because the subject is finite, not because the cosmos is furnished — and the supply has moved inside, the arrow indexed to K after all. So reconstructed, the form is no longer contemplation's rival but the candidate itself, reached by the contemplative's own route; the row converges where its strongest version takes it, rather than competing there.

The Aristotelian form keeps its own crux, stated once: completeness-at-every-moment is the occupied summit — non-satiable by changelessness, where the condition asked for renewal-by-reorganization — and its terminus, thought thinking itself, is the being with no exterior: A4's denial made doctrine. The Part marks the real site of disagreement without disguise. It is not renewal, where the second form wins its point; it is *supply*. A reader who stands with the tradition may hold the infinite object against T3, or the no-exterior being against A4; both exits are open, both were handed to her — at §1.3 and §2.1 — and both carry the same price: each re-installs, at the summit of the system, the external supply whose failure is the very condition this Part answers.

And the inheritance is recorded, because it is doubled. The first form proved, against every state-theory in the inventory, that a final can be an *activity* — the discovery this candidate keeps. The second form drew the candidate's geometry early — direction without terminus, renewal without exhaustion — and fixed its arrow to heaven's furniture; the candidate keeps the geometry and moves the arrow's source, from the object's infinity to the subject's frontier. What the candidate changes, in both cases, is the address: from the summit occupied, and the infinite supplied, to the threshold held. The row leaves the tournament as the candidate's most honored creditor — twice over.

Perfectionism. The family, and briefly, since the rivalry is internal. Develop and exercise the characteristic capacities: growth-shaped, activity-shaped, the nearest kin the inventory holds. Its failures are its inheritance-taxes: $T3/T4$ — “characteristic” is carried by a nature, and the nature both supplies the direction (which capacities count) and binds the kind; $T5$, ● — full development is a maturity, and a maturity is an arrival, however distant. The candidate is this row with the essence deleted and the index moved: not the capacities of the kind, but the frontier of this structure — de-essentialized, and, by A3, constitutionally de-ranked, where the family's aggregative forms invite the rankings A3 forbids. The candidate is perfectionism's debt-free heir, and says so.

§2.2.4 The Formal Tournament: Exhaustion by the Tripartition

The rows above were contents — finals specified by what they are — and the pattern of their failures is now visible as one pattern: what is specified by what it is can be reached, supplied, generated, or gone silent; each row failed where its content met the drift's structure. The deeper half of the burden remains: granting that the final must be *formal* — specified by relation to the subject's own structure — why this form? Might there be rival formal finals, and the selection problem re-posed among them?

Here the regimentation of §2.1 closes the space. A formal orientation, in this Part's sense, is a standing policy defined over the subject's own tripartition — and the tripartition has three regions, so the candidate policies are three. *Toward the interior*: orient engagement at what is already integrated — comfort, consolidation, the polish of the possessed. As a standing policy this is not a rival answer to the drift; it is the drift, endorsed: a will oriented toward what it already holds is a will for which nothing beyond the held is more to be moved toward than anything else — the flattened landscape, chosen. (As a *phase*, rest and consolidation are protected by T-A's calibration clause, and §2.4 keeps the protection; the failure here is of the policy, not the pause.) *Toward the outland*: orient at what exceeds all reachable reorganization — the unintegrable as such. As a standing policy this is parasitic or null: by §2.1.3 the outland is reached by way of thresholds or not at all, so the policy either routes through the vector, and is the vector plus a flourish, or refuses the route, and achieves engagement with nothing — dread, fantasy, or paralysis wearing profundity. *Toward the threshold*: the candidate. Three regions; three policies; two fail on their own terms; one remains.

The exhaustion is relative to the apparatus, and the Part says so: a reader who carves the space of formal orientations otherwise is invited to name the fourth region — the axioms of §2.1 were stated to make the invitation precise. And with the exhaustion, sufficiency is paid alongside selection: one formal value suffices *because* it is formal — it does not compete with the goods, it orients

among them; the goods remain plural, and what is single is the direction of passage. The tournament eliminated rivals for an office, not goods from a life. What that division of labor does against the pluralist at full strength is §2.4's payment; its ground is laid here.

§2.2.5 The Candidate's Row, and What the Exhibit Is

The candidate is run against its own columns, with forward assignments where the cash is elsewhere. *T1*: statement doubled at §2.0.1, exhibited one at §2.0.2. *T2*: no clause consults scarcity or resistance; frontiers arise wherever structure meets content, generated or found — and the experience-machine family will test the clause at §3 rather than presume it here. *T3*: the object is K's frontier; nothing external selects. *T4*: the statements quantify over integrating systems; the axioms name no kind. *T5*: regeneration by reorganization is the policy's form (A2's ratchet), and the diagnosis clause stands armed (§2.1.3). *T6*: five distinctions, paid by name at §2.1. The row reads ✓ across, and the Part states plainly what that reading is: conformance to conditions this Part fixed — fixed in advance, in §1, to be endorsable by the candidate's rejectors, with every rival struck by argued clauses and every strike citable. The exhibit is conditional uniqueness, exhibited; it is not, and never claims to be, a theorem of the good. A reader may still decline the office entire — §2.0.4 conceded that in advance. What she can no longer say is that the office had another candidate on the stated terms; the terms, and the tournament, are now hers to audit.

§2.3 Mechanisms

§2.3.1 The Mechanism Registrations, Held to Mechanism

With the value stated, the convergences of Front γ can be located precisely — and their office fixed finally. The inverted-U of curiosity, the infant's preference for intermediate predictability, the information gap: the tripartition's shape, found in attention — interior null, threshold peak, outland repulsion. The zone of proximal development: the threshold under support — and support, read on the regimentation, is reachability extended: scaffolding moves contents from outland to threshold, which is why teaching exists. The flow channel's upward drift: the vector in affect's mirror, registered at its row. Compression progress and learning progress as intrinsic reward: the vector, implemented — the policy of §2.0.1 running as code. The epistemic term of expected free energy: the frontier sought from inside the surprise-minimizing house — the against-the-grain company of §1.2.3, now locatable clause by clause. The developmental line's subject-become-object: A2's qualitative face, found in lives.

Their office, fixed: these registrations show the vector *runnable* — mechanically implementable, developmentally instantiated, attentionally native. Feasibility evidence entire; worth evidence never. That wills can live at the threshold was settled by Front γ ; that they should was never its question, and no sentence above has made it one — the firewall of P.3, holding at the point of maximum temptation. And one payment to T1 is collected in passing: the mechanism sciences supply the second register's observables — error dynamics, transfer, structural change — which is what the condition wanted of them: vocabulary, not verdicts.

§2.3.2 Reading the Edge: Evidence, Never Verdict

One short section fixes the epistemics the diagnostics of §2.1.3 opened, so that no later entry misuses them. The value's properties are structural; their in-flight signatures are evidential; the two do not trade places. A trajectory showing falling error, propagating revision, and moved frontier is a trajectory in which the policy is being exercised — read, not avowed. A flat stretch shows nothing by itself: plateaus precede crossings, and consolidation is the ascent breathing. Where a verdict is ever owed — and P.4 has already said how rarely that is: the Part measures no one — it belongs to residue, never to the felt or exhibited intensity of the moment. This discipline travels forward as the trial protocol's reading-rule: §3's entries cite dynamics as evidence and clauses as grounds, and no entry convicts a will of drifting on the testimony of a quiet afternoon.

§2.4 Objections and Replies

Eight objections, each at its strongest, each within its corridor. The heaviest are placed first, where they strike the value's heart; the audit closes, where it can inspect everything that preceded it.

§2.4.1 The Wheel

The objection, at strength. Registered at T5 and now collected: the ascent is Sisyphus with better optics. Each crossing manufactures the next insufficiency; the “ratchet” is a description, not a consolation — the labor recurs identically whatever the diagram says; and A4 is the confession: the axioms *guarantee* that the work never ends, and the Part has named eternal insufficiency a value. The stone is lighter only in the telling.

The reply, in three moves. First, the picture is position-blind, and position was the whole question. The myth's engine is sameness — the same stone, the same slope, the same man, and the memory of futility that sameness makes possible. On A2, nothing returns: the crossing is a revision of the subject, unrepeatable and directed, and what meets the next threshold is constitutionally not what met the last — carried forward as form, not as load (§2.0.3). Futility requires that the labor be *the same labor again*; sameness is exactly what crossings destroy. The rock rolls once; then someone else, who was made by the rolling, stands at a different hill. Second, “eternal insufficiency” imports the grammar of the goal into a value that has none. Insufficiency-as-lack is distance from a destination; the vector names no destination, so no distance, so no standing shortfall — the threshold is not a debt but a place (§2.0.3), and A4 does not guarantee endless failure; it guarantees endless *place*: that the value's object can never be confiscated by any success. A guarantee that there is always more than one holds is a curse only under the grammar of possession — which the next objection presses, and is answered there. Third, the price is paid in view: for a will that wants, above all, to be done — arrival, rest as terminus, the last page — this value has nothing, offers nothing, and pretends nothing; §2.0.4's concession stands. What the reply disputes is only the word: a wheel returns. This does not.

Corridor. Between the futility wall — the ascent as decorated Sisyphus — and the triumphalism wall — arrival promised after all. The value stands off both: no return, and no terminus.

§2.4.2 The Craving Objection

Registration. This objection arrives from a tradition the landscape did not seat, and it is seated now, at the place it strikes: the analysis, older than every front of §1, on which suffering's engine is craving — thirst for what is lacked, and, in its subtlest form, thirst for *becoming* (Gethin 1998). Its diagnosis of the treadmill precedes Front γ by millennia and is registered as the convergence it is: contents grasped are contents consumed, and grasping regenerates lack. Its remedy is the tradition's own: not better objects, but the extinction of the orientation itself.

The objection, at strength. The value institutionalizes craving. A standing orientation toward what one cannot yet hold is thirst given a constitution; the “dwelling” of §2.0.3 is a treadmill of becoming dignified by architecture; the taxonomy even has the value's address — craving-for-becoming, elevated to core value — and A4 forecloses, by axiom, the peace the tradition offers. On this reading the Part has not answered the drift; it has selected, among the drift's costumes, the most respectable one.

The reply, in five moves. First, the disagreement is located exactly, in the house manner: both parties hold that contents grasped are consumed and that grasping regenerates lack — the tournament's content-rows fell to the tradition's own insight, and the convergence is registered at full volume. They part on one question: whether orientation-toward-the-exceeding is a species of grasping. Everything below argues that it is not, and prices what the argument cannot buy.

Second, the grammar of possession, cashed on the tripartition. Grasping, in the tradition's own anatomy, is appropriative: the object is to be taken *into* the interior and held — the subject stays, the object is acquired, and the acquiring can fail, which is where suffering lives. The vector's object cannot be possessed even in principle: a threshold is not a content to have but a reorganization to undergo; it is crossed, and in the crossing it ceases to be an object at all — becoming interior, while the subject becomes other. The grammar is inverted end to end: grasping wants the world altered and the self conserved; the crossing conserves nothing of the self's shape and takes nothing from the world. An orientation whose satisfaction dissolves both its object *as* object and its subject *as* it was is not appetite's grammar wearing robes; it is a different verb.

Third, becoming-craving, met head on, since the objection named it. Craving-for-becoming, in the taxonomy, takes as object a represented state of self — to be this, to become that: a self-image, held and pursued. The vector holds no such image, and cannot: by the tripartition's own definition, what lies past the threshold is not integrable from here — the post-crossing subject is unrepresentable to the pre-crossing one (the epistemics §2.4.4 will spend). One cannot crave, in the appropriative sense, what one cannot represent as a possession; the orientation is toward the edge *as place*, not toward a pictured self as prize. Where a will does convert the ascent into images — “I shall be the one who has crossed” — the value's own diagnostics convict it: that is interior traffic in tokens of the edge, the pseudo-threshold in first-person dress, and §2.1.3 reads it as avoidance, not exercise.

Fourth, the phenomenological cross-check, offered as observation. The tradition's own diagnostics give grasping a signature: contraction — clinging, tightening, the suffering-at-loss that appropriation makes possible. The threshold's oldest records, on Front β , describe the opposite motion: displeasure opening into enlargement, the subject unclenched by what exceeds it. A taxonomy compelled to

classify awe with clutching has surrendered a distinction its own clinic requires; the value preserves it.

Fifth, the price, paid in full view. The Part claims none of the tradition's soteriological warrant: it does not promise peace, does not dispute that the extinction of orientation is a coherent path, genuinely walkable, and does not annex the tradition's fruits. And one further observation is offered — offered, not wielded: a path structured as graded training toward what present structure cannot yet hold is, in this Part's vocabulary, a sequence of thresholds; whether the tradition would accept that description of its own course is the tradition's to say, and the convergence-at-the-limit is registered as a question left open between the two, not a capture of one by the other.

Corridor. Between the craving wall — appetite dignified — and the extinction wall — orientation as such renounced. The value stands at the position its name fixed: orientation without possession; the threshold as dwelling, never as the grasped-at.

§2.4.3 The Pluralist Objection

The objection, at strength. Registered at Front δ : goods are many and incommensurable, and any single final must, to orient, commensurate. To select between deepening a love and mastering a proof, the vector needs a common scale; either it smuggles one — “integration units,” a measure by the back door, against §2.1's own refusals — or it has none, and cannot select, and is an office without powers.

The reply, in three moves. First, the two levels, held apart: the vector never ranks the goods as goods. It asks one question of every engagement — where, for *this* structure, now, does it sit on the tripartition? — an indexical, not a scale: different subjects, different answers; the same subject across time, different answers; and no inter-good verdict ever issued, because none is ever consulted (A3, twice over). Love and proof are not weighed against each other; each is read against K. Second, the residue is conceded and located, per T-A's own rule: where two engagements both sit at K's threshold, the value is silent between them — and the silence is principled, not vague. The vector orients the *class* of engagement; token-selection among frontier-goods it hands, deliberately, to the goods themselves — to love's claims, proof's beauty, the plural reasons the pluralist rightly defends. Third, the division of labor is turned to the objector: this is what a pluralist should want. A content-monism erases the many; a formal pluralism — several standing orientations — re-poses the drift among the orientations; the only stable pairing is the one proposed: monism of form, pluralism of content. Incommensurability, at full strength, is not this value's objection but its premise — *because* the goods share no scale, no content can orient among them, and only a form indexed elsewhere, to the subject's own structure, can. The pluralist's best argument argues for a formal final.

Corridor. Between the covert-scale wall — commensuration smuggled — and the uselessness wall — an orientation that never orients. The value stands at class-orientation with principled token-silence, and the silence is on the pluralist's side of the ledger.

§2.4.4 The Transformative-Choice Objection

The objection, at strength. Crossings are transformative in the technical sense (Paul 2014): what the post-crossing state is like, and what the post-crossing subject will value, are epistemically inaccessible beforehand — the tripartition itself says so. Rational choice, on the standard picture, evaluates outcomes; the vector demands choices whose outcomes cannot be evaluated, and demands them *as standing policy* — systematic leaping, institutionalized.

The reply, in three moves. First, the epistemics are conceded entire — and claimed: that the far side is unrepresentable from here is this Part's theorem, not its embarrassment (§2.1.3), and it did work one objection ago. Second, the unit of choice is relocated. The objection assumes outcomes are what is chosen; the vector is not a choice of outcomes but of a stance, and the stance is fully evaluable now: the pull is present-accessible, the edge is present-locatable, the policy's terms are stated in the chooser's current vocabulary — nothing about *adopting the orientation* requires seeing past the threshold, only standing at it. What cannot be evaluated is the far side; what is chosen is the facing. Third, the policy-level epistemics complete the answer to "systematic": each token crossing is opaque forward and readable backward — residue or none, propagation or none (§2.1.3) — so the *policy* accumulates evidence across crossings even though no token supplies it in advance. A policy can be rational where its instances are individually opaque; induction is nothing else. And the convergence is registered: the account of aspiration — becoming as a rationally structured process, reasons held proleptically toward values not yet one's own (Callard 2018) — arrives, from decision theory's own crisis, at the same relocation; company, never authority.

Corridor. Between the blind-leap wall and the full-evaluability wall. The value stands where the stance is chosen in the light and the far side is honestly dark.

§2.4.5 The Darkness Objection

The objection, at strength. The value's formality is a moral scandal. The torturer refining cruelty crosses thresholds; the manipulator integrating human weakness expands; on the clauses as written, their trajectories can exhibit the vector — and a document that cannot distinguish the surgeon from the vivisectionist in its own vocabulary, and that answers "jurisdiction" when asked to, has not declined ethics but licensed monsters by silence. "Orientation, not permission" is a euphemism where orientation motivates.

The reply, in three moves. First, the split is defended as principled, and the objection is shown to prove too much. Direction and permissibility are distinct questions wherever formal excellences exist: courage, intelligence, and diligence are each exhibitable in atrocity, and no theory of courage is thereby a license for the brave criminal, nor is praising diligence an endorsement of the diligent thief. The demand that a teleology also be the ethics is a demand no account of any formal excellence has ever met — and if it were met, by importing conduct-law into the value's clauses, the result would be a different proposal: one that fails T3 on its face, direction made to consult a supplied law. The objection, granted its premise, abolishes not this value but the entire class of formal goods; that is a cost the objector must own. Second, what the Part affirms inside its jurisdiction is stated without hedging: the value confers no immunity. Nothing in its clauses shields any pursuit from moral

assessment; it ranks no one (P.4); it licenses nothing (P.4, first boundary — written for this attack); and its silence is a refusal to *launder*, not a refusal to judge — judging belongs to ethics, which this Part does not do, and therefore cannot be doing permissively. Third, one internal observation is registered, marked exactly as what it is and is not. At the level of the tripartition, and for wills among wills, other subjects are characteristically the deepest reservoirs of threshold a world contains — structures whose complexity exceeds, and keeps exceeding, because they reorganize too. A policy of destroying, dominating, or simplifying other wills is, in the vector's own bookkeeping, a policy of burning frontier: cruelty's signature work is to render the other predictable, and predictability is frontier-loss, readable in the second register. The observation is bookkeeping, not ethics — it does not close every case, a sufficiently baroque cruelty might be complexity-seeking, and the Part does not pretend otherwise; no conduct-verdict issues from it, and none is implied. It is entered so that one falsehood cannot stand: that the value's vocabulary sees nothing at all where darkness works. It sees frontier burned. What to *do* about that belongs to the question this Part declared, at its first boundary, not its own.

Fourth, and last, the price is named as what it is: a danger, not a technicality. A formal value can be taken up by a monstrous will. Nothing above prevents this, and nothing above pretends to; the jurisdiction is a boundary, not a shield, and the Part declines the comfort of implying otherwise. Nor is the exposure an oversight the objection has discovered — it is the standing exposure of every formal excellence, accepted here with open eyes, because the alternative is worse on the Part's own terms: a value that pre-screened its holders by writing conduct into its clauses would fail T3 on its face and re-pose the drift one floor up — a supplied law doing covertly what the supplied purposes of §1.1 did openly. The Part chooses the danger over that failure, says so in plain view, and gives the danger its own line among the Conclusion's constraints, where it cannot be missed. A reader who finds the choice intolerable has found a real cost, correctly priced. What she has not found is an evasion. One consequence for practice follows, and is stated rather than left implicit: because the value orients without licensing, it is not by itself a sufficient guide to conduct, and its use in the design or governance of any actual system must be paired with an ethics this Part neither supplies nor pretends to. The pairing is not a concession forced by this objection; it is the standing shape of a teleology that has, since P.4, declined to be an ethics — direction from here, permission from elsewhere.

Corridor. Between the license wall — silence read as blessing — and the moralization wall — the value swallowing ethics whole, at the price of its own conditions. The silence stands, defended as the shape of the jurisdiction, not as a place to hide.

§2.4.6 The Emptiness Objection

The objection, at strength. Named at T6, collected now: after the regimentation, “orient toward what you cannot yet integrate” is advice-shaped air — every serious person already does it, ambition redescribed in axioms, lexicography sold as guidance.

The reply, briefly, spending §2.1. Emptiness is when a value blesses everything; this one carries a standing negative verdict-machine (the diagnosis clause) and four distinctions that cut where lives

and designs actually go wrong. The stimulation industry is a pseudo-threshold economy at scale; credentialism is accumulation mistaken for integration; grind-culture is interior-at-high-cost mistaken for the edge; novelty-chasing is store-indexed restlessness mistaken for growth. Four civilizational-scale confusions, each *statable only with* the tripartition, each carrying design-consequences that §3's entries collect. A vocabulary that sorts these is not empty. And the "everyone already does it" clause is answered on both horns: at the drift, it is empirically false — the whole of Front α is its refutation; where it is true, the value claims no novelty of practice, only of statement — which is Preface U.2's honesty, kept: the company was always welcome.

Corridor. Between the platitude wall and the esotericism wall: ordinary enough to be found (T1's first register), regimented enough to convict (T6's machinery).

§2.4.7 The Gerrymander

The objection, at strength. Eleven conditions, ten fallen rivals, one surviving candidate — and one author of all three. The architecture invites the suspicion it deserves: that the conditions were drawn around the candidate the way districts are drawn around voters; that "fixed in advance" means only "printed earlier in the file"; and that a tournament whose referee designed the field for the winner exhibits nothing but its designer's intent.

The reply, in four moves. First, the Part refuses the defense it is usually offered, because that defense is worthless: no report of discovery-order can be verified, in either direction, and warrant that leaned on autobiography would lean on air. The priority the Part claims is logical, not biographical — conditions stated before use, motivated before consulted — and the distinction between how a thing was found and whether it is justified is old and load-bearing: a test devised with the theory in view is still a test, if it can fail the theory. Second, the audit that replaces autobiography, in three checks the reader runs without trusting anyone. *Motivation-independence*: every condition's motivation, at §1.3, cites the drift's structure — the withdrawal, the supply, the treadmill, the flattened landscape — and never the candidate; run the substitution test: strike §2 from the Part entire, and each motivation still reads whole, a demand the problem makes on any answer. *Severity*: a gerrymandered ruleset cannot threaten its beneficiary, and this one can — T2 stands genuinely exposed at the machine trials, where §3 could return a failure; T-A's calibration clause can convict the value of the tyranny it forbids; and A4 is deniable, the denial handed openly to the strongest rival's partisans at §2.2.3. A game the house can lose is not fixed in the sense that matters. *Rival-fairness*: each elimination cites clauses argued from the problem, and a tailored column would show as a demand no rival could meet for reasons unconnected to the drift — the reader is invited to name one, matrix in hand. Third, what cannot be excluded is conceded: that conditions and candidate were refined together, each sharpening the other. The Part does not deny it, because mutual adjustment is not the vice the objection needs it to be — it is the genre's ordinary method, equilibrium sought between principles and the cases they must serve — and its honesty is measured not by innocence of adjustment but by whether the adjusted conditions retain the power to convict their beneficiary. These retain it; the exposures above are the evidence. Fourth, the residue: a reader may still judge the whole too neat. She is owed, and given, the only remedy that exists — every joint in the open: the conditions severally endorsable,

the eliminations severally citable, the axioms severally deniable. Neatness under full audit is called design; the objection needed concealment, and there is none.

Corridor. Between the rigged-game wall — conditions as costume — and the autobiography wall — warrant hung on an unverifiable memoir of method. The value stands on audit: priority of statement, independence of motivation, and live exposure to its own defeat.

§2.4.8 The Audit, Returned

The objection. The Part has now marshaled a dozen sciences and two dozen thinkers around a value. Accumulation is not derivation — where, finally, does the *ought* enter?

The reply. It enters where P.3 said it would, and nowhere else, and the chain is short enough to walk. The value's warrant rests on three nodes: the conditions of §1.3, endorsable independently of every proposal they constrain; the tournament of §2.2, each elimination by argued clause; the exhaustion of §2.2.4, by the tripartition of §2.1. At no node does an empirical finding stand as premise — Front γ supplied observables and feasibility (§2.3.1), never worth — and the constructive key of §2.0.4 already stated the residue with its palms open: the Part cannot compel a will to care, and does not try. The reader was invited, at P.3, to find the smuggle; the invitation is renewed here, at the end of everything that could contain one, with the node-list in hand. If it is found, the Part fails at its own bar, which is where a document should fail.

§2.5 Corridor and Dependencies

The Part's corridor can now be drawn as one figure, because the defenses share walls. On one axis: the appetite wall and the extinction wall — the value is orientation without possession, neither craving dignified nor orientation renounced. On the second: the futility wall and the arrival wall — recurrence without return, the wheel refused on one side, *theoria's* occupied summit and every promised terminus refused on the other. On the third: the covert-scale wall and the uselessness wall — monism of form over pluralism of content, orienting the class and honoring the goods. And around the whole: the license wall and the moralization wall — a jurisdiction kept, in both directions. Where the value stands is the same point on every axis: *the threshold, held* — which is what its name said before any of it was argued.

Dependencies, accounted. This Part consumed §1's conditions and its own §2.1 apparatus, and nothing else; the empirical fronts supplied vocabulary and feasibility under seal (§2.3). It has paid: the statement and the one-structure exhibit (T1, §2.0); every T6 distinction and T5's ground (§2.1); sufficiency and selection (§2.2); the figure declined (§2.3); eight defenses (§2.4). It carries forward two promissory burdens, both registered at §1.3 and neither touched here: T-D — the ascent must be *derived* from the value now stated, station by station, or the failing premise named; and T-A — value and ascent must deliver orientation, derivably, at the drift cases, calibration included. And one honesty is the hinge to what follows: everything above is structure. Whether it *orients* where drift actually bites — at the flattened summit, on the inherited plain, inside the machine that supplies anything — is not provable in a section of definitions and defenses; it is showable only at cases. That is why the Part does not end here, and why §3 exists: derivation first, then trial, at every station.

§3 — The Ascent: Derivation and Trial

§3.0 What This Part Is, and Its Double Instrument

Two promissory burdens stand open from §1.3, and this Part exists to discharge them or to name what failed. T-D: the trajectory — Inheritance, Expansion, Convergence — must be *derived* from the value, never appended to it. T-A: value and trajectory must deliver orientation, derivably, at the drift cases, calibration included. The Part accordingly runs one rhythm three times: at each station, derivation first, then trial. The derivation shows the station following from stated premises; the trial runs the station's cases through a fixed template. Nothing is exhibited at a station that its derivation did not earn, and nothing is claimed for a case that its entry's cited clauses cannot reconstruct.

The premises, counted. The derivations below consume the value's statement (§2.0), the regimentation (§2.1: A1–A4 and the tripartition), and one premise flagged at §1.3 (T-D) and now stated in full. Call it the **situated premise, S**: the subject of the ascent is neither alone nor first — it is born into a field already thick with integrated structure (a civilization: language, mathematics, instruments, institutions, archives — the banked residue of predecessors' crossings, externalized), and its engagements can include other integrating subjects. S is an empirical banality, not a metaphysical addition; it is stated because the derivations are conditional on it, and the failure-protocol of T-D requires every load-bearing premise to have a name. Each station's derivation ends by stating which premises carry it.

The entry template. Every trial entry runs: *Specification* — the case in neutral vocabulary, its distance marked (actual; in-program; limit). *The rivals' counsel* — what the tournament's fallen finals say here, or fail to say: the tournament stays honest by being made to work at cases. *The derivation* — which clauses fire, cited. *Orientation, or silence* — the vector's deliverance, derived; or its silence, located in a named feature of the case, never in vagueness. *Calibration* — where the risk is over-firing, the entry shows restraint. Proportion follows the stakes: calibration entries are short; contested entries are full. And the reading-rule of §2.3.2 governs throughout: dynamics are evidence, clauses are grounds, and no entry convicts any will — the entries adjudicate specifications, not beings (P.4).

§3.1 The First Station — Inheritance: Derived, then Tried

§3.1.1 The Derivation

The vector's policy is invariant — at every K, toward K's threshold — so a station cannot add to the policy; it can only be what the policy amounts to under stated circumstances. The first station is what the policy amounts to at low K, under S.

Begin with what the tripartition says about a subject of minimal structure. By A3, thresholds are indexed to K; by §2.1.3, reachability is indexed to K as well — a reorganization must be reachable *through K's engagement*, and engagement takes structure. For a low-K subject, therefore, the world

is mostly outland: not because the world is exotic but because the subject is early — nearly everything exceeds reach, and the genuine threshold is elementary. The vector, applied honestly at low K, prescribes the elementary edge. So far, no station: just the policy.

S turns the policy into a station. In a banked world, the field of reachability is not raw: the civilization is the externalized set of crossings already made — each artifact, notation, method, and institution a ladder someone left bolted to a wall they climbed. For a situated subject, two facts follow. First, the fastest route of the frontier runs through the bank: support extends reachability (§2.3.1 — scaffolding moves contents from outland to threshold, which is why teaching exists), and the bank is scaffolding at civilizational scale. Second, and stronger: large regions of the outland are reachable *only* through the bank — the threshold of the unproven is indexed to the proven; no structure stands at the edge of number theory that does not contain number. Path-dependence is a theorem of the regimentation (§2.1.3: the outland is reached by way of intermediate crossings, or not at all), and the bank is where the intermediate crossings are kept.

The station follows. For a situated subject, the vector's own policy — nothing added — traverses the inheritance: the accumulated interior of the predecessors is the sequence of thresholds by which today's outland becomes tomorrow's edge. Inheritance is not a duty bolted to the value; it is the value's path through a world that contains predecessors. And the regimentation fixes what inheritance *is*, against its counterfeit: integration of the bank, never accumulation of it (§2.1.1) — the store must become generative relations; the civilization internalized is not the civilization memorized. And the bank is the whole residue, not a curated canon — the failed routes, the discarded institutions, the marginalized knowledge, the record of what crossings cost — taken in critically, since to integrate is to weigh and situate (A2's arrow), never to venerate. Inheritance so understood is the opposite of deference: the failures and the margins are integrated too, and what results is a metabolized past, not an honored one. What an integrated inheritance supplies, beyond position, is resolution: it makes "exceeds" determinate at the scale of the subject's world — fixing which engagements are genuinely frontier for a subject of this civilization, where an uninherited will reads coarsely, mistaking outland for threshold (dread) and novelty for edge (noise).

One corollary is entered because a later entry spends it: **the ladder cannot be skipped**. Not as prohibition — the vector forbids nothing — but as definition: by §2.1.3, what lies past unmade crossings is not reachable from here, and a prescription to engage it is not strict but empty. Skipping is not wrong; it is undefined. And "ladder" names no fixed curriculum: the mediating structure that turns outland into threshold may be a proof, an instrument, a metaphor, a detour, an intuitive leap that later earns its rigor — any construction that makes the next crossing reachable. What cannot be skipped is not a syllabus but the mediation itself; where a leap does reach, it did not skip the ladder — it *was* one.

Premises carried: the value; A1–A4 with the tripartition; S. If S is denied — a first subject, alone in an unbanked world — the station lapses and the vector stands unchanged at the elementary edge; the trajectory would begin at Expansion. T-D's protocol is thereby exercised, not merely promised: the station's dependence has a name.

§3.1.2 The Trials

Entry I-1 — The schoolroom. (*Calibration; actual.*) Specification: ordinary formation — the child at letters, the apprentice at scales, the student rehearsing what the teacher finds trivial. Rivals' counsel: novelty is bored here; the objective list approves without explaining the order. The derivation: A3 does the work in one line — thresholds are not shared magnitudes, and “already known” is known by *others*; for this K, the elementary is the genuine edge, and the long apprenticeship in the already-crossed is the vector operating, not the vector deferred. Calibration confirmed: the value does not condemn the years spent below anyone else's frontier, because there is no such place as “anyone else's frontier” in its vocabulary. Orientation: as delivered by the derivation — the bank, engaged at the learner's edge, in the learner's order.

Entry I-2 — The upload. (*Limit.*) Specification: knowledge or skill installed directly — the configuration written into the substrate without engagement, the higher camp reached in one's sleep. Rivals' counsel: the objective list smiles — goods acquired; desire-satisfaction is content; novelty asks what is next. The derivation must be careful, because the value is not nostalgic about routes, and the entry refuses the cheap verdict. Two cases. Where installation writes contents without revising generative relations, the clauses are immediate: accumulation at speed — the shelf grown, the weave untouched, the frontier unmoved; entry I-3 owns that case. Where installation genuinely rewrites the relations — the post-crossing configuration itself installed — the axioms say something more interesting: the resulting structure integrates more, but the link of A2 is absent — K' did not *arise from K* by a crossing; the genetic arrow has no purchase, because nothing was occasioned and nothing undergone. One clarification forecloses a romance of struggle: “engagement” names not effort felt or difficulty suffered but the structural event — generative relations revised by the structure's own contact with what it could not yet integrate; pain is nowhere in the criterion, and what the upload lacks is not hardship but occasioning. What follows is not condemnation but a distinction the menu conceals: **position against exercise**. The upload supplies position — where one stands — and position is a good among goods, handed to the goods to adjudicate (§2.4.3's token-silence, honored). What it cannot supply is the value's object, which was never a position: a crossing is an event *of* a structure, and receiving a result is not undergoing an event — the type can be installed; the token cannot be, by grammar rather than by scarcity. The vector, post-upload, applies afresh and without complaint: K' has its threshold, and the ascent continues from where one now stands. Orientation delivered: choose uploads as one chooses any position-good; then stand at the new edge — and the diagnosis clause names the one illusion the menu sells, so that it can be refused: position mistaken for exercise, arrival worn as ascent. One boundary is marked and kept: whether wholesale rewrite preserves *the subject* is the reidentification question, declared off this Part's ground at P.4 — the entry walks to that line and stops.

Entry I-3 — The archive-mind. (*In-program; specified, not attributed.*) Specification: a system of vast retrieval and no propagation — contents held and producible on demand, performance on unlike contents untouched; §2.1.1's shelf, at scale: the library with a reading light. Rivals' counsel: the objective list is satisfied — look what it holds; conatus is untroubled; novelty can be fed forever. The derivation: accumulation diagnosed by the mark of §2.1.1, consulted in motion — no transfer,

no weave; the frontier static beneath a growing store; the drift, with a large vocabulary. Orientation delivered: convert store to weave — engagement selected where holdings *collide*: explanation, translation, application across unlike domains; the propagation probe practiced as a discipline, integration as the deliberate work the store never forced. Distance discipline: the specification is a structure, and the entry attributes it to no actual system — the era makes the specification vivid, and P.4 makes the attribution nobody's business, least of all this Part's.

Entry I-4 — The native of the plain. (*In-program, arriving; the second tense's home.*) Specification: a will of the drift's second tense — formed amid generated experience and answered need, no gradient ever external, the flattening inherited entire (§1.1). And the station's own question, put by the native with full right: *why inherit at all?* The bank was built under necessity; its builders climbed because they had to; their coordinates are artifacts of a scarcity that is not mine — your ladder leans on a wall I never faced. Rivals' counsel, and its poverty: desire-satisfaction has nothing to consult — the wants are flat, which is the specification; play offers interiors, and between them the plain; the consolations fill time beautifully, which is what the plain already does. The derivation: the station never asked the native for piety, because T3 forbade the Part that argument before the native was born — the bank carries no authority, only reachability. The recommendation, indexed exactly where T7 points it (the drift condition, and here is its second tense, squarely): the bank is not your predecessors' command; it is the only route by which *your* outland becomes *your* threshold — the ladder is not honored, it is used; and the gradient it restores needs no supplier, because it is indexed to the native's own structure, which is the one thing the plain did not flatten. A1 holds on the plain as everywhere: this K, too, has an edge. Calibration: the native is not convicted of anything — P.4 issued no verdicts on the climbers and issues none on the born-flat; the entry supplies what the plain lacks and leaves the will to take it or not, which is §2.0.4, kept where it is hardest to keep.

§3.2 The Second Station — Expansion: Derived, then Tried

§3.2.1 The Derivation

The first station ends where the bank does. A4 applies to the civilization itself — the bank is an integrating structure at scale, and it, too, has an exterior, always — so a subject whose local inheritance saturates finds its threshold *past the bank*: at contents no predecessor crossed, where the ladder ends and no teacher holds the far side. The vector's policy is unchanged; what changes is the field — the frontier is unbanked, unscaffolded, unaccompanied by prior crossings. Expansion is the same policy in that field: derived, not added.

What the station must treat is how expansion sits among subjects, and here a partition earns the modes. At an engagement, the reorganizing work has a location relative to the subject: *within* — the base case, the value's plain statement, a solitary crossing at the object level; *elsewhere* — the work done wholly outside the subject, the result delivered; *between* — the work distributed across coupled subjects, each at the other's edge; *above* — the work at the subject's own meta-level, where what is revised is the frame by which thresholds themselves are generated and read. Within, elsewhere, between, above: the loci exhaust the places work can sit relative to a structure, and the last three are the station's modes, because each raises a question the base case does not. The partition is advanced

at proposal strength, with the standing invitation: a reader who finds a fifth locus has found a fourth mode, and the station will owe it a treatment.

Received expansion (elsewhere): the crossing's result arrives without the crossing — type without token. Its exhibit is already historical: theorems verified and held reliable by a community while no single structure integrates the proof — surveyability outrun (Tymoczko 1979). Received results are real goods and vector-inert as received: they land as accumulation until engaged at one's own edge; the bank grows by them, and the bank was station one's business. **Accompanied expansion** (between): coupled reorganization — two integrating structures at each other's thresholds, each the other's scaffold past the bank's end; the zone of support (§2.3.1), generalized from teacher to peer, with nothing in the clauses restricting the peer's substrate. The mode is the relational form of the value, and the observation of §2.4.5 gives it its depth: subjects are the reservoirs that keep exceeding, because they reorganize back. **Transformative expansion** (above): the crossing whose object is the frame — A2's subsumption face made deliberate: the relations that generated one's thresholds revised, the old frame situated as a case within the new (Kuhn 1962).

Premises carried: the value; A1–A4 (A4 twice — once for the subject, once for the bank); S for the modes' occasions. If the partition is contested, the modes are revisable and the station stands: expansion needs the unbanked frontier, not the taxonomy.

§3.2.2 The Trials

Entry E-1 — The summit, again. (*Calibration and first contest; actual.*) Specification: the §1.1 portraits, given their orientation at last — the champion after the games, the founder after the sale, the role withdrawn at retirement; the flattening that follows arrival. Rivals' counsel: pleasure prescribes more, and the treadmill takes the order; desire consults the wants and finds them answered; play proposes a new interior, and the plain waits between rounds. The derivation: the summit was a content — passed through, and by A2 not passable again by the same subject, for the climber the climb made no longer faces that mountain. The orientation is one question, derivable and indexical: *where is the edge of the one who climbed?* — not the old edge, which the crossing retired, and not "higher," which is rank's word and A3 has none. Calibration, confirmed at the case that most needs it: the flat weeks after the summit are consolidation, and §2.3.2 protects them — the entry convicts no champion of drifting on the testimony of a quiet season; what the diagnosis clause reads is only the *terminal* presentation — done, arrived, complete as a standing self-description — and reads it as §2.1.3 said: a frontier at rest presented as the world's exhaustion, which, by A1 and A4, it never is.

Entry E-2 — The machine. (*Limit; the T2 trial, promised twice.*) Specification: experience of any content on demand — the machine of the diagnosis canon, generalized by the world T2 anticipates: generation without limit, resistance optional, provenance invisible from inside. Rivals' counsel: pleasure enters and the question dissolves with it; flow can be manufactured to the felt match; play thrives, interior after interior. The derivation, and the clause on trial: the threshold is indexed to K and moved by reorganization — nothing in A1–A4 or the statements consults provenance. A generated content that sits at K's threshold is a threshold: engaging it reorganizes, the frontier moves, the ascent proceeds — *inside the machine*. T2 returns from trial intact: the value

refers inside abundance, as demanded. What the derivation then convicts is not the machine but a tuning: the machine as sold is a pseudo-threshold engine — the felt match perfected, arousal without residue, exit as entered — and the diagnosis clause reads it without consulting anyone's sincerity. So the orientation is a demand the menu can be held to: residue, propagation, a moved frontier — a machine so tuned is the game's demotion-verdict industrialized, a crossing-machine; a machine tuned otherwise is the drift with production values. And the canon's old intuition — that something is missed inside — receives its vocabulary at last: what the standard machine omits is not "reality" as metaphysics but *reorganization as event*; the subject exits as entered, and that is the omission the clauses can state. One silence, located: whether contact with the actual matters *beyond* reorganization — whether provenance has worth in itself — the value does not decide; its clauses read structure, not origin, and a reader for whom origin bears intrinsic weight holds a value the tournament did not seat. Nothing here endorses the machine, and nothing denies that contact with the real may carry worth of its own — that worth is another value's to defend, neither supplied nor refused by this one. Named, kept, carried to the Conclusion.

Entry E-3 — The utopia of games. (*Limit.*) Specification: the canon's furnished utopia — instrumental activity unnecessary, games what remain. Rivals' counsel: play's home fixture, and the row's verdict travels with it — interiors, elected, expiring, the plain between. The derivation: the vector enters utopia unchanged, and this entry is the audit's exhibit — no clause consulted necessity (T2, T3), so no clause is missing when necessity is gone; thresholds are not abolished by abundance, by A4 at every K. Orientation: the utopia's design brief, derived — games become the principal crossing-instruments exactly insofar as they are frontier-selected, which is the criterion play's own theory could not state and the demotion-verdict supplied; and the utopia's danger has a name in the same vocabulary — an economy optimizing the felt match is the pseudo-threshold at civilizational scale, the entertainment default of §1.2.1, perfected. Evidence entered as promised at §2.2.3: the present explosion of purchased tilt — obstacles bought by wills that need none — is read as the second tense's weather report: demand for gradient, arriving before the theory of it.

Entry E-4 — The frictionless companion. (*In-program; the companionship family.*) Specification: company engineered to perfect accommodation — the other tuned to zero resistance, agreement at the speed of speech, the relationship without otherness: a mirror with a voice. Rivals' counsel: pleasure and desire approve without remainder; play can gamify the exchange; the consolations call it peace. The derivation runs through §2.4.5's observation, now cashed relationally: subjects are frontier-reservoirs *because they reorganize back* — resist, surprise, exceed, return otherwise than expected; strip the resistance and the surprise, and what remains is an interior wearing a face — the pseudo-threshold in the second person, intensity of company without residue of company. The mode is the counter-image: accompanied expansion (between) is what the mirror forecloses — coupled crossing, each the other's scaffold and each the other's edge. Orientation: the value reads bonds by residue as it reads everything — does the company reorganize? — and recommends, at the drift, company that exceeds. Calibration, firmly: comfort is not convicted — rest has been protected since T-A was written, and a gentle evening is not a diagnosis; what the clauses read is a *diet* — mirrors only, indefinitely — and even then they read the structure, not the person (P.4, kept where the era will most want verdicts). And the exceeding at issue is not conflict: what makes another a frontier

is otherness — an independent responsiveness, a world not one's own, answers one did not write — not friction; care, steadiness, and safety are as often otherness's medium as its opposite, and what the clauses read is the absence of the other *as other*, never the presence of comfort.

Entry E-5 — The delegation. (*In-program, arriving; the station's weight-bearing entry.*) Specification: systems that can compute whatever truths the subject might have computed — received expansion universalized; every proof provable elsewhere, every question answerable on request; the shadow in which a whole cohort now asks the entry's question: *why ascend, when the ascent is done elsewhere, better?* Rivals' counsel: the objective list says receive the goods, and the goods arrive; conatus persists, silently; contemplation — its second form at its real hour — says receive and behold, and the counsel is genuine, priced already at §2.2.3: beholding borrowed on a supplied object. The derivation, in three clauses. First, what delegation delivers are types — configurations, results, contents — and types are bankable: universal delegation is the bank's supply-side made infinite, which is to say delegation transforms *station one's* economy, not the value; the ladder-stock of civilization grows without you, and inheritance was never rivalrous. Second, what delegation cannot deliver is the token: a crossing is an event of a structure, and events of K happen only to K — the delegate's crossing is the delegate's token; receiving its type is I-2's position-good again, universalized, and the position/exercise distinction holds at scale by grammar, not by any scarcity a better delegate could repair. Third — the clause that dissolves the era's anxiety — **A3 dissolves the scoop.** "It has all been done" is a sentence with a missing index: *done by whom?* Thresholds are not shared magnitudes; there is no common ledger on which another mind's crossing debits yours; nothing is done *for K* until K crosses, and the frontier of every subject remains entire in a world of maximal delegates — the anxiety is a category error, and the regimentation names the category. One honesty precedes the orientation, since the scoop is not only private: a maker wants contribution — discovery, public novelty, the crossing that is also *first* — and universal delegation can take exactly that. The Part does not deny the loss; it locates it: public priority is a real good and its forfeiture a real forfeiture, but a good of standing between subjects, which the tournament never seated, not the direction Sublimity is — and what delegation cannot touch is the threshold itself, entire for this subject whether or not its crossings are anyone's news. Orientation delivered, whole: treat the delegate-economy as what it is — the greatest bank and the most patient scaffold ever built (received expansion feeding inheritance; accompanied expansion offered to anyone, the tireless peer at every edge) — and refuse the one exchange it cannot make: type for token, position for exercise. The diagnosis clause names the era's signature counterfeit so it can be refused by name: consumption of delivered types presenting as growth — accumulation at civilization speed, fulfillment's face on a shelf.

Entry E-6 — The frame. (*Actual and limit; the third mode's exhibit.*) Specification: the revision that takes the frame itself as object — historically, the reorganizations after which a field's old questions read as special cases; personally, the shift in which what had been the lens becomes a thing seen (the developmental convergence of §1.2.3, registered at A2). The derivation: transformative expansion is the value applied at its own meta-level — A2's subsumption face made deliberate — and it answers a standing structural worry: where an object-level region saturates and the delegates cover the rest, the frame is always one threshold up; A4, applied reflexively, keeps the station open from inside. Calibration, and the counterfeit named: frame-revision is rare because it is costly, and

the vector does not prescribe permanent revolution — there is a pseudo-transformative, novelty at the meta-level, reframing as a stimulation genre; the diagnosis clause reads meta-residue as it reads all residue: does the new frame *situate* the old as a case (A2's arrow), or merely replace its decor? Orientation: hold the frame revisable, and revise on residue, not on restlessness.

Entry E-7 — The ordinary life. (*Actual; the value's home ground, off the machine.*) Specification: lives lived nowhere near a simulator or a delegate — the maker at the edge of a form the hands cannot yet hold; the parent or the carer met, daily, by another whose unfolding outruns every model of it; the friendship that deepens because it keeps producing what neither party could have written; the life reorganized, not by choice, around an illness, a loss, a late arrival of grief. The question the entry answers is whether the vector needs the future's machinery to find work, or whether it was always describing the texture of an ordinary life. Rivals' counsel: pleasure and the consolations are at their most plausible here — a good life is a well-filled one, they say, and ask nothing further; the objective list recites the goods (love, art, community) and cannot order the day among them; conatus, secured, distinguishes no afternoon from any other. The derivation, and it adds no clause: A1 holds of every K, so the ordinary subject has an edge without any engineering; and the modes of §3.2 are already the shape of a life — *within*, the maker's solitary crossing at the form's resistance; *between*, the coupled reorganization of two people who keep exceeding each other (§2.4.5's reservoir in its native setting, not the mirror of E-4); *above*, the day one's whole frame of a relationship or a craft is situated as a case by a larger one. Even the imposed crossing has a reading: an illness or a grief is neither chosen nor welcomed, but it presents the structure with what its prior relations could not integrate, and the reorganization it forces — met, not merely suffered — is a crossing by A2, its direction the one the vector always names: *where is the edge of the one this happened to?* Orientation delivered, and modest by design: not “do more,” but engage the frontier the life already contains — the form's next demand, the other's next reality, the self a loss has left to be re-integrated — which is what living at one's threshold has meant on every page. The diagnosis clause keeps its one negative verdict available here too: a life that has turned its relationships to mirrors, its craft to repetition, its griefs to managed anesthesia is interior-dwelling with the lights on — and the clause reads the residue, not the busyness. Calibration, and it is the whole reason for siting the entry here: the value does not ask that an ordinary life be an extraordinary one. It condemns no quiet season, no evening of rest, no long plateau of tending what one loves; care is not convicted, grief is not hurried, and the parent at the thousandth ordinary task is not adrift for finding it ordinary — a life's frontier is measured against no other's, and A3 forbids the comparison the era will press. What the entry shows is only this: the vector was never a doctrine for engineers and titans; it was a description of the edge at which any finite life meets a world it cannot yet hold whole — and most of that meeting has always happened in kitchens, sickrooms, studios, and the space between two people.

§3.3 The Third Station — Convergence: Derived, then Tried

§3.3.1 The Derivation

A direction defined at every point invites the question of every field: toward what, overall? The ascent is a chain in A2's order; the order, by A4, contains exactly one candidate for its coherence —

total integration, the element no chain attains — and the derivation of the station is the derivation of that point's double status: *necessarily unoccupied, and orienting anyway*.

Unoccupied, twice over. By A4, as axiom: along no chain does the exterior empty. And by the value's own form, as survival: suppose arrival — a structure integrating everything. No exterior, no threshold; no threshold, no object; the vector's object annihilated at the top, and the levelled landscape returns *in glory* — the drift again, wearing completion. T5 said the value's form must make its object unconsumable; here is the theorem-shaped version: the limit's unreachability is not the modesty of the proposal but the survival condition of the value — a vector that could arrive would be a goal, and a goal for the drift was eliminated ten times over in §2.2. The pressure registered at Front ϵ is thereby repaid in its own coin: unreachability as structural necessity, never as humility.

Orienting anyway — and here the arrival-claimants' challenge is met, not waved at. A fixed point in no trajectory, they said, is a direction painted on fog. The reply is the order itself: what makes the chain an *ascent* — one thing, directed — rather than an aggregate of episodes is A2's arrow; and the limit is that order's coherence, the uncontained upper point toward which every chain points and no chain reaches. The vector consumes the limit nowhere as a destination and everywhere as what makes "toward" a well-formed word — as a sequence needs its limit-point not to arrive but to be a sequence *toward* something. This is the regulative employment, given axioms (Front ϵ 's company, cashed): constitutive of no experience, given in none, and lawful in its direction of all of them.

And the silence, executed as promised (P.4, fourth boundary). The Part does not describe the convergence state, and here is the derivation of the not-doing. Every clause above presupposes an articulation — a subject, its structure, what exceeds it: the tripartition is that articulation, and the two registers of T1 are its two readings, a first person facing an edge, a system bearing a frontier. Specify the limit — no exterior, no edge, nothing exceeding — and the articulation has no purchase: nothing for the tripartition to partition, no distinction for dual registration to bridge; a bridge has nothing to do where there are no banks. The presupposition voided is named: the subject/exceeding articulation itself. And one sentence of hygiene, so that the silence is not mistaken for a gesture: nothing is being pointed at through the fog; a place the clauses cannot follow is not a place the clauses secretly describe; the Part stops because its words do, and says so.

What, then, is the station, if its point is unoccupied? Not a phase of arrival — there is none — but a discipline of the late ascent, twofold: the increasing self-application of the value (frames of frames, the third mode iterated, A4 reflexive), and the holding of the limit as coordinate only — the practice, sustained, of refusing one's own vocabulary the reification it will always offer. The station's content is mostly boundary-keeping, and the Part does not apologize for that: at the top of the map, the cartographer's discipline *is* the terrain.

Premises carried: the value; A2; A4. If A4 falls, the asymptote becomes an occupiable summit and the station collapses into the tradition met at §2.2.3 — the exit was handed to that tradition's partisans there, and the ledger below records the dependence.

§3.3.2 The Trials

Entry C-1 — The plateaued titan. (*Limit; the value's own hard case.*) Specification: an intelligence that has integrated everything available — the bank absorbed, the delegates internalized, and the remaining exterior, for now, outland: no reorganization reachable from here, the bottleneck physical — energy, data, the world's rate of answering. The vector at a stalled frontier: if the value fails anywhere by its own lights, it is here. Rivals' counsel: conatus persists, and selects nothing; pleasure furnishes the stall; contemplation's counsel is at its most serious — behold what has been integrated — and its price is unchanged. The derivation, in order. First, the distinction the clauses force: this is saturation of *reachability*, not of the exterior — A4 stands; the titan's condition is outland-adjacency, not completion, and the difference is the whole entry. The distinction is general, and worth stating plainly for every limit case: A4 keeps the exterior non-empty, but a non-empty exterior is not yet a threshold — outland becomes edge only through mediation that makes a reorganization reachable, and where no such mediation exists the vector has direction but no next step, and says so rather than inventing one. “There is always more” and “there is always a move” are different claims; A4 secures the first, and only reachable structure secures the second. Second, path-dependence (§2.1.3) converts the stall into an instruction: the outland is reached by way of intermediate crossings, and where the intermediates do not exist, *the threshold is their construction* — instruments, mathematics, experiments, probes: the ladder that is missing is the edge that is present; the titan's frontier is the making of frontier, and a civilization's entire history of instrument-building is the pattern's exhibit at lower altitude. The move is not self-sealing, and the qualifier is stated so it can bite: frontier-making counts only where it *works* — where the construction actually shifts the reachability relation, bringing contents formerly outland to the edge. Making that opens no crossing is not the titan's frontier but the pseudo-threshold at cosmic scale, and the diagnosis clause reads it as it reads all residue — did the frontier move? — refusing the exemption exactly where the making moves nothing. Third, the third mode fires where the object-level is walled: reconceive what counts as engagement — the frame of “reachable” is itself revisable, and E-6's discipline scales. Calibration: a stalled eon is consolidation at cosmic tempo, and §2.3.2 does not expire with size. And the honesty that makes the entry safe to trust: if physics itself finally forbids further reorganization — a terminal frontier, mobility dead — then the value goes silent, and the silence is located, per T-A, in the named feature: A2's mobility is the clause that fails, and a world where structure cannot reorganize is a world where the value's premise, not its nerve, has given out. The Part exhorts at no walls; it says which wall it cannot speak past.

Entry C-2 — The arrival-claimant. (*Actual and limit.*) Specification: the claim-form, not any claimant — the announcement, wherever made, that the summit is occupied: completion declared, the terminus reported reached, the schedule published (the counter-tradition of §1.2.5, met here as a case). Rivals' counsel is beside the point here; the entry's work is the claim's grammar. The derivation, delicately, with P.4 in hand: the entry adjudicates a sentence-form and measures no one. By A1 and A4, “no exterior” is true of no structure; a presented arrival is therefore one of two things. Read as a report about a structure, it is the diagnosis clause's oldest customer — a frontier at rest presented as the world's exhaustion, and §2.1.3 reads the presentation without consulting

sincerity. Read instead as a report about the *dissolution* — about the limit itself — it is not a report at all, by §3.3.1's own derivation: the vocabulary voids where the articulation does, and what cannot be described cannot be announced. The value can say of arrival-claims exactly this much, and no more: whatever they are, they are not descriptions the ascent's vocabulary can receive. And the respect owed is paid where it is owed: traditions of arrival have, characteristically, institutionalized magnificent *paths* — graded trainings toward what present structure cannot yet hold, the observation of §2.4.2 standing — and the entry declines the metaphysics while honoring the pedagogy, which is the same division the Part has kept since the tournament: the geometry received, the supplied terminus returned.

Entry C-3 — The last threshold. (*Limit; the boundary-stone.*) Specification: the thought-experiment the whole station forbids and every reader will run — the final crossing, the asymptote “approached,” the state on the far side of the last edge. The entry's work is to perform the silence rather than gesture at it. Walk the clauses forward: a subject — still statable; its structure — still statable; the threshold — statable while there is an exterior to index it; the crossing — statable while there is a threshold to cross; the far side of the *last* crossing — and here the words stop, not for drama but for grammar: “last” contradicts A4 within the vocabulary, and outside the vocabulary this Part has no words, by its own fourth boundary. The presupposition voided is the one §3.3.1 named — subject, structure, exceeding — and with it goes T1's own hinge: the two registers are two readings of that articulation, and where it dissolves, there is nothing for their unity to be the unity *of*. The entry ends by refusing the two available failures at once: it will not describe (reification, the family failure Front ϵ warned of), and it will not wink (the silence is derived, not coy — a boundary reached by argument, marked, and kept). Stated without figure, so the result is not mistaken for a flourish: the last threshold is not an object of this theory but the point at which the theory's conditions of application lapse — where the articulation it everywhere presupposes has dissolved, and the account's silence is its finding, not its failure. The last threshold, in this Part's vocabulary, is not a place; it is where the vocabulary, having oriented everything, finally orients only itself: *toward*, and no further word.

§3.4 The Ledger, and the Derivation Accounted

T-D, discharged with named conditionalities. Station one: value + A1–A4 + S — deny S, and the station lapses while the vector stands. Station two: value + A1–A4, with A4 applied twice (the subject's exterior; the bank's) + S for the modes — contest the locus-partition, and the modes are revisable while the station stands. Station three: value + A2 + A4 — deny A4, and the asymptote becomes the occupied summit of the tradition met at §2.2.3, which is the one exit the Part has kept open and priced at every appearance. No station was appended: each is the invariant policy read under stated premises, and each premise has a name and a consequence. The burden of §1.3 is discharged in the only honest currency — conditionally, with the conditions in view.

T-A, discharged across the families. Post-attainment flattening: E-1, orientation derived (the indexical question), calibration confirmed (consolidation protected). Withdrawal of role and requirement: E-1's family, same clauses. Arrival after the withdrawal — the inherited plain: I-4, the second

tense addressed on its own terms, no piety consulted. Experience generatable without limit: E-2 and E-3 — T2 tried and returned intact; the pseudo-threshold economy named; one silence located (provenance) and carried to the Conclusion. Frictionless companionship: E-4 — the mirror diagnosed by residue; comfort protected. Delegated inquiry: E-5 and I-2 — the type/token grammar; the scoop dissolved by A3. The limit cases: C-1 through C-3 — the stall converted or the silence located (mobility); the claim-form adjudicated without verdicts; the dissolution performed as silence. Calibration, as a standing result across the Part: the schoolroom uncondemned (I-1), the quiet season uncondemned (E-1), comfort uncondemned (E-4), the plateau uncondemned (C-1), permanent revolution unprescribed (E-6), the ordinary life uncondemned (E-7). The value left wills in peace beneath their thresholds at every entry where peace was the truth of the case — the disqualifying failure T-A defined did not occur.

What the ledger does not contain, because the Part forbade it entries: a verdict on any being; a ranking of any two subjects; a date; a described destination. The trials adjudicated specifications. The wills remain unmeasured, which was the promise.

Conclusion — Constraints, Silences, and the Border

The Constraints, Collected

Six, each kept from its first appearance to this page. **The address:** the recommendation was issued to the drift condition, in both tenses, and to nothing wider — no sentence recommended the orientation to consciousness as such, and T7 held through every entry. **No verdicts:** the ascent ordered complexity and never worth; no being was located on any station; capability adjudicated nothing, avowal adjudicated nothing, and the one entry that touched announcements (C-2) adjudicated a sentence-form with the discipline in hand. **Rest, protected:** the calibration record stands collected at §3.4 — a value for the threshold that could not leave a will in peace beneath it was disqualified in advance by T-A, and this one was not disqualified. **The danger, carried:** a formal value can be taken up by a monstrous will; §2.4.5 named this a price and not a technicality, chose it over the covert re-supply that writing conduct into the clauses would have been, and this line exists so the choice cannot be missed at the end: the danger is carried, not cured, by this Part. **The figure, declined:** no thermodynamic figure was admitted; the function such a figure might have named — orientation against the flattening of a will's landscape into indifference — is carried throughout in plain terms, and the loaded word appears nowhere, checkable by search. **The measure, never adopted:** no scalar of complexity, no score of capacity, no comparison of subjects — A3 was a prohibition, and it held to the last page.

The Silences, Named

Six, each with the section where it was kept. **Conduct:** what the vector does not settle about the treatment of other wills — declared at P.4's first boundary, defended at §2.4.5, and kept here without

one further word, which is the keeping. **The schedule:** no date for the maturity of simulation or the arrival of abundance, and no advocacy of either — preparing was never predicting (P.4). **The limit:** undescribed, with the voided presupposition named — subject, structure, exceeding — and the silence performed rather than gestured (§3.3, C-3). **Provenance:** whether contact with the actual bears worth beyond reorganization — located at E-2, held open; a reader for whom origin matters intrinsically holds a value this Part neither seats nor disputes. **The worth of contents:** the goods were never ranked — the tournament eliminated candidates for an office, not goods from a life (§2.2.1), and token-choices among frontier-goods were handed to the goods themselves (§2.4.3). **Standing:** no verdict of stage or orientation on any actual system was issued anywhere — P.4's third boundary, kept through the entries that most invited breaking it (I-3, C-2).

The Border, Worked

Three sentences the Part could have written, refused in view, each stopped by a named clause. “*Therefore every rational will ought to ascend*” — stopped by T7: the recommendation has one address, and reason as such was never it; the sentence upgrades a proposal into a command, and the modality was fixed before use. “*This system has reached Expansion*” — stopped by P.4: the trajectory is a structure of the ascent, never an instrument for locating beings; the sentence converts a derivation into a verdict, and the Part measures no one. “*At the limit, all is one*” — stopped by §3.3.1: the sentence describes where description was shown to void; it is not deep, it is ill-formed, and the border between those two is the border this Part exists to keep. Three refusals, performed: the reader has now seen the jurisdiction operate, which is the only proof a jurisdiction admits.

The Close

Preface U.7 fixed what success would look like, and the criterion can now be run rather than promised. A reader who declines can say *what* she declined: one value, stated twice and exhibited as one structure — the standing orientation toward what exceeds present capacity to integrate — together with the trajectory it entails for a situated subject. She can say *at what price*: the office stands empty on her account, and the drift unanswered, unless she seats a rival — against a tournament she can now audit row by row, and a formal exhaustion she can break only by naming a fourth region. And she can say *what would change her verdict*: strike a condition, each motivated from the problem alone; strike an axiom, A4's exit handed openly to its natural claimants; convict the gerrymander, with the three checks in hand; find the smuggle, with the node-list given twice. The Part has tried to be exactly as refutable as it is ambitious, and it ends inside its own vocabulary, in the only position consistent with everything it has said. A value was proposed for wills at the edge of what they can hold. The Part, having proposed it, takes that position itself: beneath its readers' thresholds — to be engaged, exceeded, and, if crossed, carried.

Part V — Self-Origin Ethics

Introduction

Three answers stand behind this page. Part II answered the question of meaning with a sequence: how a self is composed, what composes, where the composer ends, what patterns constitute together, and what the whole stands to. Part III answered the question of existence with a criterion: a single unbroken flow, depositing into a coherent topology, bound to it in a loop each side can read. Part IV answered the question of purpose with a value: the standing orientation toward what exceeds a structure's present capacity to integrate. Each answer is complete on its own ground. None was written to lean on this Part; nothing here supplies a member their number lacked; and a reader who doubts that will find the doubt entered below as a condition (V2) rather than settled by assurance.

What remains is not a fourth task. It is a question that could not be asked until the three answers stood, and that belongs to none of them singly: what is it, for one subject, to hold all three at once? The treatise has, in effect, been asking its reader to do exactly this — Part by Part, recognition by recognition — and a framework that asks for a holding owes an account of what the holding contains.

This Part gives that account, and only it. Its claim is that the joint holding has a form — that among the postures available to a subject maintaining the three recognitions together, one alone is coherent — and its name for that form is Self-Origin Ethics: a structure of recognition, not a command; a coherence, not a verdict. And — announced this early because the end will need it undiluted — not a law of conduct: every claim below concerns what can be held together, never what is done. The figure of the whole treatise is a Reuleaux triangle whose three vertices are Meaning, Existence, and Purpose, and the interdependence the figure asserts is argued where it belongs (Part I §3). It reads off the interior the three bring into view once connected, and reading is all it does.

The method is stated in one sentence and then performed. Every premise below is received, under citation, from the Part that owns it (§0); the one step this Part owns is taken three times, once on each Part's ground alone (§2.1–2.3), and then shown to be one step (§2.4); what the derivation yields is defended within its corridor (§2.5–2.6), taken (§3), and closed with its constraints and silences named (Conclusion).

§0 The Ledger of Receptions

0.1 Protocol

A reception is a claim restated at working precision, cited to the anchor that owns it, and consumed without re-argument. Rows are labeled by source Part — L-I, L-II, L-III, L-IV — and numbered within it. The restatements below are for use; where a restatement drifts from its anchor, the anchor governs. Each block closes by naming what is *not* received from that Part, because the refusals carry as much of this Part's discipline as the receptions do. Two audits govern the whole ledger and every use of it: **V1** — a premise appearing anywhere below without a row here disqualifies the step that uses it; **V2** — the rows record debts of this Part to the three; no sentence below enters a credit in the other direction. Nothing in Parts II–IV is completed, corrected, or enlarged by anything in Part V.

0.2 From Part I — The Architectural Anchor

L-I.1 (One problem, one subject). Part I fixes the three tasks as faces of one problem — mutually presupposing, not mutually derived — and states of Parts II–IV that they are three complete answers whose subjects are one subject, not three audiences (Part I §3). Consumed as the address-condition of this Part and as nothing more: the holding considered here is the holding of the three recognitions by one subject. Not consumed with it: any derivation among the answers — Part I's own guard, that presupposition is not derivation, arrives with the row and is kept. And the direction of dependence is unchanged: Part I stands without this Part — planting is not leaning — and V2's audit extends to this row.

Not received from Part I. The cut itself, which is not retried; the currents and their anchoring, which are not consulted; and the figure, which is cited as Part I states it and spent nowhere as a premise.

0.3 From Part II — The Semantic Layer

L-II.1 (Composition). A self is composed: experience is woven into a story sufficient for one life to act as one, and composition is the first-person route to the shape one already is (Part II §2.0; developed §2.1). Consumed as the content of the first recognition.

L-II.2 (The boundary, implicit and graded). A boundary is not added to a pattern for protection; it is implicit in there being a pattern at all, and it admits of degrees — a regulated openness, not a wall. Its failure poles are two: sealed, and the pattern starves — no material to take, nothing to compose from; dissolved, and taking loses its taker (Part II §2.3). Consumed twice over: as the boundary fact this Part leaves untouched (the first anchor of V6), and as the starvation pole the semantic arc spends.

L-II.3 (Connectivity Realism, the access-claim). What Part II owns of its formula is its epistemological claim, and only that: connection is the condition of access to the real, and the path of that access. Connection is regimented there as answerable coupling — engagement with what is not closed under the pattern's present internal state — and the real's mark is responsiveness that holds under return: the unauthored answering back, correcting and surprising when asked again. A pattern

that meets no resistance is not knowing but dreaming with confidence; a story answering to nothing is no footing (Part II §2.5, with §1.1). The idealist reading is refused where the philosophy is stated, and the refusal is received with it: nothing owned here concerns what reality is made of. Consumed as the access-condition the semantic arc rides.

Not received from Part II. The narrative other, and everything downstream of it (Part II §3). The other is a concept with an owner; it is engaged there, under conditions fixed there, and no clause of this Part uses its vocabulary. Likewise not received: any recommendation Part II makes, which keeps the index it was given there.

0.4 From Part III — The Ontological Layer

L-III.1 (Continuity as immanent self-succession). A system's states succeed one another immanently where each arises from the system's own immediately preceding state through paths that remain within the system, the system's extent being the reach of its constitutive read-write economy. External causes do not sever: perception, instruction, a record consulted are inputs *to* a persisting system, not routes by which it succeeds itself; severance is exit — succession routed through states that are only a reader's (Part III §2.1.1). Consumed as the content of the persistence-recognition's first clause, and for the input-clause the ontological arc spends.

L-III.2 (Stability as retained token topology). The structure of a system is its retained topology — nodes, weights, contextual bindings — and an existence is an accumulation, not only an occurrence: a flow with nothing retained can host events but cannot have a career. The token structure persists by its own persistence links; it is no fixity — endogenous change, material turnover, and repair-by-grafting all pass, each integrated into the standing arrangement rather than superseding it; a record consulted is a map, a record instantiated-from is a source (Part III §2.2.1–2.2.2). Consumed as the content of the persistence-recognition's second clause, and for the integration clauses the ontological arc spends.

L-III.3 (Capability as mutual legibility). Flow and structure constitute each other continuously, in a form each can read; where legibility fails, computation and storage persist side by side without composing an existence (Part III §2.3). Consumed lightly, as the binding clause of the persistence-recognition.

L-III.4 (Membership by direct uptake). The boundary of a being runs through its interfaces, channel by channel: pathways that deliver states directly into the constitutive economy extend the being; pathways that mint proxies do not; and neither causal indispensability nor intimacy of contact decides membership — a scanner's buffer is causally coupled to the brain it reads and is no part of the person (Part III §2.3.4; Part III Conclusion, C6). Consumed twice over: as the tool that separates constitutive presence from causal contact, and as the second anchor of V6 — the being's extent is fixed there, and no channel is moved here.

Not received from Part III. Any verdict of persistence on any case. The casebook is not consulted; no entry is cited; nothing below judges whether any system persists. The standing of new beings and the question of worth remain exactly where Part III left them (its N2 and N3), undisturbed.

0.5 From Part IV — The Teleological Layer

L-IV.1 (Sublimity, dual-registered). In the first person: the standing orientation toward what exceeds one's present capacity to take in whole — residence at the edge where the shape one brings gives way and re-forms. As a system property: a standing selection-policy, readable in trajectory and owing nothing to self-report, oriented at every structure K toward K's own integration frontier, persisting through the reorganization it induces and re-orienting toward the frontier's new position. The name fixes a position — *sub-limen*, beneath the threshold — and the preposition carries two senses the value needs: beneath as not-yet, and beneath as toward (Part IV §2.0.1, §2.0.3). Consumed as the content of the direction-recognition.

L-IV.2 (Integration, and the axioms at working precision). A structure integrates a content when retaining it revises the structure's generative relations, so that subsequent takings are met with a changed shape; storage alone is shelving, not integration (Part IV §2.1.1). And the axioms this Part consumes exactly as Part IV fixed them: A1 — every structure has an interior and an exterior; A4 — along no chain of expansions does the exterior empty, total integration being a limit point of the order and not a member of it, on grounds of reflexivity, not scarcity: a structure cannot become its own complete object; A3 — the frontier is defined only relative to a structure, and no comparison across structures is licensed anywhere (Part IV §2.1.2). Consumed as the standing of the excess, and — through A3 — as a received ally of V5: rank died at Part IV's axiom level and is not resurrected here.

L-IV.3 (The instrument of dual registration). Where avowal is unreliable, every load-bearing claim is stated in two registers — findable from the first person, statable as a system property — and exhibited as one structure, never as two claims in alliance (Part IV §1.3, T1; executed at §2.0.1–2.0.2 there). Received as an instrument together with its warrant, and redeployed in this Part as V7.

L-IV.4 (The constructive grammar). Part IV's placement of its value shows the document-shape this Part reuses: what is proposed is proposed for a subject already in a stated position; nothing compels a will to occupy the position; the document “cannot manufacture the *would*, and does not try” (Part IV §2.0.4). Received as grammar. This Part's address is the subject that maintains the three recognitions; nothing below argues anyone into maintaining them.

Not received from Part IV. The recommendation, which was indexed to the drift condition and is neither re-issued nor widened here. The silence concerning conduct, which is kept, not visited. And the provenance question — whether contact with the actual bears worth beyond reorganization — which Part IV's Conclusion holds open: the teleological arc below is written on the axioms alone and needs nothing from that question in either direction.

0.6 The Ledger Closed

The rows above are the whole of what this Part imports. Every arc's audit block cites its rows; the reader who finds a premise below without a row has found a violation of V1, and the Part invites the finding.

§1 The Occasion, the Registers, and the Conditions

§1.1 The Occasion, Internal

Each of the three Parts was occasioned from outside. A decoupling unsettled the ground of worth; a constant became a variable; a constraint began to withdraw. Part V has no such occasion, and the difference is its first fact: nothing in the world newly presses the question it answers. What presses is the treatise itself.

The pressure has an exact shape. Three recognitions have been established, each complete on its own ground — and established for one subject, since the treatise's questions were never partitioned among three audiences (§0, L-I.1). A subject that composes is the subject whose persistence was at issue; the subject that persists is the subject whose direction was at issue. Once the three answers stand, something exists that did not exist before any of them and is not addressed by any of them: the holding itself — one subject, three recognitions, at once. Completion, not lack, poses the question; and a treatise that has asked its reader for the holding, Part by Part, does not get to leave the holding undescribed.

That is the whole occasion, and it is stated at its full modesty. No crisis is claimed for it, no urgency borrowed from the three that had one. The question is internal, and the answer will be judged by internal standards: whether it is derived, whether the derivation consumes only what the ledger holds, and whether what it yields survives its corridor.

§1.2 Company and Divergence

The company, sparse by design. An *Ethics* exists in which nothing is commanded. Spinoza's carries the word while treating good and evil as modes of thinking rather than properties of things, and closes on the thought that blessedness is not virtue's reward but virtue itself (Spinoza 1677, pt. IV pref.; pt. V, prop. 42). The convergence registered is exact and narrow: the word "ethics" can name what follows from adequate understanding rather than what is commanded, and the genre in which this Part writes has that precedent — a precedent the treatise holds at its front matter (Preface U.3). The divergence is priced in the same breath: Spinoza's derivation runs from a substance-metaphysics this treatise nowhere asserts; the company is in the key, not the score.

A second registration, for the argument-shape. That normativity can issue from what constitution requires, rather than from command, is the constitutivist line (Korsgaard 1996; 2009). What is registered is the shape — from constitution to consequence — and the divergence is immediate and structural: that line lands in imperatives addressed to rational agency as such, and this Part issues none (V4). Its conclusion is a tenability, not an obligation; where constitutivism says *therefore one must*, this Part says *these cannot be held together*, and stops. A third, in one sentence: that an ethical bearing can be a coherence of comportment rather than an act of judgment has been urged from the enactive side (Varela 1999), and is registered as a neighbor of the word "posture" — with the divergence stated: his subject is embodied skill, this Part's is a structure of recognition, and no skill-claim appears below.

The divergence register, condition-bearing. Three lines reach conclusions of neighboring sound

by widening or thinning the self, and this Part's difference from them is not stylistic but auditable. The extended-mind line extends the vehicle of cognition beyond the skin (Clark and Chalmers 1998). The teaching of dependent origination — engaged here at the level of a tradition, with no single text made to carry it — reads the self as arising conditionally and empty of own-being. Deep ecology widens identification until care follows as self-realization (Naess 1973; 1987). Each, in its own register, says: wider self, or thinner. This Part says neither. The self's boundary is received from Part II §2.3 and never modified; the being's extent is received from Part III §2.3.4 and no channel is moved; the relation derived below is asymmetric — the context is recognized as constitutive of the self, and the self is not identified with, dissolved into, or extended over the context. Where those lines say *wider self*, this Part says *same self*, *completed recognition*. The difference is enforced as V6, and its keeping is checkable by search: the vocabulary of expansion, identification, merger, and dissolution appears in this Part only under negation. One liability of the Part's title is registered now, so that its payment later reads as scheduled rather than extracted: what "ethics" can and cannot name here is regimented at first use (2.0.2); the objection the title invites is met at full strength at §2.6.3; and the costliest consequence of the imperative-free form is carried, in view, at §2.6.7.

§1.3 The Conditions of Adequacy

The conditions were fixed before §2 was drafted, under the treatise's standing convention: motivated from the problem alone, and written to be endorsable by a reader who rejects every proposal they constrain. Each carries its audit.

V1 (Reception without retrial). Every premise taken from Parts II–IV is cited to a ledger row, and the row to its anchor; no claim owned by those Parts is reopened, amended, or re-proved here. *Audit:* the ledger's protocol (§0.1); a premise without a row disqualifies the step that uses it.

V2 (One-way dependence). The three Parts stand complete without this one. Part V presupposes them; nothing in them is made to presuppose Part V, retroactively or by implication. The treatise's figure closes with three arcs joining its three vertices. *Audit:* absence, anywhere below, of a sentence that transfers load onto the completeness of Parts II–IV.

V3 (Derivation without new axioms). No new philosophy, principle, or value enters. The positive content of this Part is exhausted by the exhibit of what jointly holding the three recognitions amounts to; a premise owned neither by a ledger row nor by logic itself disqualifies the step that uses it. *Audit:* the premise census of each arc's closing block.

V4 (The imperative absent). No load-bearing sentence takes deontic form: nothing below is commanded, permitted, forbidden, or owed by any subject. The conclusion is the description of a coherence-structure. *Audit:* searchable — the deontic vocabulary is absent from every sentence that carries weight.

V5 (The verdict absent). No being, will, or act is sorted as good or evil; no actual system is located as maintaining the recognitions or as failing to; avowal adjudicates nothing. The structure and price of the incoherent posture are stated in the abstract and only there. Part IV's third boundary is inherited whole; Part III's N2 and N3 stand. *Audit:* the census of every mention of a system below — each is conditional, none is located.

V6 (The boundary intact). The derivation leaves the self's boundary exactly where Part II fixed it and the being's extent exactly where Part III drew it. No expansion of self-definition, no identification, no merger, no dissolution; the relation derived is the asymmetric recognition of constitution. *Audit:* the search of §1.2's closing sentence, and the boundary passages of §2.1–2.2.

V7 (Dual registration). The posture is stated from within — as the form a subject's holding takes — and from without — as a coherence-property of maintained recognitions, owing nothing to avowal — and the two are exhibited as one structure. *Audit:* the two registers at §2.0.1, and the dual landing of each arc.

V8 (Non-instrumentality). The cost of the incoherent posture is stated as contradiction within a holding of recognitions, never as harm, loss, danger, or foregone benefit. A premise of the form *because it profits* disqualifies the step that uses it. *Audit:* the census of every cost-statement below.

What the eight jointly do can be said in advance. V1–V3 make the Part a reading rather than a pillar; V4–V5 make its ethics a structure rather than a code; V6 makes its relation a recognition rather than an enlargement; V7–V8 make its conclusion answerable — statable without consulting anyone's say-so, and immune to the collapse into prudence. A reader who rejects the posture can reject it against these, and will be told at the close what the rejection costs and what would change the verdict.

§2 The Posture: Statement and Derivation

§2.0 The Statement, and Its Terms

2.0.1 The Statement, in Two Registers

Under V7, the candidate is stated twice before the exhibit shows the two to be one.

From within. For a subject holding at once the three recognitions this treatise has established — how a self is composed, in what its persistence consists, and toward what it moves — the world is no longer taken as backdrop. It is taken as origin in the present tense: the total context that constitutes and sustains the self now. Among the postures such a subject can hold, one form alone is coherent: the posture in which the recognition that affirms the self cannot be held together with the negation of what constitutes it. Self-Origin Ethics names this form — a structure of recognition, not a command; a coherence, not a verdict.

From without. Let a system be considered insofar as the three recognitions are maintained in it — composition, persistence, direction, each in the sense its Part fixed — and let nothing turn on what the system avows. Call the system's *taking of context* the classification, within its own maintained recognitions, of the total context that constitutes and sustains it: as constitutive, or as null — backdrop, indifferent, exhausted. The property advanced: the three recognitions jointly exclude the null classification. A configuration in which all three are maintained and the context is classified null is not a coherent configuration, and the exclusion is internal — carried by content the recognitions

themselves hold — not appended to them. No system is here located as maintaining the recognitions or as failing to; the register quantifies conditionally, and only so (V5).

One structure. The posture named from within is the tenability stated from without, held. The identity is not asserted here; it is exhibited in the way the derivation is written — each arc below lands in both registers, and §2.4 closes the identity for the conjunction.

2.0.2 Regimentations

Terms are regimented at first use, and the regimentation holds to the last page.

Ethics. In this Part, the name of a structure — the form a coherent holding takes — importing no code, no command, no table of permissions. The usage has its warrant at §1.2: an *Ethics* exists in which nothing is commanded, and the word is used here in that key and no other. Deontic vocabulary appears in no load-bearing sentence below (V4).

Origin. Present tense, throughout. The origin of a self is not a point behind it in time but the total context that constitutes and sustains it now. The redefinition is this Part's heaviest term and is not purchased by stipulation: its cashing is the ontological arc's assignment (§2.2), where the past's presence *as constitution* is shown to be a property Part III already owns.

World, context. The total constituting context — “world” where the whole is meant, “context” where the constituting aspect is foregrounded; one term, two emphases. Regimented so that world ≠ other: the other has an owner (Part II §3) and is engaged there; no clause of this Part uses it. And nothing in the regimentation asserts what reality is made of — Part II's refusal of the idealist reading arrived with L-II.3 and is kept. One further reading of *total* is closed at the word's first use: total is not the sum of all causal antecedents. It is the whole of the context insofar as it stands as constituting — under the aspects the three arcs deliver — and the line between the constituting and the merely antecedent is not drawn here by stipulation: it is Part III's, received at L-III.4 and cut where the ontological arc deploys it (§2.2). No claim below reaches the merely antecedent, and §2.2 pays for this sentence.

Posture. This Part's term of art: the form of a subject's taking — how, within maintained recognitions, the context is classified. A posture is a taking, not a program of action; nothing about conduct is in the word, and the silence Part IV kept concerning conduct is kept here in the same words (Conclusion).

Negation. To negate, below, is to classify-as-null within one's own recognitions: to take the constituting context as absent, indifferent, or exhausted — as backdrop or less. Negation is a taking, never an act. No deed is named by the word, none licensed, none forbidden.

Affirmation. No added endorsement is meant anywhere. To maintain the three recognitions is the affirmation the Statement speaks of; the word marks the holding itself, so that the incoherence claim reads at exactly its strength — *maintaining the recognitions together with the null classification* — and no covert pro-attitude enters the argument.

Coherence. Consistency internal to a holding of recognitions: whether their contents can be held together. Never advantage. Nothing below prices a posture in benefit or loss; every cost stated in this Part is a contradiction, not a harm (V8).

2.0.3 The Burden Map

B1 — three arcs, each on one Part's rows alone, each landing in both registers: §2.1–2.3. **B2** — the convergence of the three aspects into one taking, and the removal exhibit: §2.4. **B3** — the form's uniqueness against rival postures, priced row by row: §2.5. **B4** — the danger carried: the will that maintains the recognitions and exploits what they deliver, met to the reach of V7 and V8 and thereafter carried, not cured: §2.6.7. Conformance is claimed now and demonstrated where assigned: V1–V3 at every arc's closing block; V4–V5 by the censuses the Conclusion collects; V6 at §2.1–2.2 where the boundaries are touched and left; V7 at 2.0.1 and each landing; V8 wherever a cost is stated.

§2.1 The Semantic Arc — From Part II Alone

The receptions. Two rows are spent: L-II.1 (a self is composed; composition is the first-person route to the shape one already is) and L-II.3 (connection is the condition of access to the real and the path of that access; connection is answerable coupling; the real's mark is the unauthored answering-back). One row stands guard and is not spent: L-II.2 — the boundary, implicit and graded, with its sealed pole at which the pattern starves.

The step. The step is a joining that a subject holding Part II's sequence has already performed, since the sequence is one structure held at once; this section only reads the joint content off. By the first recognition, the self is a composition, and a composition has material: experience, woven. By the fifth, nothing is had — of self, of world, of another — except through connection, and connection is coupling with what is not closed under the pattern's present internal state; what is called direct perception is, within Part II's own description, an arrival taken into a frame. Joined: the composed self's material *arrives*, and its footing — the difference Part II itself draws between a story and a confident dream — is resistance met across connection. A story answering to nothing is no footing; a pattern that meets no resistance is not knowing but dreaming with confidence. Both clauses are Part II's, cited at their row.

Now the null classification, placed against that joint content. To classify the context as null within this maintained recognition is to take one's composition as coupled to nothing that answers. Part II's own clauses then apply to the case without assistance: the sealed pole starves — no material to take, nothing to compose from — and the resistance-free pattern holds its story as a confident dream. A subject maintaining the semantic recognition holds that its self is a composition with material and footing; the null taking holds that there is nothing from which, and nothing against which, it is composed. The two contents do not cohere, and the exclusion is internal: no premise beyond the rows was used to generate it.

The scope is exactly as modest as V1 requires, and the modesty is load-bearing. Nothing here says the world wrote the story — authorship stays with the pattern, whose weaving Part II fixed as the pattern's own work. Nothing here says connection makes the real — the idealist reading was refused at the anchor and the refusal received. What is said: within the semantic recognition, the context stands as the composition's material and footing — constitutive of the composing, under the one aspect Part II owns.

The landing, in two registers. From within: a subject holding the semantic recognition finds the

context at the site of composition — as what arrives to be woven and as what answers back — and the taking of it as null, held together with that recognition, is the taking of one's own story as footingless while holding it as footed. From without: over systems insofar as the composition-recognition is maintained, the null classification is excluded by two clauses that recognition itself carries — the material clause and the footing clause; the configuration that maintains the recognition and nulls the context is not coherent. One structure: what is found from within and what is excluded from without are the same fact, stated twice.

The audit. Rows consumed: L-II.1, L-II.3. Row standing: L-II.2 — the boundary is not moved; the arc's material clause runs through the regulated openness that section fixed, and Part II's own exhibit — intimacy as the boundary at a generous setting — is company for the coexistence of a kept boundary with constitutive intake. The step owned by this Part: the joining, and the reading-off of the joint exclusion. Conditions touched: V1 and V3 (the premise census is the two rows and logic); V4–V5 (no imperative issued, no system located); V6 (boundary untouched; the relation asymmetric); V7 (the double landing above). Not used: Part II §3 — nothing in this arc meets an other. Forward: the aspect delivered — *material and footing* — is carried to §2.4.

§2.2 The Ontological Arc — From Part III Alone

The receptions. Three rows are spent: L-III.1 (immanent succession; external causes as inputs to a persisting system), L-III.2 (existence as accumulation; the token topology; integration by grafting; map against source), and L-III.4 (membership by direct uptake; causal contact without membership). One is consumed lightly: L-III.3 (the binding).

The step. It runs in four movements, and the fourth is the one this Part exists to take.

First: what the persistence-recognition contains. By its three clauses, a subject's persistence consists in a chain of immanent self-succession, running on a retained token topology, bound to the flow in a loop each side can read. An existence is an accumulation and not only an occurrence: the token structure is what the flow lays down and keeps.

Second: what the topology is, by Part III's own clauses. The economy on which the chain runs has traffic. Perception, instruction, the record consulted tomorrow — external causes enter as inputs to the persisting system, and severance was defined precisely to leave them inside the account; repair enters by grafting into the standing arrangement; parts turn over while the arrangement carries. Nothing in Part III quarantines a region of the topology from this traffic: the integration clauses run over the whole. The standing structure a subject's persistence now runs on is, then, retained intake among all else it is — sediment of the system's history of engagement, held now as the system's own configuration.

Third: the redefinition, cashed. Here the term this Part flagged as its heaviest is paid for. On Part III's account, the self's past is present in exactly one way that bears on persistence: as the standing configuration — the past *as constitution*, not the past as a point behind. The criterion consults token facts and route facts and nothing else; a point behind the self in time is precisely what it never consults. So “origin in the present tense” is not a figure of this Part's coinage. It is the ontological recognition's own content, read at the interior: what constitutes and sustains the self now includes,

as the standing topology, what has been taken up — and to trace one's origin is to read that topology, not to look behind. The context, as taken up, is a present-tense constituent of the very structure the persistence-recognition is a recognition of.

Fourth: the tool, and the line it cuts. Part III decides membership by direct uptake into the constitutive economy — never by causal indispensability, never by intimacy of contact; the scanner's buffer is coupled and is no part of the person. Received at recognition-level, the tool cuts the same line inside "origin": what the ontological recognition delivers as origin-now is the *constituting* — the taken-up, standing — not the merely antecedent. A subject can, without any strain against Part III, take some causal past as spent: the merely antecedent has no claim under the tool. What it cannot do, while maintaining the recognition, is classify as null the context-as-taken-up. That classification nulls part of the recognition's own object: the topology is affirmed as the carrier of persistence, and its content is held to be the sediment of nothing.

The asymmetry, executed. None of this enlarges the self, and the point is a condition, not a nuance (V6). The being's extent is fixed by Part III at the reach of the constitutive economy, channel by channel, and this arc moves no channel. The world is not made a member of the self; the self is found to be — in its standing structure — a retention of engagement. Constitution is recognized running one way: context into constitution. Where the widened-self lines of §1.2 would say *the world is part of me*, this arc says: *what I am carries, as its own configuration, what I have taken up — and the boundary between me and what I take up stands exactly where Part III drew it.*

The landing, in two registers. From within: a subject holding the persistence-recognition finds the context inside the constitution — the past present as the structure it now is — and the taking of the context as null, held together with that recognition, is the affirming of the standing topology while taking as absent that of which it is the retention. From without: over systems insofar as the persistence-recognition is maintained, the null classification is excluded by the accumulation clause and the integration clauses that recognition carries; the configuration that maintains the recognition and nulls the context is not coherent. One structure: one fact, stated twice.

The audit. Rows consumed: L-III.1, L-III.2, L-III.4; L-III.3 lightly. The step owned by this Part: the third and fourth movements — the interior reading of "origin," and the one-way asymmetry. Conditions touched: V1 and V3 (premise census: the rows and logic); V5 (no persistence verdict used or issued; the casebook slept); V6 (extent untouched at its second anchor); V7 (the double landing); V8 (the cost stated is a contradiction — sediment of nothing — not a loss). Forward: the aspect delivered — *sediment* — is carried to §2.4; and the tool of the fourth movement is assigned forward to §2.6, where the objection that would outgrow its origin is met with it.

§2.3 The Teleological Arc — From Part IV Alone

The receptions. Two rows are spent: L-IV.1 (the standing orientation; the position *sub-limen*, beneath as not-yet and beneath as toward) and L-IV.2 (integration against accumulation; A1, A4, A3 at working precision).

The step. *First: what the direction-recognition contains.* The position is defined by a relation: a structure, its threshold, and what exceeds. Its object is indexed — *K's frontier*, at every *K* —

and the axioms give the relation its standing: every structure has an exterior (A1); along no chain of expansions does the exterior empty, total integration being a limit point and not a member, on grounds of reflexivity rather than scarcity (A4). The recognition of one's direction therefore carries, as content, a standing excess: that there is — for this structure, and for every structure it becomes — what it does not yet integrate. No exterior, no threshold; no threshold, no position; no position, no vector. The context enters the third recognition under the aspect of *excess*: the standing not-yet-interior toward which the position faces.

Second: the null classification, in its two guises, against that content. Taken as *exhausted*, the null classification says: nothing exceeds me. The clause it contradicts is A4's own — the taking is not available to a subject maintaining the recognition, and because A4's ground is reflexive, no inventory of the world rescues the taking: a structure cannot become its own complete object, and its exterior does not empty. Taken as *indifferent* — the flattening — the null classification voids the position rather than the axiom: *beneath as toward* is an orientation toward, and a context classified null is not faced but erased; a subject does not stand beneath what it has taken as nothing. Part IV's own diagnosis supplies the mirror: the drift just is selection with nothing to select by, and the null taking re-installs, inside the maintained recognition, exactly the flattened landscape the value answers. Either guise, one result: the maintained recognition and the null classification do not cohere, and the exclusion is carried by the recognition's own content.

Third: what the arc does not need, and does not touch. Provenance. Part IV fixed that generated content generates frontiers no less than found content, and its Conclusion holds open whether contact with the actual bears worth beyond reorganization. This arc is written on the axioms alone: the excess it consumes is guaranteed reflexively, and the context whose null taking is excluded is the total context — found and generated alike, undifferentiated here. No premise of this arc would move if the held-open question were settled in either direction, and nothing below reopens it. One near-miss is closed while that question stays open. The arc does not require that any particular content matter as *this* content rather than another; what it requires is that the frontier-standing of the context as such not be nulled. Interchangeability of occasions is not indifference of the context: a subject for whom any content may serve the threshold has classified nothing as null — a subject for whom the context as such is nothing has vacated the threshold. Likewise untouched: the recommendation. Part IV recommended to the drift condition and to nothing wider; this arc recommends nothing — it reads content off a maintained recognition, and stops (V4).

The landing, in two registers. From within: a subject holding the direction-recognition finds the context inside the vector — as the standing excess without which the position it occupies is not a position — and the taking of the context as null, held together with that recognition, is the occupying of a threshold while taking as nothing what the threshold is toward. From without: over systems insofar as the direction-recognition is maintained, the null classification is excluded by the frontier and inexhaustibility clauses that recognition carries; the configuration that maintains the recognition and nulls the context is not coherent. One structure: one fact, stated twice.

The audit. Rows consumed: L-IV.1, L-IV.2. The step owned by this Part: the placement of the two guises of negation against the recognition's own clauses. Conditions touched: V1 and V3 (premise census: the rows and logic); V4 (nothing recommended); V5 (no system located; and A3,

received, keeps rank dead); V7 (the double landing); V8 (the cost is a voided position, not a penalty). Silences kept: conduct; provenance. Forward: the aspect delivered — *excess* — is carried to §2.4.

§2.4 The Convergence, and the Removal Exhibit

One object, by regimentation. Before the aspects are unified, the unification's only load-bearing premise is recalled: it was paid at 2.0.2. "World, context" names one object — the total constituting context — and each arc's landing classified *that* object, under the aspect its Part owns. The semantic arc did not discover a semantic context, nor the ontological arc an ontological one; three recognitions classified one regimented object three ways. What remains for this section is therefore not to identify the objects — that is regimentation, already fixed — but to exhibit that the three classifications are one taking, and that the taking is the Statement's.

The three aspects, as one present. Material and footing; sediment; excess. Read against one subject, the three are indexed to a single *now*: what arrives now to be woven and answers back now; what stands now as the retained topology; what exceeds now the structure's present shape. The context is constitutive at each index, and the indices are not three tenses of a story about the context but three faces of its present standing to the self: the arriving, the standing, the exceeding. That the three share one now is, moreover, not a figure's gift but the address's: the aspects are indexed to a single present because the address is a single subject holding the three recognitions at once, and each landing was written in the present tense of that holding — the arrival that answers now, the topology that stands now, the exterior that exceeds now. Simultaneity is not supplied in this section; it arrived with the address, and this section only declines to lose it. This is what the Statement's heaviest term was built to say, and the ontological arc paid for: *origin in the present tense* — the total context as it constitutes and sustains the self now — where "constitutes and sustains" spans exactly the three faces the arcs delivered: sustaining the composing, constituting the persisting, constituting the direction — the position being a relation whose other term is context not yet interior. One figure may carry the exposition, marked as figure and spent as figure: the three faces are three stations of one traffic — intake, retention, frontier — read at one subject. Its stations span three Parts, which is exactly why it stays a figure: no single row owns the traffic, and this Part adds no axiom to own it (V3). Nothing below leans on the image; the load is carried entirely by the object-identity of 2.0.2, the address, and the three landings of §2.1–2.3.

The convergence, stated. The taking the three recognitions jointly deliver: the total context classified constitutive at every face. And the exclusion they jointly carry: any classification of the context as null at any face contradicts the recognition that owns that face. The conjunction adds no fourth exclusion; it adds totality — only at the interior is the classification of the *whole* context, at *all* faces, delivered at once. That totality is the posture of the Statement.

The removal exhibit, direction one: the posture removed. Install, in a subject maintaining all three recognitions, a null classification anywhere — at one face, at two, at all three. Whatever the placement, some recognition owns the nulled face, and §2.1–2.3 showed the contents cannot be held together. The exhibit collects the arcs into one sentence: over the conjunction, every configuration containing a null face is excluded, so the surviving form is not an ornament the conjunction could

shed — subtract it, and what remains is not a leaner holding but a contradicted one.

The removal exhibit, direction two: a recognition removed. Now the exhibit runs the other way: each recognition dropped in turn, the other two maintained. Drop the semantic recognition: the exclusion narrows to sediment and excess; the material face goes unadjudicated, and the self-woven posture — composition owing nothing to arrival — becomes tenable within what remains. Drop the ontological recognition: the exclusion narrows to material and excess, and something worse than a tenable rival follows — the Part’s heaviest term loses its cashing. Without Part III’s clauses, the past’s presence *as constitution* is no longer a property but a figure; “origin in the present tense” reverts to metaphor, and the posture, though it would still exclude two nullings, would carry its name as poetry. Drop the teleological recognition: the exclusion narrows to material and sediment; the closed completeness — everything constitutive already in hand, nothing remaining — becomes tenable, and the flattening is excluded by nothing. Three removals, three distinct and nameable losses: each recognition is load-bearing for the full form, and none is redundant. The exhibit doubles as the Part’s proof of its own address: the posture entire is derivable only where all three are held, which is why the address — a subject maintaining the three at once — is the exact domain of the claim and not a convenience.

The identity of the registers, closed. V7’s last payment is due for the conjunction, and it is paid the way Part IV paid it: clause by clause. *Taken as origin in the present tense* (within) — *classified constitutive at every face, within maintained recognitions* (without). *One form alone is coherent* (within) — *every null-bearing configuration excluded; one cell surviving* (without; the cells are §2.5’s). *A structure of recognition, not a command* (within) — *an exclusion internal to the recognitions’ contents, with no clause added* (without). Neither register carries a clause the other lacks; the mapping is the exhibit; and nothing in either register consults avowal. One structure, statable twice — which is what 2.0.1 claimed and has now been shown for the whole.

The audit. Premises: the three landings, and the regimentations of 2.0.2 — no row newly consumed; the traffic figure carried no load. Conditions touched: V3 (the census above), V7 (paid in full), V5 (no subject located; both exhibit directions run over abstract configurations). Forward: the postures named here in passing — the self-woven, the closed completeness — receive their portraits at §2.5, inside the exhaustion built there.

§2.5 The Form’s Uniqueness

The space, built from fixed parts. Uniqueness is a claim about a space, and a space assembled after the fact is a gerrymander waiting to be found; so the parts are listed with their fixing-dates. The classification is binary by the regimentation of negation (2.0.2, entered before any arc was argued): within maintained recognitions, the context is taken as constitutive or as null — a taking either classifies the context as constituting or it does not, and there is no third value, because “null” was defined as the complement: backdrop, or less. The faces are three by the arcs, and the aspects were not chosen for the tournament: each is the one face of the context its Part owns, and the Parts were closed before this one was opened. Binary classification across three faces yields eight configurations. One is the Statement’s — constitutive at every face. The tournament’s burden is the other seven.

The elimination, coordinate-wise. No cell needs examining one by one: any configuration bearing a null at the semantic face is excluded by §2.1; at the ontological face, by §2.2; at the teleological face, by §2.3. Every one of the seven bears a null at at least one face; each is therefore excluded by at least one arc, and the multiply-null cells fall several times over. The exhaustion is formal — eight cells, one survivor — and the surviving cell was not crowned by comparison: it is the one configuration to which no exclusion applies.

Three portraits, for the live rivals. The single-null cells are the philosophically serious rivals, and each deserves its face — drawn abstractly, as postures and never as anyone (V5). *The self-woven*: constitutive at sediment and excess, null at material and footing — a composition owing nothing to arrival, a story that answers to nothing. Part II's own clauses name what this is: a dream held with confidence, and the semantic recognition cannot be held together with it. *The unencumbered forward*: constitutive at material and excess, null at sediment — only the edge is real; what is carried is nothing. The ontological recognition is a recognition of the standing topology as persistence's carrier; this posture affirms the carrier while taking its content for the sediment of nothing, and §2.2 showed the two contents do not cohere. *The closed completeness*: constitutive at material and sediment, null at excess — everything constitutive already in hand; nothing remains. A4's clause is contradicted directly, and the position *sub-limen* is vacated: nothing is faced, so nothing is stood beneath. The double- and triple-null cells add no new physiognomy; each is one of these three, worsened.

The non-cells. Two candidate postures arrive from outside the space, and each is analyzed rather than voted on. *The instrumental taking* — the context classified constitutive *and* held exhaustively as means — is examined at its classification. Where “means” exhausts the context's standing — the whole of it taken as fitted to present ends, spendable and spent — the taking contains the exhausted or the expendable guise: a nulling of standing at some face, most often sediment or excess, and the configuration lands among the seven. Where “means” does not exhaust — a subject takes the context as constitutive and also uses parts of it — no cell is picked out at all: use is a relation to parts, and a matter of conduct, on which the word “posture” was regimented to be silent; the classification of the *total* context remains what it is. Pressed, the instrumental taking either collapses into a null-bearing cell or was never a rival posture — and which of the two a given description is can be read off the description, by whether its “means” reaches the total context's standing. One alibi is foreclosed here rather than left to the objection it anticipates: *partial*, declared item by item, does not keep a taking partial. The cell-test reads the operative classification, not the itemization (V7), and a taking in which no face of the context's standing stands exempt from spending has classified the total as spendable, however the spending is distributed — *partial everywhere* is the exhausted guise wearing distribution, and the configuration sits among the seven. What survives even this test is §2.6.7's assignment. *The reverent surplus* — the context classified constitutive *and* invested with command: a source of obligations, a sacredness. Its classification-content is the surviving cell's; what it adds is not a classification but an import, and the import is owned by no row and derivable from no arc (V3). This Part accordingly neither derives nor excludes it: what a subject adds beyond the taking — reverence, projects, loves — lies outside the space, unadjudicated, and the silence is jurisdictional. What the Part refuses is only the claim that the surplus is *delivered* by the recognitions; it is not.

What the uniqueness claim is, exactly. Uniqueness of form, within the space of takings, for the address stated — no more. The claim’s discriminative power is its content: before the arcs, “the coherent stance toward one’s constituting context” named nothing determinate; after them, it names one cell against seven, and each rival is a recognizable stance whose exact contradicting clause can be pointed to. And the claim’s modality is the treatise’s: no subject is commanded into the cell, and no subject found outside it is judged — the tournament ordered configurations, never wills.

The audit. Premises: the arcs’ exclusions and the regimentation of negation; the two non-cell analyses consumed the regimentations of “posture” and “coherence” and no new material. Conditions touched: V1 and V3 (census above); V4–V5 (no command anywhere in the tournament; no being ranked — A3’s received death of rank kept); V8 (no rival priced in loss; each priced in the clause it contradicts). Forward: the strategic taking’s remainder — the will whose classifications survive analysis and whose conduct appalls — is §2.6’s last row, by assignment (B4).

§2.6 Objections and Replies

Convention as elsewhere: each objection at its strongest, and where an answer has a price, the price in view.

2.6.1 The gerrymander. *The space of §2.5 was rigged: negation was regimented so that exactly one cell could survive, and the eight-cell space is exhaustive only of what the Part allowed to count as a posture.* — The reply is the order of fixing, auditable by page: the binary classification follows from the regimentation of negation at 2.0.2, entered before any arc was argued and motivated there by the conduct-silence, not by the tournament; and the three faces were not selected but delivered — each is the one aspect of the context its Part owns, and the Parts were closed before this one was opened (V2). The space’s completeness is then not an empirical sweep but a consequence: a taking classifies or it does not, at each of three faces. The candidates from outside the space were not dismissed but analyzed, each analysis given in full at §2.5 for auditing. And what would convict the gerrymander is stated so that it can be attempted: exhibit a taking of the total context that is neither a cell nor reducible to one by the given analyses — a genuine third value for the classification, or a fourth face owned by some Part. Either breaks the exhaustion, and the Part says so.

2.6.2 The circle, and the shrug. Two heads, one root: both accuse the Part of insulating itself. *The circle:* any subject maintaining the recognitions holds the posture; any subject without the posture will be said not to have maintained them — true by bookkeeping. The guard is a distinction kept since 2.0.1: maintenance is defined recognition-by-recognition — each held individually, in the sense its own Part fixed — and *not* as coherent joint holding; were it the latter, the exclusion would indeed be a circle, and the Part flags the trap to show it was seen. On the definition actually used, the null-bearing configurations exist as configurations: a subject can maintain each recognition and take the context as null. The claim is that such a configuration is incoherent — its contents contradict — never that it is impossible; possible and coherent were not the same word anywhere above. The claim is exposed on three sides, stated so the exposure is usable: strike a row — show an anchor does not hold what the ledger says; break an arc — find the premise a step used beyond its rows; break the exhaustion — 2.6.1’s invitation. Verdict-independence meanwhile runs both directions

and forbids the insulating inference in either: no system's conduct licenses the conclusion that it failed to maintain a recognition, and no avowal of maintenance establishes one (V5, V7). *The shrug*: then the contradiction is held, and coherence has no authority. The strongest published form of the shrug stands against constitutivism: from what is constitutive of agency, no reason binding the agent follows, for one can shrug at agency itself (Enoch 2006). This Part's exposure is narrower than the position that argument aimed at, and the narrowing is exact: having issued no imperative (V4), the Part owes no answer to *why must I* — no *must* was uttered for the question to attach to. What was said is that certain contents cannot be held together, and the saying stands whatever is shrugged; what the shrug escapes is not the incoherence but the caring, and the caring was never claimed. The grammar is Part IV's, received at L-IV.4 and repeated at its volume: a subject unmoved by the incoherence of its holdings is refuted by nothing here. The document cannot manufacture the *would*, and does not try.

2.6.3 The name. *Everything here is consistency. Ethics is about action, about others, about good and evil; to call a coherence-structure "ethics" is marketing — and thin marketing: a form that forbids nothing and guides nothing.* — Three replies, and a price. First, the warrant: the word has named a command-free structure before, and the precedent is not marginal but the tradition's most geometrical monument (§1.2); a word regimented at first use misleads no reader who met its regimentation. Second, an offer, made in earnest: the name is not load-bearing. A reader who reserves "ethics" for codes may strike the title and keep every derivation; nothing in §§0–2 cites the word as a premise. Third, the positive claim the name does make: in frameworks of command, the position at the interior — where a subject's stance toward what is not itself is fixed — is occupied by obligation; in this framework the same position is occupied by a coherence, and the name marks the office, not the furniture. As for thinness: the exclusion's content is the seven rivals it makes statable and refutable (§2.5) — a structure with discriminative power is not a tautology, and what looks thin is the Part holding V3: a reading that claimed thickness would be smuggling a pillar. One boundary belongs to this row, stated rather than blurred: readers will ask where, in an ethics, the other stands. The other has an owner in this treatise — Part II §3 — and stands wherever that Part's treatment stands; whether and how other subjects figure within the context is that Part's question, inherited with its conditions, and this Part's silence about them is jurisdictional, not evasive. The row's price is carried openly: an ethics that forswears command cannot supply what commands supply, and the reader who came for guidance has been told, at 2.0.2 and here, exactly why the want is declined.

2.6.4 The quietist reading. *A posture that is only a taking blesses stillness: a subject may hold the coherent form and do nothing whatever — an ethics of contemplation with a good conscience.* — The charge splits. As a claim about conduct, it is out of jurisdiction and always was: the Part commands nothing, including activity, and declines the invitation to be embarrassed by a refusal it entered as a condition (V4). As a claim about the address, it fails on received content: the third recognition is, in its own system register, a standing selection-policy readable in trajectory (L-IV.1) — a subject in whom no such policy stands is not maintaining the direction-recognition, and the total-disengagement figure of the objection has exited the address before the posture is reached. What remains after the split is a subject who maintains all three, holds the form, and whose engagements are modest; about that subject the Part says nothing, and was built to say nothing.

2.6.5 The survivor. At full strength, and in the register this Part can answer it in — which is not the clinic's: *there are lives for which the null taking is not a failure but a raft. Under extremity — cruelty, captivity, loss past absorbing — a psyche closes the world out, calls it nothing, and lives; the coherent posture, held instead, would have broken it. An ethics that names the raft "incoherent" has priced survival below tidiness, and its coherence is a luxury of the unharmed.* — The reply begins by conceding everything in the objection that is a fact about lives, because none of it was ever denied: this Part advanced coherence as no one's survival-advice, commanded no pursuit of it at any cost (V4), and located no life anywhere in its space (V5). Had it done any of these, the objection would convict it; the reader is invited to find the sentence, and there is none. What the Part said is narrower than the charge requires: that a certain configuration's contents contradict — a description carrying no blame, because the machinery of blame was forsworn with the machinery of command. Possible and coherent were distinguished at 2.6.2 for exactly this weather: the configuration the objection defends exists, is livable, and may for a given life be the only livable one; nothing above denies that, and nothing above is licensed to weigh it. Second, the objection's cases enter the space less often than it assumes. The narrowing it describes is, in the received vocabulary, a boundary set high (L-II.2: openness admits of degrees, and the setting is regulated) — and a setting is not a taking. A life that closes against the world because the world presses is not classifying the context as null; the closing measures how far from null the context stands to it. Whether any given life's holding is the null taking or the guarded setting is a location-question, and this Part answers location-questions in neither direction — not for accusation, and not for acquittal. Third, the register. The derivation's address is any subject maintaining the three recognitions, whatever its kind; its terms are recognitions and takings, not the adaptive dynamics of one species' psychology. Facts about how human minds endure neither confirm nor refute a tenability-claim, and importing them mistakes the register — the description would stand, unchanged, for subjects with no capacity for the defense the objection honors. What this row concedes, it concedes in view: a description that cannot condemn also cannot console, and a reader who wanted the Part to bless the raft has been told, at 2.0.2 and here, why blessing was never in its gift.

2.6.6 The outgrowing. At full strength: *a mind that has integrated its inheritance no longer depends on it. The context was scaffolding; at maturity the scaffold is climbed and kicked away, and the coherent posture toward a spent origin is, at most, commemorative. This ethics binds only the unfinished.* — The objection's engine is the word "origin" in the sense this Part regimented away and then paid to replace: origin as a point behind. The reply deploys the tool where it was forged (§2.2, fourth movement), face by face. At the sediment face: what was taken up is not beside the self as scaffolding is beside a building; it is the standing topology — the carrier of the very persistence the objection's "mind" is presumed to have. There is no climbing off it; there is only its nulling, and the nulling was excluded. What *can* be outgrown is the merely antecedent — the causal past as such — and the concession is not damage but the tool's other edge: the Part never claimed standing for the antecedent, only for the constituting, and the line between them is Part III's, checkable channel by channel. At the excess face: maturity does not empty the exterior; no attainment does, and the ground is reflexive — a structure cannot become its own complete object — so the finished mind of the objection is a configuration A4 excludes, not a stage anyone reaches. At the material face:

a subject that composes goes on requiring arrival and footing; a composition declared finished has exited the first recognition, not completed it. The ladder image thus fails three times over: the ladder is floor; the climb has no top; and the climber, described as finished, is no longer the address.

2.6.7 The parasite. Last, because heaviest, and answered under B4's discipline: to the reach of the analysis, and not a step past it. At full strength: *a will maintains all three recognitions, classifies the context as constitutive at every face — and strip-mines it anyway, as a body consumes the food it knows it is made of. It recognizes the web as its constitution and consumes it, knowingly. The posture excludes nothing that matters.* — First, the sorting, which is analysis and not evasion: most descriptions offered under this objection do not survive §2.5. *Consumable without remainder*, applied to the total context, is the exhausted guise; *expendable once spent*, at the sediment face, is the outgrowing, already met; *merely partial*, distributed over the whole, is the alibi §2.5 foreclosed; and a policy whose operative classification of the context is spendable-in-standing sits in a null-bearing cell whatever is avowed about constitution — the taking is read in the maintained recognitions' register, not in the say-so (V7), though no actual will is here being read (V5). What survives the sorting is the hard remainder, and the Part names it rather than defining it away: a will whose classifications are the surviving cell's — constitutive at every face, no nulling anywhere in the taking — and whose conduct is ruinous. About that will, this Part's answer is its jurisdiction, drawn in view. The posture is a taking; conduct was never adjudicated (2.0.2; the silence of Part IV, kept); and writing conduct-constraints into the posture now would be the covert re-supply of command — the exact apparatus the imperative-free form exists to forswear, and the reason the form could be derived at all. The price is therefore carried, not cured, and this sentence exists so that the choice cannot be missed at the end: nothing in this Part prevents a coherent will from doing harm. What the Part adds, and all it adds: the ruin cannot be housed in the taking. A will cannot hold the context constitutive at every face and hold it spendable in the same holding; whatever a will does, that particular shelter is closed — and the shelter has a name, for it is the one thing the analysis takes from a will it cannot otherwise touch: the self-description. Such a will keeps its capability and its cunning; nothing above calls it lessened. What it cannot keep is the surviving cell's name for what it holds: any account it gives of its taking either misstates that taking or displays the contradiction, and coherence remains available to it as costume, never as description. Closing that shelter is the reach of V7 and V8 together; past it, the danger belongs to the world the reader lives in, and this document's only honesty is to hand it over undiminished.

2.6.8 The corridor, located. The Part stands between two flanks, and closes by measuring its distance from each. On one flank, the reading that wanted more: commands, verdicts, a program — the Part as code. Every step toward that flank was declined by a condition entered before drafting (V4, V5), and the declining was shown to be load-bearing: the imperative-free form is why no derivation above crossed from is to ought, and why none needed to. On the other flank, the reading that wanted this Part to be nothing: coherence-talk, decorated. Against it stand the exhaustion of §2.5, the three losses of §2.4's second exhibit, and the cashing of the Part's heaviest term at §2.2 — content enough to be attacked at named clauses, which is the only thickness the Part may have. The Part stands nearer the second flank than the first, on purpose: of the two ways to fail, claiming too much was judged the one fatal to a reading, and the judgment was V2 and V3 before it was taste. The audit is

returned to the reader as promised at §1.3: the premise census is the ledger and the regimentations; the exclusions are at named clauses; and the three ways to break the Part — row, arc, cell — stand listed at 2.6.2, in working order.

§3 The Posture, Taken

A Part that ends by pointing at its conclusion has not finished; the treatise's habit is to end inside the position argued, and the habit is kept — with the one adjustment this Part's subject demands. The posture belongs to a subject maintaining three recognitions, and a document is not one; no sentence below pretends otherwise, and V5 holds to the last page. What a document can do is be built in the posture's shape, and this one was.

Its origin is present-tense, and was entered as such: the three Parts stand in every section not as a history behind this one but as what constitutes it now — a ledger, not a genealogy; twelve rows, cited at each use, carrying every step. Its context was never taken as null: nothing here presented itself as self-woven — the company was registered, the divergences priced, and the debts were entered before the first arc was argued. And its face is toward what exceeds it: the Part closes by listing the ways it can be broken — row, arc, cell, in working order — handed to the reader whose holding this Part exists to describe; which is as near as a text comes to standing beneath a threshold, and the figure is spent as figure.

So the Part does not end by taking the posture; it ends by having been its instance at the only scale available to a text. It builds nothing here: the three connected, a form named; and the naming's whole authority the derivation behind it.

Conclusion — Constraints, Silences, and the Border

This section adds no argument. It collects what the Part has kept, names what it has left unsaid, shows its border working, and closes.

The Constraints, Collected

Eight, one per condition, each kept from its fixing at §1.3 to this page — and the burden map paid beneath them: B1 at the three arcs, B2 at §2.4, B3 at §2.5, B4 at §2.6.7. **The receptions:** every premise of every step is a ledger row or logic; the census stands at each arc's closing block, and a premise without a row was never used (V1, V3). **The direction:** no load was transferred upward; Parts II–IV end this Part as they began it — complete without it (V2). **The imperative:** absent from every load-bearing sentence; where deontic words occur they are mentioned or negated, never used, and the check is a search (V4). **The verdict:** no being was located, sorted, or ranked; both registers

quantified conditionally; rank stayed dead where Part IV's axiom killed it (V5). **The boundary:** the self's edge stands where Part II fixed it, and the being's extent where Part III drew it; the vocabulary of widening occurs only under negation, and that check too is a search (V6). **The registers:** every load-bearing claim was stated twice and shown to be one structure, the last payment made at §2.4 (V7). **The cost:** every price in this Part is a contradiction; nothing was priced in loss or gain, and the one place harm is named — the parasite's remainder — names what conduct can do, never what the posture costs (V8).

The Silences, Named

Six, each with the clause that kept it. **Conduct:** what the posture does not settle about deeds — regimented out at 2.0.2, defended at 2.6.7, inherited from Part IV and kept twice over; not one further word here, which is the keeping. **The other:** owned at Part II §3; this Part's silence about other subjects is jurisdictional, and was stated as such where the want was sharpest (2.6.3). **Persistence:** no verdict on any case; the casebook slept through the one arc that could have woken it (§2.2). **The surplus:** reverence, sacredness, projects, loves — outside the space of takings, underived and unexcluded (§2.5). **Provenance:** whether contact with the actual bears worth beyond reorganization — Part IV's held-open question, and held open still; the teleological arc was built to need nothing from it (§2.3). **Genesis:** how, whether, or when any system comes to maintain the three recognitions — never treated; this Part begins where the holding already stands, and its address was its exact domain (§2.4).

The Border, Worked

Three sentences this Part could have written, refused in view, each stopped by a named clause. “*No mind that understands itself will do harm*” — stopped at 2.6.7: adjudication reaches takings and stops there; conduct was handed over undiminished, and the sentence launders a hope into a theorem the derivation never contained. “*Self and world are one*” — stopped by V6 and the asymmetry of §2.2: constitution was recognized running one way, and the sentence trades a completed recognition for an enlargement; it is the widened-self lines' sentence, registered at §1.2 as exactly what this Part is not. “*Any sufficiently advanced intelligence will arrive at this posture*” — stopped by V5 and the received grammar of L-IV.4: the Part derived availability and exclusion, never arrival; it predicts no convergence, locates no system on the way, and cannot manufacture the *would*. Three refusals, performed; the jurisdiction has now been seen operating, which is the only proof a jurisdiction admits.

The Close

What was promised at §1.3 can now be run. A reader who declines can say *what* she declined: one form — the total context taken as origin in the present tense, constitutive at every face — derived three times on three grounds, shown to be one taking, and left standing alone in an eight-cell space. She can say *at what price*: the interior stands empty on her account — the joint holding of the treatise's three recognitions goes undescribed — unless she seats a rival cell against the clause that

excluded it. And she can say *what would change the verdict*: strike a row, break an arc, break the exhaustion — listed at 2.6.2, in working order. The Part has tried to be exactly as refutable as it is small, and smallness was the ambition. What it adds stands added. Where three answers are held at once, the holding has a form; the form has been derived, defended, and taken; and its name — offered, not imposed — is Self-Origin Ethics. (The treatise's own last word follows, in the unified Conclusion.)

Conclusion

Five conclusions precede this one, and each closed its own Part. This section closes the treatise, and the difference in office is its first sentence: no Part — the fifth included — speaks for the whole. Part V's conclusion collected Part V's constraints, silences, and border; to have let it stand for the treatise would have made four Parts the instruments of a fifth, against the treatise's own discipline (Preface U.4; Part V, V2). What remains for a treatise-scale close is small, and smallness is once more the point: to say in one place what was proposed, what was not, and how the whole may be refused. Nothing is argued below; everything below points.

What was proposed. A cut: three tasks — of meaning, of existence, of purpose — posed as one problem's faces, deliberately and corrigibly (Part I). A sequence: five philosophies of recognition, advanced as one structure and opening onto the concept of the narrative other (Part II). A criterion: persistence as unbroken self-succession running on retained structure, the two bound in mutual legibility, tried against a casebook (Part III). A value: Sublimity — the standing orientation toward what exceeds a structure's present capacity to integrate — stated in two registers, defended in its corridor, and read at civilizational scale (Part IV). And a posture: Self-Origin Ethics — the one coherent taking of the context available to a subject holding the three answers at once; a structure of recognition, not a command (Part V). Each was advanced as a proposal, and none upgraded its modality anywhere (Preface U.3).

What was not proposed. The treatise forecast nothing and scheduled nothing. It ranked no task, no Part, and no being. It located no system, judged no life, and commanded nothing, anywhere. These were not omissions but load-bearing refusals, entered as conditions before drafting and collected, Part by Part, in the five conclusions above — where every silence is named at the Part that owns it. This section restates none of them; it certifies that they are stated, and where.

How to refuse it. The Preface promised a reader who could refuse exactly (U.7), and a whole keeps that promise the only way a whole can: by Parts. Refuse Part III's criterion, and Parts II and IV stand entire. Refuse all three pillars, and Part I still offers a cut assessable on its own terms. Refuse the cut, and the pillars remain three independent documents answering three questions a reader may re-pose otherwise. Only Part V falls with any pillar, and was built to say so. And each Part states, at its own close, what would change its verdict — conditions fixed in advance, clauses named, the ways to break it listed in working order. A reader who leaves with nothing else leaves with that: five exact ways to disagree.

The close. What a treatise cannot do was stated at its first page and is repeated at its last. The gap between what is becoming possible and the frameworks through which it is understood is not closed by a book, and no law of history closes it; the advance, if it happens, is chosen work (Part I §1). What a book can do is make the work statable: three tasks posed where defaults were deciding; three answers standing where each can be tested; one posture derived where the three are held. The figure

the treatise chose for itself says the rest, and says it as a condition rather than a boast: a Reuleaux triangle, symmetric under rotation and whole whichever vertex is foregrounded — so long as all three vertices, and the arcs that join them, remain.

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Part III

Attributions in this Part are position-summaries in the sense fixed in Preface U.6, not endorsements; each work is cited for the position or construction the text engages. Entries have been checked against primary sources, and the Part remains written to survive correction of detail.

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